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INTRODUCTION

Investing in the United States has become a hobby for many.1 In
dividual ownership of equity, moreover, has increased over the past
decade due in part to the introduction of internet-based trading.2
While providing the possibility for greater returns compared with
bank savings accounts, among other investment alternatives, the pub
lic capital markets also pose greater risks for investors.3 Many individ
ual investors lack both the resources and the incentive to analyze the
value of any particular security in the market. Such investors thus
trade at a systematic disadvantage relative to more informed parties.
In response, regulators have asserted that certain informational dis
parities cause uninformed investors to lose confidence in the market,
thereby justifying stringent regulation.4 This Article analyzes the im
pact of information advantages in the market and proposes a unified
approach to regulating such advantages.
Informational disparities in the market arise from a number of dif
ferent sources. An individual investor may contemplate a trade in a
particular publicly traded company. Call the company whose securi
ties are being traded the "traded firm". In a world without regulatory
prohibitions, individual investors first face the possibility that the
traded firm itself will provide nonpublic material information to only a
subset of investors in the market. Insiders at the traded firm, for ex
ample, may enjoy preferential access to confidential information
about the company's business prospects and expansion plans, among
1. In recent years, a number of news reports have surfaced detailing the exuberance
individual investors have brought to the stock market. The Boston Globe, for example, ran
a story in early 2000 detailing the stock market zeal of a group of taxi cab drivers working
for Town Taxi. See Benjamin Wallace-Wells, He Dispatches Cabs - And Stock Market
Tips, BOSTON G LOBE, Mar. 21, 2000, at Al.
2. See Investment Company Institute and Securities Industry Association, Equity Own
ership In America 1 (Fall 1999), available at http:/lwww.ici.org/pdf/rpt_equity_
owners.pdf. The Investment Company Institute and the Securities Industry Association re
ported that the number of Americans owning stocks either directly or through a mutual
fund increased from 42.4 million in 1983 to 78.7 million in 1999 (accounting for a 85.6 per
cent increase). See id. During the midst of the 1990s bull stock market, stock market in
vestments accounted for forty percent of the average American family's net worth. See
Kirstie Hamilton & Garth Alexander, Summertime Blues, SUNDAY TIMES, Aug. 9, 1998,
§ 3, at 8.
3. For example, the historical return on equity from 1926 to 1994 averaged 10.3% per
year. See, e.g., Lynn Asinof, Weekend Report: Check the Past When Investing for the Future,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 1994, at Ct. In contrast, the present average passbook savings annual
interest rate is below 3%. See Thomas A. Fogarty, A verage Tax Refund Keeps Growing, But
Should It?, USA TODAY, Apr. 13, 2001, at lB (noting that the present passbook savings
rate is about 2.5%).
4. See Jeffrey M. Laderman et al., The Epidemic of Insider Trading, BUS. WK., Apr. 29,
1995, at 78 (quoting SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt as stating "[i]f the investor thinks he's not
getting a fair shake, he's not going to invest, and that is going to hurt capital investment in
the long run").
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other things. Insiders may then exploit this information t o profit from
trades in the market at the expense of outside investors. The traded
firm may also provide internal information to outside investors selec
tively; for example, giving nonpublic material information solely to a
group of analysts that regularly follow the firm.5
Several sources of information advantage may also originate out
side the traded firm. Market professionals command far more re
sources than any one individual investor.6 Through their resource and
expertise advantage, market professionals may determine more accu
rately whether the market price over or undervalues the traded firm's
securities. An analyst, for example, may use its knowledge about the
general economy, the industry sector, the movement of oil prices, and
the political situation in the company's various worldwide markets, in
combination with the securities filings information to estimate the
company's overall value. Non-market professionals may also possess
an information advantage with respect to the traded firm. Industry
regulators about to impose new regulations on a particular company
may possess nonpublic information pertaining to the new regulations
material to the valuation of the company.7 Newspaper reporters may
possess material, nonpublic information obtained from their employ
ment relevant to the valuation of a particular company.8 Companies
that interact with the traded firm, including suppliers; customers, and
5. Recently, the SEC moved to curtail the ability of firms to inake disclosures selec
tively to capital market participants under the newly promulgated Regulation FD. See Se
lective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. § 243.100-.103) (hereinafter SEC, Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading].
See infra Section III.C (discussing Regulation FD); see also Stephen J. Choi, Selective Dis
closures in the Public Capital Markets, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 533 (2002) (providing an
analysis of Regulation FD); Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading,
Markets, and "Negative" Property Rights in Information, 87 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1268-73
(2001) (noting that selective disclosures may play a role in compensating specific analysts
for providing the firm with monitoring of management, liquidity, and enhanced price effi
ciency).
6. Boston-based Fidelity Investments, for example, has nearly $900 billion of managed
assets. See Fidelity Investments Introducing Two New Stock Funds, Bus. WIRE, Dec. 21,
2000, available at Westlaw 12/21/00 Bus. Wire 10:59:00. Fidelity's large amount of managed
assets allows Fidelity to spread the fixed costs of investment research, resulting in a lower
per managed asset dollar research cost.
7. Elton "Butch" Bryan, the former Director of the West Virginia Lottery, for example,
used his influence to ensure that Video Lottery Consultants would be selected as the sole
manufacturer of video lottery machines for a planned expansion of such machines through
out West Virginia. Shortly after the decision to select Video Lottery Consultants, but before
the public announcement of the selection, Bryan purchased 300 shares of Video Lottery
Consultants stock. See United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 937-39 (4th Cir. 1 995).
8. R. Foster Winans, for example, was one of the writers of the Wall Street Journal's
" Heard on the Street" column. Winans entered into a scheme with two brokers to provide
information from the newspaper column on particular companies prior to publication.
Based on the information, the two brokers then either purchased or sold securities in the
featured companies. The net profits from the scheme totaled almost $690,000. See United
States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1026-27 (2d Cir. 1986).
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competitors, may also possess nonpublic information material to the
valuation of the traded firm's securities.9 For example, a biotech firm
which knows it has just patented a particular gene may have a profit
able opportunity to trade its rivals' shares short.10
In response to the potential harm uninformed investors face from
informational disparities in the market, U.S. regulators have focused
on the use of information in the public capital markets. The insider
trading prohibitions under Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 ("Exchange Act") generally permit trading on the basis of de
liberately acquired information advantages (which other market par
ticipants also had the opportunity to acquire).1 1 Conversely, the securi
ties laws often - although not uniformly - prohibit individuals from
trading on information that is casually acquired through an investor's
fiduciary position or privilege and not from a source readily available
to all investors.12 Insiders, for example, are prohibited from engaging
in trades based on nonpublic material information casually acquired
from the insiders' privileged fiduciary relationship with their own
company.13 Under the misappropriation doctrine, fiduciaries of an
9. See Ian Ayres & Joseph Bankman, Substitutes for Insider Trading, 54 STAN. L. REV.
235, 241-42 (2001); Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider
Trading Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 1 79, 216-17 (1991) (noting that present insider trading
prohibitions allow suppliers among other outside parties to trade on the securities of a firm
based on confidential information obtained from the relationship).
10. Through short sales, an investor may sell shares that it does not own. To execute a
short sale, the investor first borrows shares typically from a securities broker. The investor
then sells the shares at the prevailing market price, promising to purchase shares in the fu
ture to repay the securities broker. Where the share price drops in value from the time of
the initial sale to the time of the repurchase, the investor profits from the short sales.
1 1 . Rule 1 Ob-5 was promulgated under § 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See
Securities Exchange Act of 1 934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (2000).
1 2. Note that casually acquired information does not implicate the federal insider
trading prohibitions absent a pre-existing fiduciary relationship. See, e.g., SEC v. Switzer.
590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1 984) (analyzing incident where Barry Switzer, at the time the
University of Oklahoma football coach, overheard a conversation revealing nonpublic in
formation and then traded based upon the information); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Incorporating State law Fiduciary law Diiiies into the Federal Insider Trading Prohibition,
52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1 200-01 (1995) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Incorporating State
law] (arguing that the relevant fiduciary duty for insider trading liability is the "duty to re
frain from self-dealing in nonpublic information"). For a discussion of the concept of casu
ally acquired information, see Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and
the law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 13, 18 (1978) (arguing that contract cases provide
greater protection from the duty to disclose to "deliberately acquired information" com
pared with "casually acquired information"). Insiders of a corporation, for example, face a
disclose or abstain duty when trading based on nonpublic material information obtained
through their position as insiders of the corporation. See infra note 71 (discussing the dis
close or abstain duty placed on corporate insiders).
13. For example, Ken Lay has notoriously been investigated for selling his Enron stock
just before the company's collapse. See, e.g., http://www.enronfraud.com/insider.html (last
visited Aug. 24, 2002); see also Section lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 78
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000); Rule lOb-5, 1 7 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (2001 ). For a description of the
application of insider trading prohibitions to actual corporate insiders, see A.C. Pritchard,
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outside source cannot free-ride on the source's effort by trading with
out the source's consent (or at least knowledge).14
Commentators have put forth several theories that justify (at least
in part) the present securities law's focus on the source of the informa
tion and whether a trader acquires her information through deliberate
hard work or casually through a fiduciary duty breach. Under one
prominent theory, individuals should not be able to trade on casually
acquired, "unerodable" information advantages.15 Trades based on
unerodable information, under this theory, reduce the confidence of
uninformed investors and the willingness of such investors to put
money into the capital markets.16 Information obtained by outsider
traders is erodable (and therefore tradeable) because any person had

United States v. O'Hagan: Agency Law and Justice Powell's Legacy for the Law of Insider
Trading, 78 B.U. L. REV. 13, 18-30 (1998).
14. The misappropriation theory originated with Chief Justice Burger's dissent in
United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 240 {1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Burger wrote
that "a person who has misappropriated nonpublic information has an absolute duty to dis
close that information or to refrain from trading." Id. at 240. Burger argued that persons
trading on misappropriated information engage in "conduct [that] quite clearly serves no
useful function except [their] own enrichment at the expense of others." Id. at 241. For a
discussion of the misappropriation theory of insider trading liability, see infra Section Ill.A.
Recently, for example, Merrill Lynch barred its analysts from purchasing shares of compa
nies on which they provide coverage. See Gretchen Morgenson, Brokerage Puts Limits on
Stock Analysts, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2001, at Al (noting that the ban will cover 600 Merrill
Lynch analysts worldwide but stating that it "fails to address the most significant area of
conflict: the role that rhapsodic research reports can play in supporting the firm's lucrative
investment banking business or in attracting new deals").
15. See Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Information Advantages Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 354 (1 979) ("[T]he essential . . . element
which makes an information advantage unusable by those who possess it in dealing with
those who do not is the inability of the latter to overcome it lawfully, no matter how great
may be their diligence or large their resources."); see also Pritchard, supra note 1 3, at 51
{"By limiting the misappropriation theory to information obtained in breach of a duty, the
common law of agency protects individuals who have gained their information advantage
through superior insight or hard work.").
Brudney adds a gloss to his definition of an unerodable advantage, arguing that
unerodable information advantages are "not generally accumulated for use by its possessor
in personal trading in securities . . . and therefore the incentive for personal gains from
trading is not necessary to induce those few to pursue it." Brudney, supra, at 356. Analysts,
nevertheless, with superior information and skill that generate proprietary information en
joy an unerodable advantage directly acquired with a view to trading profits. In response,
Brudney narrows the scope of unerodable information advantages to cover primarily
"unerodable information advantage[s] generally acquired for nontrading purposes . . . . " Id.
at 360-6 1 . Brudney writes further that "there may nevertheless be systematic inequality of
lawful access to information by reason of disparities among individual investors with respect
to power, wealth, diligence, or intelligence. The values of efficiency in pricing and resource
allocation served by encouraging pursuit of information about the worth of securities are
diluted, if not destroyed, by a rule purporting to offset those disparities by requiring univer
sal sharing of information." Id. at 360.
16. See Brudney, supra note 15, at 356 ("A rational buyer (or seller) in a market, who
knows that the person with whom he is dealing has material information about the value of
the product being exchanged which he could not lawfully acquire, will either refrain from
dealing with the transactor or demand a risk premium.").
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the opportunity to invest the effort in uncovering the valuable infor
mation.17 We are all on a level information playing field when it comes
to unearthing erodable pieces of information, and market competition
will mean that advantages based on such information will quickly
erode as the information is incorporated into the stock price. In con
trast, in a world where markets are not strong form efficient,18 outsid
ers do not have an opportunity to erode the information advantage of
insiders with superior information. Explicitly referring to the need to
stem "unerodable information advantages," the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") designed Regulation FD to curtail
the ability of companies to provide nonpublic material information
selectively to favored outside investors and market professionals.19
Stock analysts can trade on information that they work to obtain, but
the rules work to stop analyst trading on the basis of information that
is bestowed on them by the firm itself. The recently promulgated SEC

17. See id. at 341. Brudney's theory of unerodable information advantages is similar but
not identical to the parity-of-information theory initially espoused by the Second Circuit.
The parity-of-information theory requires that all investors have access to the same infor
mation. Under the parity-of-information theory, an investor must either abstain from trad
ing or disclose any material information known only to the investor but not to the public
market. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that
Rule IOb-5 "is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace
that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material
information"); see also Joel Seligman, The Reformulation of Federal Securities Law Con
cerning Nonpublic Information, 73 GEO. L.J. 1083 (1985) (advocating a parity-of
information approach). The Supreme Court later rejected the parity-of-information theory
in United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 234-35. In contrast, Brudney's unerodable advan
tages theory would allow outside investors who obtain a nonpublic material advantage
through their own hard work and not through position or privilege to profit from such in
formation. See Brudney, supra note 15, at 341; Joel Seligman, A Malllre Synthesis: O'Hagan
Resolves "Insider" Trading's Most Vexing Problems, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 4, 5 n.27 (1 998).
18. Several versions of the efficient market hypothesis exist. The strong form of the hy
pothesis holds that all information, whether public or nonpublic, is incorporated in the sec
ondary market securities price. The semistrong version of the efficient capital markets hy
pothesis in turn posits that the secondary market price of companies reflects all publicly
available information on the company. In contrast, the weak form version of market effi
ciency posits only that the market price reflects all prior price information. See Eugene F.
Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383
(1970) (providing a survey of theoretical implications of efficient markets and empirical
testing of the efficient markets hypothesis); see also Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital
Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud in the Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 907, 911, 912
n.11 ("The empirical evidence to date (with some exceptions) appears to establish the va
lidity of the weak and semistrong but not the strong form of the efficient capital markets
hypothesis."). Unless otherwise specified, this Article utilizes the term "efficient market" to
refer to a trading market that displays features of a semistrong efficient market.
19. See SEC, Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, supra note 5, at 51,716 (stating
that "selective disclosure has an adverse impact on market integrity that is similar to the
adverse impact from illegal insider trading: Investors lose confidence in the fa irness of the
markets when they know that other participants may exploit 'unerodable information ad
vantages' derived not from hard work or insights, but from their access to corporate insid
ers"). For a view critical of the confidence in the market argument, see Bainbridge, Incor
porating Swte Law, supra note 12, at 1241 -45.
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rules under Regulation F D also resonate with the Lockean notion of
desert under which a person enjoys a natural right to the results of her
labor.20
This Article comes to bury the concept of unerodable advantage as
the basis for regulating informationally driven trades.21 The distinction
between erodable and unerodable advantages is to our minds un
workable in practice,22 but more importantly, it is not sufficiently con20. See JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise § 27, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
(Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1970) (1690) [hereinafter LOCKE, The Second
Treatise § 27, in Two TREATISES):
Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a
property in his own person; this, nobody has any right to but himself. The labour of his
body and the work of his hands we may say are properly his. Whatsoever, then, he removes
out of the state that nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and
joined to it something that is his own. and thereby makes it his property. It being by him
removed from the common state nature placed it in, it hath by this labour something an
nexed to it that excludes the common right of other men. For this labour being the unques
tionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once
joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others.
Id. The Lockean notion of just deserts is used frequently in the intellectual property litera
ture. See Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism
in the Natural Law ofIntellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993).
·

21. Commentators have also advanced the theory that the insider trading prohibitions
should work to protect the property rights of those that invest in creating information. See
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice Between
Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L. REV. 1589 (1999) [hereinafter Bainbridge,
Insider Trading Regulation] (propounding a property rights rationale to justify the misap
propriation theory of insider trading). And the law, by prohibiting agent trading, protects
the principal's property in the information from being eroded - thus enhancing the princi
pal's incentive to expend effort to unearth the information in the first place.
Other a pproaches to insider trading exist. None, however, as a positive matter explains
present insider trading doctrine as well as the unerodable advantage or property rights
theories. See supra note 17 (discussing the parity-of-information theory); see also Fisch,
supra note 9, at 184 (arguing that insider trading liability should focus on insider "status"
rather than on the presence of fiduciary duties); Roberta S. Karmel, Outsider Trading on
Confidential Information - A Breach in Search of a Duty, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 83 (1998)
(advocating that insider trading prohibitions exist to complement mandatory disclosure re
quirements imposed under the securities laws); Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Prin
ciple in the Law of Insider Trading, 78 TEXAS L. REV. 375 (l999) (providing a moral argu
ment against insider trading). In providing a unified framework to assess the merits of
informational advantages in the securities markets, we assess and ultimately reject these
approaches as well. See infra Part III.
22. Many forms of unerodable information advantages exist unregulated in the market
today. Insiders in rivals firms are free to trade with impunity on the stock of a competitor
even though their informational disparity was casually acquired and even though other
market participants did not have a credible opportunity independently to acquire the infor
mation. See Ayres & Bankman, supra note 9, at 24. And an investor with particularly good
investment acumen will always enjoy a trading advantage over investors without such ex
pertise. Larger, more professional investors will always enjoy a resource advantage over
smaller investors who make only insignificant investments in the capital markets. Smaller,
individual investors will never find it feasible to overcome such advantages. Frank
Easterbrook originally made the observation that all information advantages require some
amount of costly expenditures. B ecause investors vary in the cost function they face to ob
tain information, due to skill, wealth, and human capital differences, no investors are truly
equal in their access to information. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret
Agents, Evidentiary Privileges and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309,
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nected to either efficiency or equity. Even the use of unerodable in
formation advantages in securities transactions may result in a net so
cial benefit. Managers engaged in insider trading may very well bene
fit from their unerodable advantage at the expense of uninformed
investors. Nevertheless, the use of such insider information may alter
the securities market price, resulting in increased price accuracy.23
Similarly, shareholders may benefit both from the reduced direct
·
compensation necessary to attract the manager as well as from the in
creased incentives to maximize share value that the manager may ex
perience from the ability to engage in insider trading.24 Conversely,
the use of erodable information advantages in securities transactions
may generate a net social loss. Competition between investors to gain
a brief information advantage may create duplicative research costs,
for instance.
This Article instead proposes a common framework to assess all
forms of informational disparities. From a social welfare perspective,
informational disparities have similar impacts. On the one hand, in
formational disparities certainly raise the cost to uninformed traders.
To the extent a trader lacks information, the trader will suffer system
atically reduced returns compared with more informed investors. In
vestors seeking an information advantage as well may expend costly
resources doing so. On the other hand, the same informational dis
parities may generate benefits. The trading losses of uninformed in
vestors translate directly into trading profits for the informed traders.
Trades based on an information advantage will also result in an in
crease in overall securities price accuracy regardless of the source of
the advantage.
Applying the framework, the Article shows that the informed out
sider25 fails to internalize the social impacts of her trading. She
compares her expected profits from informed trading to her expected
costs of acquiring the information - and ignores, inter alia, the

330. Coming from the opposite perspective, Krawiec argues that at some level investors
enjoy access to all information, including even insider information. For example, a person
may work hard to become a corporate officer and then director to obtain even inside infor
mation. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructing
the Coin ofthe Realm in the Information Age, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 443, 478 (2001 ).
23. See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Infor
mation, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 683, 719 (1 980) (arguing that the prohibition against insider
trading has resulted in less efficient securities market prices); Henry G. Manne, Insider
Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547, 565-76 (1970) (contending that in
sider trading increases the accuracy of securities market prices).
24. This Article later discusses the positive impacts on corporate welfare from allowing
insider trading. See text accompanying notes 75-77.
25. See SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 443 (9th Cir. 1990) (defining "outsiders" as "per
sons who are neither insiders of the.companies whose shares are being traded, nor tippees
of such insiders").

·
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impact on stock price accuracy or the costs to the other side (consist
ing of uninformed investors) of the transaction.
Just like a polluter who fails to internalize the social impact of its
pollution, the outsider trader is not well placed to decide whether in
formed trading enhances social welfare. We will argue that outsider
trading can produce externalized costs that the outsider Ignores in de
ciding to trade. Informed outsider trading will predictably increase the
bid-ask spread that shareholders of a traded firm must bear as a trans
action cost of buying and selling their positions. Informed outsider
trading can also distort the decisionmaking of the traded firm. A
traded firm seeking to protect its shareholders from the transfers
worked by informed traders may inefficiently rush the disclosure of
information that would be more beneficially delayed absent the out
sider trading. And more generally, informed trading by taxing the net
profitability of share ownership can dampen the incentives for optimal
decisionmaking. It is well understood that residual claimants - who
capture the marginal profits - are often well placed to control the
firm. But outsider traders capture some of the residual profits
(through trades with more uninformed shareholders) and thereby can
blunt shareholders incentives to maximize firm value.
If anything, a stronger argument therefore exists for the manda
tory regulatio1,1 of outsider trading advantages than for insider trad
ing. 26 Henry Manne's seminal work in the 1960s, for example, recog
nized that traded firms internalize the effects of insider trading upon
their investors.27 Building on that insight, Manne argued that the secu
rities laws should not ban insider trading; he instead contended that
the traded firm would design an insider trading policy that maximized
the value to its own shareholders.28 Compared with the traded firm,
outsider traders do not internalize the impact of their actions on unin
formed investors. Instead of prohibiting insider trading and permitting
outsider trading, Manne could have argued that the law got it just
backward: it might be more efficient for the law presumptively to pro
hibit outsider trading (because outsiders do not internalize many of
the important social costs when deciding whether to trade), but to al
low insiders to trade with the consent of their employers.
Rather than assess the various costs and benefits of engaging in the
mandatory regulation of different forms of informational disparities
directly, this Article adopts a different approach, arguing that regula26. On the other hand, problems with managerial opportunism may loom larger for
insider trading as opposed to outsider trading. We discuss the problem of managerial oppor
tunism with respect to outsider trading in Section IV.A.2. The relative lack of managerial
opportunism related to outsider trading, we argue, provides policymakers with the option of
relying more on the traded firm to internalize the impacts of outsider trading.
27. See HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).
28. Seeid.
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tors ask the wrong question in focusing on whether an information
advantage is unerodable. Regulators should instead pose the question
of which actor should determine what information advantages are al
lowable in the capital markets. Regulators should leave this decision
to market participants that internalize the various social effects of in
formed trading. The task of regulators then becomes assisting market
participants in internalizing the impacts from the creation and use of
informational disparities.
Outsider traders individually fail to internalize all the effects of in
formed trades. One market participant, however, already does inter
nalize many of the impacts from a particular type of information ad
vantage: the traded firm. The present securities law can be viewed as
having two independent facets: (1) permitting outsider trading (based
on an erodable information advantage) and (2) assigning the rights to
control whether outsider trading takes place to the source of the in
formation. This second facet is rarely discussed and in some ways
seems an inevitable implication of the first facet. Only the person with
the information would know that she had a trading opportunity. And
we cannot conceive of a rule that could effectively force an informed
outsider to trade on her information. But it is possible to grant a non
source the right to block such informed trading.29

Indeed, the thesis of this Article is that regulators should allow the
traded firm to block informed trading in its securities. Unlike the cur
rent regime that grants outsiders laissez faire trading rights, our pro
posal reassigns the outsider trading rights to the traded firm itself.30
The traded firm may then (a) generally waive its rights to control in
formed outsider trading, (b) impose restrictions or prohibitions on in
formed outsider trading, (c) sell the right to engage in informed trades
to any market participant(s) of its choosing, or (d) even subsidize out
siders to encourage them to engage in informed trading. Under this
regime, the traded firm, which internalizes many of the costs and
benefits from the outsider traders' decision to engage in information
research, will have an incentive to design the optimal information re
search policy for its own particular situation.
29. In contrast, Goshen and Parchomovsky talk about "negative" property rights in in
formation that they argue the legal regime should grant to insiders at least with regards to
inside information. Under such a negative property rights regime, insiders are denied the
ability to use their inside information to profit from securities trades, thereby providing out
side analysts a greater ability to profit from the analysts' own external research efforts. See
Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 5, at 1266-69. Under Goshen and Parchomovsky's
conception of negative property rights, insiders may not trade with outside analysts to re
lieve the insiders of their negative property right. See id.
30. Following the framework of Wesley Hohfeld, our proposal assigns the right to en
gage in outsider trading to the traded firm. All outside investors then owe a corresponding
duty to the traded firm not to engage in such outsider trading without the permission of the
firm. See, e.g., Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied
in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 1 6, 30 (1913).
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Informed trading that is good for the traded firm is likely to be
good for society - thus our proposal crucially gives the traded firm
control over whether particular types of such trading can go forward.
Granting the traded firm the right to block informed trading is more
efficient than the current regime which gives outsider traders sole dis
cretion whether to trade both because (1) in the absence of Coasean
negotiations,31 the traded firm is better situated to decide whether par
ticular classes of trades are on net socially beneficial, and (2) Coasean
negotiations (which more fully guarantee through mutual consent that
only beneficial trades proceed) become themselves more likely. Re
assigning the trading rights from the owner of the information (the
source) to the traded firm is more likely to facilitate a Coasean trade.
Under the current regime, a traded firm that wanted to limit a certain
class of outsider trading (based on superior information) would need
to identify and negotiate with an amorphous and replenishing class of
potential stock analysts. In contrast, under our proposed regime, it is
much cheaper for potential traders to identify and negotiate with the
firm on which they wish to undertake deliberate research.
It might initially appear to be unfair to reassign to the traded firm
the right to control whether an outsider can trade. It is the outsider's
information after all, and she should be able to do whatever she wants
with it. But this argument does not withstand analysis. The stock ana
lyst may own the information, but mere ownership of information
does not necessarily translate into laissez faire trading rights in some
body else's firm. If Carleton learns that there is gold on Fischel's land,
Carleton may own the information - but he does not perforce have a
right to go onto Fischel's land and start mining. More importantly,
Carleton does not have an unimpeded right to buy Fischel's land on
the cheap. Fischel has the right to demand a representation from
Carleton that the sale is not being motivated by particular kinds of in
formation advantage. We will refer to this as the "Laidlaw right" of
uninformed traders.32 We are so inured to the unrestricted trading of

3 1 . The term "Coasean" refers to Ronald Coase's classic argument that the location of
a legal entitlement does not matter from an efficiency perspective to the extent that affected
parties may costlessly negotiate and reallocate the entitlement, among other conditions. See
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
32. In the well-known contracts case of Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178
(1817), a similar situation arose. Organ possessed information that the signing of the Treaty
of Ghent (ending the war of 1812) would soon raise the B ritish naval blockade, increasing
the value of tobacco among other goods. Organ purchased tobacco from Peter Laidlaw &
Co. Before completing the purchase, an employee of Laidlaw asked "if there was any news
which was calculated to enhance the price or value of the article about to be purchased." Id.
at 183. While Chief Justice Marshall writing for the Supreme Court held that Organ ordi
narily had no duty to disclose the information to Laidlaw because the information was
"equally accessible to both parties," id. at 195, he remanded the case to determine whether
there had been "overreaching," given that Laidlaw had asked the question (and received no
response). Id.
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stock that it is difficult to remember that an organizing firm surely has
an equitable right to set up rules restricting or conditioning the trans
ferability of its securities in ways that accrue to the benefit of its
shareholders.33 And there is evidence in large block trades that unin
formed traders require representations from the other side that they
are not trading on the basis of nonpublic information.34
In crafting a proposal that grants the traded firm an alienable right
to control the extent of informed trading, it is important to specify
clearly the default (that will govern if the traded firm remains silent)
and "opt out" rules (that determine whether the traded firm has pri
vately varied the defa ult class of allowable trades). We propose re
taining the current trading restrictions as defaults. Insiders would be
prohibited from trading on the basis of nonpublic information, but
outsiders as a general matter would - in the absence of a traded firm
opt out - be allowed to trade. However, unlike the current trading
restrictions that tend to be mandatory rules, our focus on internaliza
tion militates toward default rules that would allow the traded firm to
decide whether a particular class of informed trading was beneficial.35
Thus, we would allow a traded firm to opt out of many of the tradi
tional mandatory restrictions against informed trading or opt into ad
ditional restrictions against informed trading by outsiders - even
those who are not in privity with the traded firm - who presump
tively could (and under current law can) trade with impunity.36
A thorough appreciation of internalization thus undermines the
foregoing theory of "unerodable advantage" as a basis for prohibiting
informed trading. Our proffered system of default trading restrictions
(and defa ult trading permissions) would, like the proposals of Manne
and his followers, allow insiders to contract for the right to trade on
the basis of material, nonpublic information. But even if readers pre33. For a discussion of the ability of a firm to impose trading restriction on its own
stock, see infra Section IV.B.2.
34. Conversation with Professor Steve Thel, Fordham Law School in New York, N.Y.
(Feb. 8, 2002).
35. Note that trading restrictions placed on outsiders under the misappropriation the
ory of insider trading are not necessarily immutable. Because the misappropriation theory
depends on a breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the source of the information, the source in
theory could shield outsiders from insider trading liability simply by sanctioning such trades.
Indeed, the Supreme Court in O 'Hagan indicated that the mere disclosure on the part of an
outsider trader to the source that she will engage in trades based on the source's informa
tion eliminates deception and therefore the possibility of insider trading liability even where
the source does not condone such trades. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 643, 655
(1 997).
36. Present mandatory restrictions against informed outsider trading include the mis
appropriation theory of insider trading prohibitions and Rule 14e-3 of the Exchange Act's
limits on the ability of any trader other than the acquirer to trade on nonpublic material
information related to a tender offer. We would prohibit traded firms from opting out of
Rule 14e-3 because of our concerns with managerial entrenchment and self-dealing. For a
discussion of present limits on informed trading, see infra Part III.
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fer not to make insider trading contractible, they should still be willing
to make outsider trading contractible.37 Indeed, there are even
stronger reasons to worry that unregulated outsider trading on the
basis of material nonpublic information will impose uncompensated
costs on the traded firm that exceed the external benefits of such
trading. Traded firms would have strong incentives not to impose
overbroad trading restrictions that reduced their shareholders' liquid
ity - we even foresee that some firms would directly or indirectly
subsidize informed outsider trading. But we see no reason why an
issuing firm should not have the right to expand the scope of Rule
14e-3 of the Exchange Act to restrict informed outsider trading on the
basis of nonpublic patent information or block rivals from speculating
on the basis of nonpublic information.38
Traded firms already have considerable freedom to restrict the
ability of informed traders to profit at the expense of the un
informed.39 We will show that issuing restricted stock can serve to limit
outsiders' unfettered ability to profit on material, nonpublic informa
tion. However, such restrictions are rarely if ever imposed. Instead of
arguing that firms have simply failed to think about the utility of such
restrictions or the means of implementation, we believe it would be
useful for the government to adopt policies that make clear that such
restrictions are contemplated by law and that facilitate their adoption
and enforcement. Traded firms can as a formal legal matter privately
restrict some types of outside informed trading, but they do not cur
rently have the power to restrict informed trading on options or future
markets or to contract for public investigation and criminal prosecu
tion of such violations. To wit, when we describe our proposal in more
detail, we will suggest a menu system of opt outs that grant traded
firms more flexibility in tailoring the class of outsider trading which is
restricted and the type of restrictions which are imposed. Moreover,
the SEC should make' clear that both its investigative and enforce
ment resources would be brought to bear against violations of the re37. As we discuss later in the Article, the risk of managerial self-dealing through out
sider trading is much reduced compared with insider trading. Even where managerial self
dealing may pose a problem, specific exclusions are possible as we discuss infra in Section
IV.A.2.
38. For Rule 14e-3, see General Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240, 14e-3 (2001). Rule 14e-3 prohibits trades based on material informa
tion related to a tender offer where the person engaging in the trade "knows or has reason
to know" that the information is nonpublic and the person "knows or has reason to know
[the information) has been acquired directly or indirectly from (1) the offering person; (2)
the issuer of the securities sought or to be sought by such tender offer, or (3) any officer,
director, partner or employee or any other person acting on behalf of the offering person or
such issuer." Id. Among other things, Rule 14e-3 excludes the acquirer from its scope. See
id.
39. See infra Section IV.B.2 (discussing the ability of traded firms under present law to
restrict trading in their own securities).
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strictions announced by the traded firms, perhaps charging a fee to the
traded firm for such services.40
There are two important limitations to our proposal which them
selves are natural outgrowths of our internalization theory. First,
regulators should scrutinize whether a traded firm's restrictions on
outsider trading are a by-product of managerial self dealing. Our in
ternalization result fails if the traded firm's decisions are motivated by
managerial interests instead of those shareholders. In particular, we
worry that managers may use restrictions on informed outsider trad
ing to make it harder for third-parties to mount tender offers or to
make it more difficult for shareholders to find out about mangers' mis
or malfeasance. But as with takeover defenses, the optimal response is
not to completely eliminate managerial discretion. Instead, we pro
pose a combination of limits on the types of trading restrictions that
managers can impose and heightened judicial scrutiny of those restric
tions that raise self-dealing concerns.
Second, regulators should scrutinize whether particular types of
trading restrictions sacrifice third-party pricing benefits. Our internali
zation result can fail if outsider trading produces third-party benefits
that are external to the combined interests of both the outside trader
and the traded firm. Investments in information that have allocational
spillover effects for other decisionmakers may produce net social
benefits even though they harm the private interests of the traded
firm. As with the self-dealing concern, however, the optimal response
is not to completely eliminate the rights of traded firms to control out
sider trading. Indeed, no one who supports Rule 14e-3's ban on trades
based on tender offer-related information can simultaneously believe
that unregulated outsider trading always produces net social benefits.
Instead of giving outsiders unfettered freedom to engage in informed
trading or giving traded firms unfettered freedom to block informed
trading, we propose limiting the types of trading restrictions that
traded firms can impose to circumstances in which external pricing
benefits are likely to be less important. At a minimum, we believe that
traded firms should have the freedom to prevent what we call "infor
mational frontrunning" in which outsiders profit from trading on non
public information (such as quarterly sales) which by Jaw are about to
be publicly released.
Part II of this Article establishes a framework to consider the vari
ous impacts to market participants and society from information re
search into securities prices. Part III assesses the current approach se
curities laws take toward informational disparities. Part IV sets forth
this Article's internalization proposal giving traded companies a prop-

40. The costs of government enforcement are of course real expenditures. Through a
fee, the government may force the traded firm to internalize such costs.
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erty right to control whether informed trades in their shares take
place.
II. AN INTERNALIZATION MODEL OF INFORMATIONAL DISPARITY
When one investor holds an information advantage with respect to
a particular security, the investor will enjoy systematically greater re
turns than uninformed traders. Insiders that trade on nonpublic in
formation obtained from their company, for example, will profit at the
expense of the rest of the market. Likewise, smaller, uninformed in
vestors trade at a disadvantage relative to larger, financial institutions
with the resources to engage in detailed securities research.41 Despite
the loss to uninformed shareholders from informed trades, other par
ties nevertheless may gain when an investor engages in informed
trades. To the extent securities prices become more accurate as a re
sult of the trades, market participants that depend on accurate prices
will benefit.
The informed trader obviously internalizes the benefits of the ex
pected trading profits. But these are private and not social benefits
because they are exactly offset by losses to the uninformed trader.
This part shows that the social costs and benefits of informed trading
- which on net may be either positive or negative - are largely
borne by others and hence external to the informed trader's calculus
in deciding whether or not to trade. The only substantial social cost
borne by the informed trader concerns the expenditures that she may
incur to acquire the nonpublic information. Outsider traders compare
whether the private transfer benefit of such trading is greater than the
private (and social) research costs of acquiring information - and not
whether such trading is on net socially beneficial. From a societal
viewpoint, therefore, informed traders (whether insiders or outsiders),
if left to their own devices under a completely laissez-faire market sys
tem, may engage in either too much or too little research.
Section (A) sets forth a framework to assess the different impacts
of the creation and use of information in securities market transac
tions from the perspective of overall social welfare. Using this frame
work, Section (B) applies the framework to analyze the regulation of
insider trading. Section ( C) then uses the framework to assess the de
sirability of regulating outsider trading that involves an informational
disparity.

41. See supra note 6.
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A. Disaggregating the Internal and External Impacts of an
Information Advantage

Imagine first a market where investors all possess the same set of
information and have the same estimates of the value of particular se
curities. Moreover, the investors are unable to improve on their in
formation or estimates and thus, enjoy an equal playing field with re
spect to knowledge about securities market valuations. In such a
market, each investor will have no better information than the securi
ties market price as to the value of the traded firm. Given a particular
price, the traded firm is just as likely to be over as undervalued. With
out any additional knowledge, therefore, executing a trade in the
traded firm's securities will, on average, not change the net worth of
the trader. Instead, only traders that seek to rebalance their portfolio
or that need to obtain cash will seek to sell securities in such a situa
tion. A liquidity trader, for example, may need to sell shares to raise
money to pay for a house, car, or other consumption good.42 As li
quidity traders execute orders in the market, the market will not treat
individual trading transactions as a signal about the valuation of the
traded firm. Rather, the market price will adjust discontinuously as
the entire market learns of new information from non-trading sources,
for example through SEC filings on the part of the traded firm.43
Now introduce the possibility that investors may obtain informa
tion on the traded firm that provides the investors with an advantage
over uninformed investors. At least fo ur distinct effects result from
the decision on the part of an investor to obtain an information advan
tage: (1) the investor must make an expenditure of resources to obtain
the information as well as cover transaction costs (brokerage fees, for
example); (2) the investor gains an information advantage in its secu
rities trades leading to a systematically higher return; (3) other un
informed investors bear a cost to the extent they expect to take oppo
site positions with informed traders (as well as transaction costs); and

42. See, e.g., Douglas W. Diamond & Robert E. Verrecchia, fnformC1tion Aggregation
in " Noisy Rational Expectations Economy, 9 J. FIN. ECON. 221, 234 (1981); Milton Harris
& Arthur Raviv, Differences of Opinion Make a Horse Race, 6 REV. FIN. STUD. 473, 474
(1993). For a model of the interaction between informed investors, liquidity traders, and a
market specialist, see Albert S. Kyle, Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading, 53
ECONOMETRICA 1315 (1 985).
43. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Effi
ciency, 70 VA . L. REV. 549, 568-69 (1984) (noting that prices adjust "rapidly and with near
perfect dynamic efficiency" in situations where all become "universally informed" to infor
mation at once). On the other hand, Gilson and Kraakman note that many traders lack the
sophistication to determine the significance of "technical accounting information" con
tained in mandatory info rmation disclosure. Id. at 569. Thus, new financial information con
tained in a SEC filing may result in a more gradual price response. See id. at 569-70 (con
tending that "[t]he rapidity of such price adjustments depends on the volume of informed
trading").
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(4) investors . and other market participants may experience other
costs and benefits associated with the informed trades.
The first two effects of information research relate to the investor
making the decision to engage in informatiop research. First, an inves
tor seeking an information advantage in trading securities must ex
pend her own time and resources. An investment analyst may spend
effort to analyze a firm's recent securities disclosure filings and to in
tegrate such information with other information obtained from vari
ous sources to obtain a richer picture of a company's valuation. Like
wise, an investor who seeks to obtain an information advantage
through the theft of such information from another source of informa
tion must expend resources in engineering the theft.44
Second, the investor who obtains an information advantage will
benefit from this advantage through securities transactions. An
analyst with an information advantage may either engage in proprie
tary trades or sell this advantage to other investors. Misappropriators
may use their purloined information advantage to engage in trades to
their own financial benefit. Armed with the knowledge that a com
pany is overvalued, for example, an investor may sell the securities of
the company short.
In deciding whether to engage in research, however, the investor
may ignore impacts from the decision to engage in information re
search on other market participants. The third effect this Article ad
dresses involves the cost to uninformed traders from informed trades.
Informed traders will not directly take into account the cost they im
pose on uninformed investors. Indeed, the very benefit which in
formed traders seek to obtain is derived from the loss uninformed
traders suffer. Those uninformed investors who planned to trade for
liquidity reasons regardless of the market price will not directly suffer
harm, of course. Consider a situation where the market undervalues
the traded firm's securities. Whether a liquidity trader sells securities
at an undervalued price to the informed investor or to another un
informed investor, the liquidity trader will lose to the extent of the
undervaluation.
Nevertheless, identifiable subsets of uninformed investors exist
that will lose because of their informational disadvantage. A range of
uninformed investors, for example, may offer to trade a certain vol
ume of securities at the current market price; some investors may of
fer to sell to obtain cash while others may seek to purchase to
rebalance their portfolios. Now introduce an informed investor who
44. A newspaper reporter, for example, who seeks to use information from an upcom
ing article to engage in informed securities trades must exert effort in obtaining assignments
that may lead to such informative articles as well as in hiding her trades from the newspaper
itself. See supra note 8 (detailing the insider trading scheme of a Wall Street Journal re
porter).
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realizes the traded firm's securities are undervalued and therefore
seeks to purchase securities. The increased purchase orders on the
part of the informed investor may displace uninformed investors who
would have otherwise purchased the offered securities. Assume, for
example, that the increased purchase orders cause the market price to
rise.45 To the extent the informed investor's purchase orders alter the
market price, some uninformed investors who otherwise would not
have engaged in such a transaction may be induced into selling their
securities.46 Likewise, investors who planned to purchase securities at
the previous lower market price may choose to forego such transac
tions after the informed investor's purchase orders raise the market
price.47
Significantly, the trading benefit that informed traders receive
from their information advantage will exactly equal the trading loss to
uninformed investors.48 To the extent a fixed amount of securities ex
ist in the secondary market for any one traded firm, the purchase of
undervalued securities at a discount necessarily requires the sale of
such securities from another investor. Likewise the sale of overvalued
securities at too high a price requires the presence of other investors
willing to purchase the securities.
This Article's fourth informational effect focuses on other conse
quences of informed trades for market participants. As with the direct
trading loss to uninformed investors, informed investors may not take
into account the impact on other market participants from their in45. Increased purchase orders may cause the market price to increase for two separate
reasons. First, more purchase orders may signal to the market that informed investors be
lieve the market price is presently undervalued. Reacting to this signal, market makers
among others may increase the bid-ask price for the particular securities. Second, increased
demand may place pressure on the price where an upward sloping supply curve exists for
shares. An upward sloping supply curve may exist, for example, because investors have dif
ferent expectations as to share value or because investors vary in the tax impact from selling
their shares. For a discussion of the possible reasons why an upward sloping supply curve
may exist in the securities markets, see Stephen J. Choi & Eric L. Talley, Playing Favorites
with Shareholders, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 271, 346-47 (2002). For a discussion of empirical
studies demonstrating an upward sloping supply curve for shares, see Jesse M. Fried, Insider
Signaling and Insider Trading With Repurchase Tender Offers, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 421, 43435, n.65-67 (2000) .
46. See, e.g., William K.S. Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Imper
sonal Stock Markets: Who is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule /Ob-5?, 54
S. CAL. L. REV. 1 2 1 7, 1235-40 (1981) [hereinafter Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic
Information].
47. See, e.g., William K.S. Wang, Stock Market Insider Trading: Victims, Violators and
Remedies - Including An Analogy to Fraud in the Sale of a Used Car With a Generic De
fect, 45 VILL. L. REV. 27, 34-35 (2000) [hereinafter Wang, Stock Market Insider Trading].
Wang also makes the observation that uninformed traders who engage in more frequent
transactions are systematically more disadvantaged from the presence of investors with an
information advantage. See id. at 37-40.
48. See Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information, supra note 46, at 1234-35
(setting forth the "Law of Conservation of Securities").
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formed trades. Stock price accuracy for the traded firm, for instance, is
potentially increased through the existence of informed trading.49 To
the extent the market correctly deciphers the informational content
behind trades on average, more informed trades will result in an in
crease in stock price accuracy.5° For example, the market may view a
large volume of sell orders from an insider as providing negative in
formation as to the insider's company valuation.51 Conversely, when
Warren Buffett announces that he has made a large investment in a
particular company, the market may react positively to such informa
tion.52
Greater stock price accuracy, in turn, may benefit the traded firm's
shareholders as well as third parties. For undiversified shareholders,
greater share price accuracy reduces the risk that the shareholders
may hold overvalued securities. Employees of the traded firm, for ex
ample, are frequently undiversified in their risk with respect to the
traded firm's stock.53 Individual investors also often hold undiversified
portfolios.54 Even for diversified shareholders, informed trades that
49. On the other hand, an argument exists that informed insider trading may not in
crease overall price accuracy to the extent such trades reduce the incentives of outside in
vestors to engage in research. See Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, Insider
Trading and the Efficiency of Stock Prices, 23 RAND J. ECON. 106 (1992); Naveen Khanna
et al., Insider Trading, Outside Search & Resource A llocation: Why Firms and Society May
Disagree on Insider Trading Restrictions, 7 REV. FIN. STUD. 575 (1994). I n deciding whether
to allow insider or outsider trading, a firm that internalizes most of the benefits from in
creased stock price accuracy, nevertheless, will balance the value of allowing either form of
trading.
50. The market, of course, may have more difficulty in deciphering the informational
content behind any one trade. On average, however, the market should interpret the signal
from trades in an unbiased fashion. Moreover, given that information on the identity of the
trader combined with the size of the trade is available, the market will have an increased
ability to interpret the information behind any specific trade.
51. See A.swath Damodaran & Crocker H. Liu, Insider Trading as a Signal of Private
Information, 6 REV. FIN. STUD. 79 (1993); H. Nejat Seyhun, Insiders' Profits, Costs of
Trading, and Market Efficiency, 16 J. FIN. ECON. 189, 196 (1986) (finding that months
where insiders sell shares on net are followed by an average 100-day abnormal return of
-1.7%).
52. Warren Buffett, an extremely successful investor from Omaha, Nebraska, is often
written about within the financial press. For an exemplary article, see Carol J. Loomis, The
Value Machine, FORTUNE, Feb. 19, 2001, at 70.
53. See Pui-Wing Tam, Hard Drive: Why Tech-Stock Junkies, Despite Advice, Often
Fail to Diversify, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 1999, at Cl (reporting that in many 401(k) retirement
plans, employees hold thirty percent of their money in their own company's stock); see also
Merritt B. Fox, Required Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 62 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1 999, at 113, 121 n.16 [hereinafter Fox, Required Disclosure] (citing an
unpublished study by Randall Kroszner showing that "a reduction in the riskiness of an is
suer's stock will increase the proportion of stock-based compensation that a manager is
willing to accept").
54. See Tam, supra note 53, at Cl (stating that "many individuals now are dangerously
undiversified in their investments" particularly in high technology stocks). Indeed, in recent
years, many investment web sites have advocated a variety of undiversified investment
strategies for individual investors. The Motley Fo�I (www.fool.com), for example, advo-
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reduce the systematic risk of a portfolio of shares increases share
holder welfare.55 Negative forces in the economy may impact a num
ber of companies in a similar manner, causing the market, for exam
ple, to overvalue such companies. Firm-specific information from
several companies in combination may then be useful to determine
the extent of systematic overvaluation. For example, analysts may get
a better sense of the overall direction of the economy through the as
sessment of revenue growth of a number of different companies.56
Furthermore, accurate share prices allow a corporation to use less of
its own stock in employee compensation plans as well as to acquire
other companies,57 thus benefiting the traded firm's shareholders.
From the perspective of non-shareholder third parties, greater share
price accuracy may also provide positive external benefits. For exam
ple, a company conducting an initial public offering may rely on the
share price of a competing already-public company to set the offering
price. More generally, greater price accuracy will lead to more effi
cient capital allocation with positive benefits throughout the econ
omy.58

cated among other strategies a "Foolish Four" strategy under which an investor mechani
cally "selects four stocks from the 30 companies that comprise the Dow Jones Industrial
Average. The stocks are selected based on low price and high dividend yield." See
The Motley Fool, Foolish Four Portfolios, available at http://www.fool.com/
portfolios/discontinued/foo14.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2002) (providing a description of the
now discontinued Foolish Four strategy).
55. Diversification, of course, negates the cost of unsystematic stock price inaccuracies.
Consider an investor who holds an index fund containing a value-weighted share of all
stocks in the market. Across the range of stocks, some will be overvalued and some under
valued. Where stocks are on average correctly valued, nevertheless, the investor holding a
diversified portfolio will not suffer any increased risk due to the presence of price inaccura
cies. The overvalued and undervalued stocks will tend to cancel out within the portfolio.
56. In contrast, Marcel Kahan argues that firm-specific information will not reduce sys
tematic volatility in the market to the extent such volatility is due to "liquidity crunches,
overreaction to information, or market-wide speculative trading." Marcel Kahan, Securities
Laws and the Social Costs of "Inaccurate" Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 1003 (1 992).
57. To the extent employees are risk-averse (particularly for undiversified holdings of
their own company's stock), they will demand a higher level of compensation for more in
accurate (and thus high variance) stock, all other things being equal.
58. Kahan makes the argument that accurate securities prices are important for effi
cient capital allocation. See Kahan, supra note 56, at 1005-17. To the extent more efficient
capital allocation increases the value of corporations as a group, investors holding diversi
fied portfolios benefit. Such investors will therefore internalize the benefit from more effi
cient capital allocation across different portfolio companies. See, e.g., Roberta Romano,
Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359,
2368 (1998) ("The majority of investors hold portfolios, not single shares of stock, and
therefore, unlike the issuer, they will internalize the externality if they make the disclosure
decision."). Other third parties may benefit from more accurate securities prices. When the
stock market enters into a speculative bubble, rising stock valuations may make consumers
feel wealthier leading to increased consumer spending in the economy. On the other hand,
when a stock market bubble bursts, consumers may suddenly feel poorer, leading to a dra
matic drop-off in spending and possibly a recession affecting the entire economy. See
Kahan, supra note 56, at 1034-35. Merritt Fox has argued that accurate securities prices -
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Where the information derived from informed trades eventually
would have reached the market in any case, the benefit in stock price
accuracy is simply one of timing.59 For example, when an insider
trades based on nonpublic material information about the insider's
own company, the stock market price may adjust to take into account
what that trade reveals about stock price accuracy. To the extent the
traded firm plans to disclose such information in its next quarterly
SEC filing, the benefit to stock market accuracy comes only from the
acceleration of disclosure in time from the date the insider engages in
trades to the date of the quarterly SEC filing.60 Timing, nevertheless,
is important in the securities markets. For employees taking compen
sation in stock or an acquisition target's shareholders receiving stock
as consideration, the valuation of the stock at the time they receive
the stock is of paramount importance. Information that arrives only
after they take the stock does not lower the risk they face from stock
price inaccuracy at the time they receive the stock. Similarly, a com
pany contemplating a securities offering must make a decision at the
start date of the offering as to how to price the offering. The pricing
decision, in turn, may depend on the securities prices of related com
panies in the same industry. Information that arrives only after the
pricing decision does not benefit the company conducting the securi
ties offering.61
The presence of informed trades may also impact other market
participants negatively. For example, investors seeking an information
advantage may take actions that impose costs on other investors
which increase the magnitude of the information advantage. Insiders
of the traded firm may choose to delay disclosure of confidential proj
ects within the traded firm to enhance their ability to engage in insider
trading.62 Insiders may also choose to shift the projects within the
by assisting the movement of resources to their highest value use - benefit other factors of
production including labor, for example. See Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a
Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498, 2562-69 (1997).
59. See Kahan, supra note 56, at 999-1001 (discussing the impact of timing on the value
of accurate securities prices).
·

60. For Form 10-Q, see Forms, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 249.308a
(2002).
61. Companies conducting an initial public offering may care about their ability to ac
curately price their offering for a number of reasons. For firm commitment offerings, the
underwriter promises to purchase a company's securities for resale to the public. To the ex
tent the pricing of the offering is uncertain, the underwriter may choose to sell the securities
at a lower price to the market to avoid the risk of not selling out the entire offering. Alter
natively, the underwriter may demand a higher commission to compensate for the increased
risk of mispricing the market.
62. See Robert J. Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of
the Large Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1051, 1051-64 (1982); Saul Levmore, Securities
and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 1 17, 149 (1982) (ar
guing that insiders may structure a corporation's transactions to profit from insider trading);
Kenneth Scott, Insider Trading: Rule JOb-5, Disclosure, and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL
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traded firm to lower overall value but focus on more confidential
projects in an effort to increase their insider trading profits.63 Outsider
traders may also engage in acts that impose costs on other market par
ticipants to increase their trading advantage. An employee of one
firm, for example, might intentionally reduce the value of her firm in
order to create a profitable trading opportunity in the stock of the
firm's rivals.64 Or an outsider trader with information that a particular
company is overvalued might attempt to disseminate misinformation
to the market that the company is in fact undervalued to increase her
trading advantage.65 To the extent other investors believe the misin
formation, the amount the informed investor benefits at the expense
of the uninformed investor increases and stock price accuracy is re
duced. Outsider traders who misappropriate their information from a
source that otherwise would have used the information to engage in
securities transactions impose a trading cost on the source. The source
may also lose to the extent the use of misappropriated information re
sults in the dissemination of information that the source would have
otherwise kept confidential. Other market participants may then bear
a cost to the extent the source chooses not to generate the information
in the first place. The possibility that informed trading will impose
costs on a traded firm's uninformed shareholders may also induce the
traded firm to disclose information (say about its most recent sales)
sooner than would be optimal but for the desire to preempt the mone
tary transfer worked by informed trading.66 The presence of informaSTUD. 801, 810-11 (1980). Biii see James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical
Response to the "Chicago School, " 1986 DUKE L.J. 628, 635-36 (noting that little empirical
evidence exists demonstrating the existence of abusive practices designed to increase the
value of insider trading).
63. Alternatively, managers may engage in more risky projects designed to create large
swings in firm value of which managers with inside information may take advantage
through trades in the firm's securities. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 22, at 332.
64. See Ayres & Bankman, supra note 9, at 281 n.141 (discussing the possibility of an
"Alias Shrugged" scenario in which a firm profits by first secretly destroying the value of its
own productive assets and then second reaping trading profits on related firms based on
news of the destruction).
65. The SEC has paid particular attention to so-called "pump and dump" schemes un
der which an investor first purchases a large quantity of a company's securities, portrays the
company as favorable, and then sells the securities as the price increases. See Jerry Markon,
U.S. Says Brokers Bilked Customers Of Over $50 Million, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 2001, at A4
(announcing indictments for stock fraud against, among others, members of the Gambino
crime family for a "pump and dump" scheme); see also Market Manipulation, Particularly
Online, ls Way Up, SEC Says, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7. 2000, available at 2000 WL-WSJ
2661 5864 (reporting that "[p]reliminary figures show that market manipulation accounted
for 8% of the roughly 500 cases the SEC brought in fiscal 2000, ended Sept. 30, up from 3 %
i n fiscal 1999").
66. Indeed, the present mandatory disclosure system can be viewed as reducing the in
formational advantage insiders of the firm may enjoy over outsider traders. For a discussion
of the corporate governance implications of mandatory disclosure, see Fox, Required Dis
closure, supra note 53. NASDAQ also imposes a requirement that listed companies must
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tional disparities in the market may also put market makers67 at risk,
raising the bid-ask spread the market makers demand for the liquidity
service they provide to the market.68
The decision to engage in information research leading to an in
crease in informed trades in the securities markets therefore encom
passes a number of disparate effects on various market participants.
For many forms of informational disparities, no one party takes into
account all such effects from their information-related decisions. As
discussed above, an informed trader generally ignores the loss to unin
formed traders from its decision to engage in information research.
The informed trader compares a private benefit (the transfer of trad
ing profits) to the private (and social) cost of research, but ignores a
host of external social costs and benefits that are likely to determine
whether the informed trading is on balance socially productive. As a
theoretical matter, therefore, a laissez faire regime may produce too
little or too much informed trading. Absent Coasean bargaining, we
may observe too little informed trading to the extent that the social
benefits (in enhanced stock pricing and the like) exceed the private
benefit of trading profits. Additionally, absent Coasean bargaining we
may observe too much informed trading to the extent that the social
costs of such trading exceed social benefit.69 Nevertheless, certain

"[e]xcept in unusual circumstances . . . make prompt disclosure to the public through the
news media of any material information that would reasonably be expected to affect the
value of its securities or influence investors' decisions . . . . " NASD Manual (CCH), Rule
4310(c)(16).
67. The SEC defines a "market maker" as "a firm that stands ready to buy and sell a
particular stock on a regular and continuous basis at a publicly quoted price." SEC, Market
Maker, at http:l/www.sec.gov/answers/mktmaker.htm (last visited Oct. 1 1 , 2002).
68. See Kahan, supra note 56, at 1017-22. Kahan makes the argument that stock price
inaccuracies may lead more unsophisticated investors to fear that they are at a disadvantage
with respect to the rest of the market. Such unsophisticated investors will then eschew
trades, reducing the liquidity in the stock. Lower liquidity, in turn, raises the transaction
costs to all investors seeking to engage in trades. See id. In situations where a market maker
provides liquidity, the absence of unsophisticated investors will expose the market maker to
higher risks, raising the bid-ask spread the market maker charges for its liquidity service.
Gideon Parchomovsky pointed out to us that from a Coasean perspective the
uninformed traders cause an increase in the bid-ask spread just as much as the informed
traders. This reasoning is impeccably true - just as the pedestrian victim causes her fa tality
by walking through a crosswalk at the same time as a drunk driver. But in both cases, effi
ciency and equity concerns militate toward putting liability on the least cost avoider who to
our minds is not the victim.
69. Lynn Stout, in particular, has put forth the argument that investor research (and
other costs associated with stock trading including commission fees) may result in socially
wasteful expenditures as investors engage in speculative trades. See Lynn A. Stout, A re
Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure, and Securities Regulation, 8 1
VA. L. R EV. 61 1 (1995). Other commentators have questioned the social value o f specula
tive trading. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Using Tax Policy to Curb Speculative Short-Term Trad
ing, 3 J. FIN. SERVICES R ES. 101 , 103 (1989); Lawrence H. Summers & Victoria P.
Summers, When Financial Markets Work Too Well: A Cautious Case for a Securities Trans
actions Tax, 3 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 261, 271-72 (1989).
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types of information-related decisions involve parties who internalize
more market-related effects than others. The next two sections distin
guish trades based on information internal to the traded firm and
trades based on outsider information advantages. Somewhat surpris
ingly, we find that insider trading (to which the traded firm consents)
is presumptively more efficient than outsider trading (that proceeds
without needing to garner the traded firm's consent).
B.

Implications for Insider Trading

Information internal to the traded firm (termed "inside informa
tion") will often provide investors with a significant advantage in de
termining the valuation of the traded firm. The traded firm, for exam
ple, may have plans to undertake a major business expansion into new
foreign markets. Alternatively, the traded firm may plan to engage in
large cutbacks in its operations, reducing both the size of its staff and

In Stout's view, investors often come to disparate conclusions on the value of a particu
lar security through their efforts at research. See Stout, supra, at 625-35. Given a range of
investors with heterogeneous expectations, investors with higher expectations will seek to
purchase securities from investors with lower expectations. See id. at 627-28. Investors
trading in such an environment wi,11 just as likely be on the winning side of a transaction as
on the losing side. Once the costs of engaging in information research and other transaction
costs associated with trading are taken into account, investors who trade on average lose
money relative to those investors who take a simple buy-and-hold strategy. See id.; see also
id. at 636-41 (noting that investors more optimistic about their investment prowess self se
lect themselves into the group of actively trading investors). Stout, moreover, argues that
the liquidity benefits from speculative trading are outweighed by the large costs associated
with such trades. See id. at 683-88. Stout also contends that speculative trading driven by
heterogeneous expectations are unlikely to increase share price accuracy. To the extent
speculative traders generate heterogeneous expectations, Stout argues that "investor dis
agreement and varying degrees of ignorance will ensure that stock prices bear only the
roughest correspondence to their intrinsic values." Id. at 690. Stout notes also that "adding
large numbers of speculating [heterogeneous expectation] traders to a market where inves
tors already trade modest amounts of stock for liquidity or portfolio-balancing reasons ac
tually may decrease the already questionable level of fundamental efficiency found in the
market." Id. at 690-91 (emphasis omitted).
Our model differs from Stout's conception of securities trading in one important re
spect: we do not assume that information research leads investors to reach heterogeneous
expectations that on average do not increase overall share price accuracy. While research
may result in only a noisy signal of the true value of a security, we assume nevertheless that
this noisy signal is still informative. Thus, investors who engage in informed research are
privately (and systematically) able to do better through securities trades compared with
uninformed investors. Moreover, under our model informed trades are assumed to unambi
guously increase the accuracy of stock prices (although the magnitude may be small for in
formation that would have been disclosed soon to the market regardless of the securities
trades). Of course, once multiple investors start to compete through investment research,
trading profits may become competed away. Nevertheless, the positive impact of stock price
accuracy does not allow us to conclude, as Lynn Stout does, that "federal securities pol
icy . . . should seek to minimize the incidence and costs of speculative trading." Id. at 712.
Instead, as we argue, the net costs and benefits of informed securities trading are ambiguous
and we therefore propose later in the Article that the traded firm should have the ability to
determine the extent of allowable informed trading in its own securities rather than pursue
a one-size fits all approach to speculative trading.
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product line. Knowledge of such information affords investors a
greater ability to assess the value of the traded firm.
Given the large advantage inside information may provide certain
investors, regulators have focused much of their attention on the use
of such information. Under the U.S. securities laws, Rule lOb-5 of the
Exchange Act forms the core of the insider trading prohibition.70 In
siders of the traded firm, among others, may not trade based on non
public material information relating to the traded firm.71 Rule lOb-5
also extends to the trading use of tips that insiders may provide to out
side tippees in a situation where the insider-tipper breaches her fidu
ciary duty and the tippee has reason to know of the breach.72
This Article's framework, nevertheless, provides support for
Henry Manne's contention that corporations already internalize many
70. See § lOb of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15 U.S.C. 78j (2000); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.lOb-5 (2001) (Rule lOb-5). During the 1980s, Congress passed both the Insider Trad
ing Sanctions Act {"ITSA") and the Insider Trading Se,curities Fraud Enforcement Act
("ITSFEA"), both designed to increase penalties for linsider trading. In addition, the
ITSFEA expanded the scope of "controlling person" liability. See generally Jesse M. Fried,
Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading Through Pretrading Disclosure, 71
S. CAL. L. REV. 303, 309-10 (1998) (describing the ITSA and the ITSFEA).
In addition to Section lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 of the Exchange Act, other barriers to in
sider trading on the part of corporate insiders exist. For example, under Section 16(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 corporate officers, directors, and shareholders who benefi
cially own greater than ten percent of any class of the corporation's equity must give back to
the corporation profits they earn on any purchase then sale or sale then purchase combina
tion of transactions that occur within any period of less than six months. See Section 16{b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2000); see also Section 16(c) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p{c) (2000) (prohibiting insiders from en
gaging in short sales of their own company stock). Corporate law prohibitions also exist
against insider trading. See WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC L. STEINBERG, INSIDER
TRADING 1105-172 (1996) (addressing the state law on insider trading); Donald C.
Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70
CA L. L. REV. 1, 2 n.5 (1982) (citing state law cases dealing with insider trading).
71. See, e.g., United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 232-33 (1 980) (requiring a duty to
disclose before imposing Rule lOb-5 insider trading liability); see also In re Cady, Roberts &
Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961) (presenting the SEC's position that "[w]e, and the courts have
consistently held that insiders must disclose material facts which are known to them by vir
tue of their position but which are not known to persons with whom they deal and which, if
known, would affect their investment judgment. Failure to make disclosure in these circum
stances constitutes a violation of the anti-fraud provisions. If, on the other hand, disclosure
prior to effecting a purchase or sale would be improper or unrealistic under the circum
stances, we believe the alternative is to forego the transaction . . . . ") .
72. See, e.g., SEC v. Dirks, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). Again basing insider trading liability
under Rule lOb-5 on the breach of a fiduciary duty, Justice Powell held that a tippee is li
able for trading in confidential inside information only to the extent the corporate insider
tipper "breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the
tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has l:ieen a breach." Id. at 660. Jus
tice Powell further elaborated on what constituted a fiduciary breach on the part of a tipper
writing that a breach occurs when "the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly,
from his disclosure. Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to stock
holders. And absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative breach." Id. at 662. In
dictum, Justice Powell also noted that agents in a special confidential relationship with the
corporation may be treated as "temporary insiders" for insider trading purposes. See id. at
655 n.14.
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of the costs and benefits from trades based on inside information on
the part of its managers.73 Consider the following example involving
Texon, a publicly-traded manufacturer of Texas tangy barbeque
sauce. Assume that Texon has plans to enter into new foreign mar
kets. Using our framework, first note that traders with an inside in
formation advantage will enjoy a trading profit from the use of such
information. Assuine that the information on Texon's foreign expan
sion plans, if known, would result in a share price increase for Texon
of $10. Moreover, assume that an informed investor with such infor
mation would have the ability to trade 10,000 shares before the mar
ket price adjusted upward by the full $10. For simplicity, assume that
the inside information will provide an investor with an expected gross
trading advantage of $100,000.74
Second, note from the Article's framework that traders who seek
to obtain an inside information advantage may need to expend re
sources in obtaining such information. Although a manager might
casually acquire a good d�al of material nonpublic information merely
as a by-product of carrying out her independently compensated du
ties, a manager that desires to obtain an insider information advantage
may need to expend added effort in sorting through and identifying
the valuable internal information within the company. In the Texon
example, assume that managers that seek to engage in insider trading
expend the equivalent of $2,000 of their own time and resources in
making such trades. So the net expected benefit to managers from en
gaging in insider trading in the Texon example is $98,000.
Managers of Texon seem, therefore, to benefit at the expense of
uninformed investors. The contractual relationship between managers
and their employer, however, allows the traded firm to internalize
these effects in deciding whether to permit or prohibit managerial
trading. Because the managers are in privity with Texon, Texon will
internalize the net benefit to the managers from engaging in insider
trading. Managers, for example, that expect to receive a benefit of
$98,000 from their employment due to insider trading will be willing to
work at the traded firm for a correspondingly reduced salary.75 Texon,
73. See MANNE, supra note 27.
74. As Ayres and Bankman note, the potential profits of managers having laissez faire
insider trading rights might under more plausible assumptions easily run into the tens of
millions of dollars. See Ayres & Bankman, supra note 9, at 270. To adequately compensate
a firm for being given such a trading right, the manager would not only need to reduce her
salary but in most instances would have to make a net payment to the corporation of several
million dollars per year. The textual assumption of $100,000 profit is more plausible under
an employment contract that merely grants the manager a limited right to trade the stock of
its own firm. Seeid.
75. See MANNE, supra note 27, at 1 38-41 . Manne makes the argument, moreover, that
compensation through insider trading may provide managers with more effective incentives
than through stock options or restricted stock. When a manager is compensated through
stock options or restricted stock, the upside potential of such compensation is limited by the

November 2002]

Internalizing Outsider Trading

339

in making its decision on how much to provide its managers in direct
compensation, will therefore have the ability to attract the same qual
ity .executives with $98,000 reduced compensation compared with ri
vals that prohibit insider trading, all other things being equal.76 Of
course, risk-averse managers may not view an expected $98,000 from
insider trading profits the same as a certain $98,000 cash compensa
tion. Therefore, Texon may not be able to reduce the cash compensa
tion to risk-averse managers by the full $98,000. On the other hand,
giving managers the option to buy firm shares on the basis of nonpub
lic information may provide managers with better incentives to maxi
mize firm value. To the extent that managers increase firm value more
than the market expects, managers may then take advantage of this
increase through purchases of undervalued securities in the market.
Certainly, managers may also have an incentive to decre�se firm value
more than the market expects to assist the managers' short sales of the
traded firm's shares. But the contractual relationship between manag
ers and the traded firm allows the company to impose restrictions on
the type of insider trading that are permitted. Most obviously, the
traded firm may prohibit short sales on the part of managers of the
firm's own securities so as to maintain appropriate managerial incen
tives.77
The traded firm will then take into account many of the impacts on
other market participants from informed insider trading. Consider the
third informational effect within the Article's framework: uninformed
shareholders of the traded firm will suffer a harm equal to the corre
sponding trading benefit to managers from insider trading. In the ex
ample, note that the $100,000 trading profit to insiders comes at the
expense of uninformed Texon shareholders. This loss occurs regard
less of whether managers use their information advantage to purchase
number of options or shares granted to the manager. Thus, where the manager's marginal
contribution to firm value exceeds the increase on the fixed number of options or shares in
the hands of a manager, the manager will lack full incentives to maximize firm value. In
sider trading, in contrast, allows a manager to profit more fully from her contribution to
firm value. See id.
76. For an argument that the possibility of insider trading does not provide an efficient
form of compensation, see STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, SECURITIES LAw-INSIDER TRADING
136-39 (1999).
77. Such restriction would be similar to the restrictions currently imposed by some
firms limiting managers' ability to sell or hedge employee stock option plans. See David M.
Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation of Incentive Compatibility,
100 COLUM L. REV. 440, 460-61 (2000) (noting that while some firms employ limits on the
ability of managers to hedge granted options through "trading policies" most firms do not).
But see Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, What Do CEOs Bargain For? An Empiri
cal Study of Key Legal Components of CEO Contracts (unpublished draft, Oct. 31, 2000)
(on file with authors) (reporting that none of the 62 out of 93 sampled CEO compensation
contracts restricted hedging transactions); see also Section 16(c) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c); 17 C.F.R. § 240.16c (2001) (Rule 16c prohibiting insider
short sales at Exchange Act reporting firms).
.
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from uninformed Texon shareholders or sell Texon shares to non
Texon shareholders.78 Where Texon openly allows for insider trading
that reduces shareholder value, therefore, investors will demand a dis
count when Texon initially sells its shares to the public. Texon there
fore internalizes the harm to investors in the market from its adopted
insider trading policies.79
Finally, Texon will internalize many of the other impacts to market
participants resulting from insider trading. The use of inside informa
tion in trades, for example, may result in greater share price accu
racy.80 Part of the benefit from more accurate securities prices will ac
crue directly to investors of Texon. As discussed above, more accurate
securities prices will reduce the risk facing undiversified investors;
even for diversified investors, more accurate securities prices may re
duce the systematic risks of their portfolios.81 The traded firm benefits
directly to the extent that more accurate securities prices also allow
the companies to provide a reduced level of stock compensation to
employees or to use fewer securities in acquisitions.
Texon will also internalize the incentive of managers to adjust firm
decisions to increase their ability to engage in insider trading. Manag
ers, for example, may choose to delay the disclosure of information
from Texon to the market as a whole or shift Texon's business proj
ects toward lower value but more confidential projects.82 To the extent
such activities impose an increased expected cost to Texon's investors,
the investors will demand a greater discount at the time they purchase
their shares. At the time Texon initially offers its securities for sale,

78. Suppose that Texon's securities are undervalued and managers therefore seek to
purchase the securities from uninformed investors. Where managers purchase undervalued
Texon securities, Texon shareholders who sell are directly harmed. Now suppose that
Texon's securities are overvalued and that insiders seek to sell the securities to uninformed
investors. Where rational non-Texon securities holders are unable to distinguish among
selling parties, they will require this discount from all potential selling parties including un
informed Texon shareholders. For example, if informed traders account for 10% of the se
curities sale orders and tend on average {when they sell) to have information that shares are
overvalued by $10 per share, then the non-Texon securities holders will require a $1 dis
count for all the shares they purchase. Suppose that the trade volume is 100,000 shares over
some period of time. The informed traders (selling only when the shares are overvalued)
will gain a net of $90,000 (equal to $9 per share advantage after discount times 1 0,000
shares); uninformed Texon shareholders seeking to sell shares (trading both when shares
are overvalued and undervalued) on the other hand will lose by $90,000 (equal to $1 dis
count times 90,000 shares). Even where managers are selling to non-Texon shareholders,
therefore, uninformed Texon shareholders bear the cost.
79. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN . ECON. 305, 305-07 (1976).
80. For an argument against the price accuracy benefit from insider trading, see

BAINBRIDGE, supra note 76, at 128-36.

81. See text accompanying notes 55-56.
82. See supra note 62 (detailing possible abuses on the part of managers seeking to in
crease the profit potential from insider trading).
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Texon will then internalize the negative consequences of its managers'
actions to increase the value of insider trading.
The large degree of internalization on the part of the traded firm
for insider trading calls into question the present regulatory focus
within the securities laws on insider trading. At least two objections
nevertheless are possible against allowing the traded firm to deter
mine its own insider trading policy. First, the traded firm may ignore
external positive effects on market participants from more accurate
securities prices. Second, managers may abuse the ability to fashion an
insider trading policy for their own personal self-interest at the ex
pense of shareholders.83 We address each in the context of our pro
posal to internalize outsider trading.84
But the gravamen of this Article is not to demonstrate that we
must repeal the current mandatory provisions against insider trading.
Rather we hope to make a different point. Despite the possible lack of
complete internalization, insider traders (who trade with the consent of
the traded firm) internalize far more of the social consequences of in
formed trading than outsider traders (who trade without the traded
firm's consent). Regardless of where one stands on the regulation of

insider trading, an even greater argument exists that regulators should
focus their attention on outsider trading involving informational dis
parities.
C.

Implications for Outsider Trading

No company operates in a vacuum. Because of the range of inter
actions with different economic actors that may affect a company's
business, a number of sources of information outside the traded firm
may prove· significant in valuing the traded firm's securities. Compa
nies interact regularly with customers, suppliers, regulators, and com
petitors. Economic forces outside the scope of an individual com
pany's control, as well, may affect the company's business. A cutback
in oil production from the Middle East will likely raise energy costs
for a company, reducing net profits. Nonpublic information varying
from a customer's plans for future orders to a regulator's intentions
83. Responses are possible to managerial abuse of a corporate-determined insider
trading policy regime. Under a self-dealing fiduciary duty standard, grants of trading rights
that failed to limit the ability of managers to sell short should be strictly scrutinized See
Ayres & Bankman, supra note 9, at 270-75 (discussing self-dealing standard). And it might
be advisable to force managers to price the value of the managerial insider trading option
both ex ante (as part of the executive compensation disclosure contained in the corporate
proxy statement) and ex post (as part of the disclosure of actual insider trades under Section
16{a) of the Exchange Act) to help shareholders evaluate whether the firm was adequately
compensated for granting this right See Ayres & Bankman, sup ra note 9, at 278. For a more
detailed discussion of the possibility of managerial opportunism under a private outsider
trading regime, see i nfra Section IV.A.2.
84. See i nfra Section IV.A.

342

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 101:313

toward imposing costly environmental production controls will affect
the traded firm's stock market price once such information becomes
public.
Outside information pertinent to the valuation of the traded firm,
in turn, may be separated into two categories: information that would
have been created without regard to trading profit (termed "non
trading information") and information obtained with a specific view to
generating trading profits (termed "trading information").85 Outside
parties will often generate non-trading information without regard to
the benefits obtainable from the use of such information in securities
market transactions. For example, a supplier may make the decision
that it will increase the price for its goods sold to the traded firm over
the next year. Information on the decision to raise prices is generated
regardless of the potential trading profits possible with this informa
tion. Similarly, regulators may make a decision that impacts firm
value. The U.S. Federal Reserve Open Market Committee
("FOMC"), for example, may make a decision to lower interest
rates.86 Information on the rate cut will be generated by the FOMC
regardless of possible trading profits.
Trading information, in contrast, relates to information deliber
ately acquired to engage in profitable securities market trades. Trad
ing information first encompasses -information obtained derivatively
from sources that develop non-trading information. An analyst for ex
ample, may expend resources in calling various suppliers to determine
their upcoming inventory needs and pricing policies. An investor may
telephone a member of the FOMC to learn about impending interest
rate changes. To the extent obtained with the goal of generating
trading profits, the non-trading information in the hands of the suppli
ers becomes trading information in the hands of the analyst or inves
tor. Trading information also encompasses new information that in
vestors may generate through skillful analysis of myriad pieces of
data. For example, a securities analyst may combine information on
car production in Europe with trends in energy prices to assess the
value of those auto manufacturers inside the United States. To the ex
tent the new assessment constitutes information that would not have
been created without the opportunity to engage in profitable securi
ties market trades, the information is trading information. Regulations
aimed at the use of information to engage in securities market transac
tions, in turn, will have an effect only on the production of trading in85. This distinction between "trading" and "non-trading" information parallels the dis
tinction that Anthony Kronman made long ago regarding "deliberately" and "casually" ac
quired information. See Kronman, supra note 12.
86. Information on the U.S. Federal Research Open Market Committee and its role in
establishing interest rates may be found at http://www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/ (last visited
July 14, 2001 ).
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formation. Outside parties will continue to produce non-trading in
formation regardless of limits placed on informed trades.87
To gauge the necessity of regulating the production of trading in
formation, let us apply again the four-part information framework.
Our basic contention is that insider trading that proceeds only with
the consent of the traded firm is more likely· to promote social welfare
than outsider trading that can proceed irrespective of the traded firm's
consent. A contract between the trader and the traded firm would in
ternalize much more (and to our minds virtually all) of the social costs
and benefits of informed trading and hence is much more likely to
permit socially valuable informed trading to .occur. As a theoretical
matter, outsider trading without the consent of the traded firm can in
crease or decrease social welfare. But as an empirical matter, we be
lieve that external costs are likely to be more prevalent than external
benefits so that in equilibrium we are likely to see too much informed
trading as a result of the current law's failure to force outsider traders
to garner the consent of the traded firm.88
To see this relative failure of internalization, return to the Texon
hypothetical and assume that Helen, an outsider trader, is considering
expending resources to obtain trading information relevant to the
valuation of Texon. Helen, as with all potential informed traders, will
internalize her direct cost of obtaining the trading information as well
as the trading benefits from the use of such information in the securi
ties markets. Suppose that the cost of obtaining trading information
on Texon to Helen equals $40. Moreover, assume that the trading
benefit Helen can obtain is expected to equal $100. With nothing
more, Helen will choose to expend costly effort to obtain the informa
tion advantage with respect to Texon. From such information re
search, Helen obtains an expected trading profit of $60.
Helen, nevertheless, ignores the impact of her information re
search on other market participants. Uninformed investors as a group
will lose $100 on an expected basis from Helen's information advan
tage. On the other hand, the stock market price accuracy of Texon's
securities may increase from Helen's informed trades. The value of
the increase in accuracy depends in turn on whether Helen's informa
tion would have made its way into the public capital markets without
Helen's efforts and at what time in the future.89 Assume that Texon's

87. See Ayres & Bankman, supra note 9, at 288 (noting that parties will continue to
learn of casually acquired information regardless of disclosure requirements).
88. The possibility of excessive informed trading is particularly true for large traded
firms with extensive followings of investment analysts and other sophisticated investors. For
smaller traded firms with a smaller analyst base (if any), the balance between the external
costs and benefits may swing toward too little informed trading in equilibrium.
89. For a discussion of the timing aspects of securities price accuracy, see supra notes
59-61 and accompanying text.
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shareholders gain $10 from the increase in accuracy and the non
shareholder third parties gain an additional $2. Taking into account
the effects upon other investors, therefore, Helen's decision to expend
resources to obtain the information advantage creates a net loss of
$28. While Helen privately benefits, information trading harms overall
social welfare.
In the extreme where information research provides no benefit to
market participants other than the informed trader, engaging in in
formation research always results in a net social loss. This result tracks
the insight of Jack Hirshleifer. Hirshleifer presents a model in which
information research that simply accelerates the timing of when in
formation is uncovered (termed "foreknowledge") in a pure exchange
economy generates no new value to the market as a whole.00 Where
information research is costly and all market participants would inevi
tably have access to the same information, informed traders ignoring
the loss to other parties from their trades will engage in excessive re
search from a social perspective.
The possibility of competition among investors to obtain an infor
mation advantage may then generate even greater amounts of overin
vestment in securities research. Investors may generate duplicative re
search expenditures and compete away the profits from information
research. Because multiple informed investors reduce the profit avail
able to any one informed investor, investors may then have an incen
tive to race to become the first investor with an information advan
tage.91 In the context of the debate over mandatory disclosure, Jack
Coffee in part relies on the argument that analysts may otherwise du
plicate (and thus waste) information research without mandatory dis90. See Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and Reward to
Inventive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561, 562-66 (1971). In Hirshleifer's model, partici
pants start with a fixed endowment of present goods as well as an endowment of goods for
two possible states in the future, states A and B. With some known probability state A will
in fact be realized; likewise, with some known probability state B will be realized. In equi
librium, multiple participants trading among themselves in the present will then generate
prices for the present good as well as for contingent goods in states A and B. The more
likely state A, the higher the price for goods in state A in equilibrium. Hirshleifer then in
troduces an informed trader that knows for certain whether state A or B will in fact occur in
the future. With nonpublic knowledge that state A will occur, for example, the informed
trader may sell her B endowment and purchase as much of the state A good as possible. To
the extent the information in the hands of the informed trader only changes the timing of
when parties learn about whether state A or B occurs and not the total endowment of goods
A or B, informed trades result in only a zero-sum transfer of wealth from uninformed to
informed traders. See id.
91. The race to obtain an information advantage in the securities markets is analogous
to patent races. For a discussion of the economics of patent races, see Jennifer F. Reinga
num, The Timing of Innovation: Research, Development, and Diffusion, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 849 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
See also Gideon Parchomovsky, Publish or Perish, 98 MICH. L. REV. 926 (2000) (arguing
that competitors in a patent race may choose to focus on preventing others from "winning"
rather than winning the race themselves).
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closure from the traded firm.92 However, not all information relevant
to the valuation of a traded firm derives from within the traded firm.
Mandatory disclosure, therefore, does not present an easy solution for
the duplicative research problem with respect to outside information.
Moreover, the present mandatory disclosure regime does not force
the disclosure of all material information, leaving firms the ability to
keep substantial parts of their internal information confidential.
Critics may nevertheless respond that the amount of duplicated in
formation research in the markets is self-limiting. Sanford Grossman
and Joseph Stiglitz provide the insight that the level of market infor
mation efficiency is in equilibrium with the amount investors spend on
information research costs.93 Some degree of informational ineffi
ciency in market prices is required to give investors an incentive to
engage in research. On the other hand, investors individually will only
expend resources up to the point where they earn zero economic
profits from their ability to profit in market trades from the research.
In equilibrium, investors should earn competitive market returns after
taking into account their information research costs.94
The mere fact, however, that investor information
research is self
'
limiting does not guarantee that social welfare is at a maximum under
the laissez-faire approach to outsider trader information research. The
tragedy of the commons is self-limiting in the sense that individuals
ignoring the collective good will only have the ability to bring the
value of the commons to zero, but not below zero.95 Likewise, compa
nies seeking monopoly rents will expend resources attempting to ob
tain a monopoly. The expenditures to obtain a monopoly are also self
limiting in the sense that companies engaging in such rent-seeking
will, in a competitive equilibrium, expend resources up to the amount
of their expected benefit from the monopoly, leaving the companies
with a competitive return.96 Despite the competitive return, companies
92. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 733 (1984). ( [A] major significance of a mandatory
disclosure system is that it can reduce these [duplicated] costs. Rival firms do not need to
incur expenses to produce essentially duplicative data banks when a central securities data
bank is in effect created at the SEC.").
93. See Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Information
ally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1980).
94. Empirical studies of mutual fund performance, for example, have found that the
funds earn a risk-adjusted return just sufficient to cover their information research and
management costs. See Richard A. Ippolito, On Studies of Mutual Fund Performance, 49
FIN. ANALYSTS ]. 42 (1993).
"

95. For a description of the tragedy of the commons problem, see Garrett Hardin, The
Tragedy ofthe Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
96. See generally Richard A. Posner, The Social Cost of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J.
POL. ECON 807 (1975) (arguing that rent-seeking competition among parties seeking to
obtain monopoly profits results in the dissipation of such profits). In the context of insider
trading regulation, Haddock and Macey have made the argument that a prohibition on in.
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engaged in rent-seeking waste resources in doing so. Likewise, out
sider traders, ignoring the cost of their trades to uninformed investors,
may reduce overall social welfare in their desire to obtain a brief mo
nopoly informational position that allows them to profit from securi
ties trades.
The possibility of having to split trading profits with other outsid
ers or the failure of outside investors to internalize all the social bene
fits of informed trading could also as a theoretical matter result in too
little information research. Individual investors making the decision
whether to engage in information research will ignore any beneficial
impact from this research on other market participants. As detailed in
the Article's information framework, information research may in
crease the accuracy of the stock market price. To the extent the social
benefit from increased stock market price accuracy exceeds the total
amount spent on information research, investors may have too few in
centives to engage in securities research.97
More generally, Jack Hirshleifer has shown that where informa
tion research may in fact affect resource allocation decisions (due to
shifts in prices resulting from the research), trading profits resulting
from the investments in information may create either excessive or in
sufficient incentives for the trader to produce the information.98
Hirshleifer was analyzing the potential trading profits that might be
garnered from a new invention (in the absence of patent law), but his
analysis is equally applicable to the incentives to produce other types
of socially valuable information.99
sider trading may prove socially wasteful to the extent outside investment analysts compete
with one another to acquire and use the firm-specific information upon which the insiders
are prohibited from trading. See David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasian
Model of Insider Trading, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1449, 1463 (1987) (noting that "[a] ban also
increases incentives for market professionals to invest in ways that speed the acquisition of
firm-specific information. The latter investments constitute a waste of real resources be
cause insiders obtain the same information in the course of their normal duties without
having to expend resources searching for it, and they can transfer the information to the
securities markets more promptly than do the professionals."). Similarities between the race
to gain an information advantage in the securities markets and the race to obtain a patent
exist. For a discussion of the patent race literature, see supra note 91.
97. Note that two of the effects from an information advantage - the trading profits to
informed traders and the trading losses to uninformed traders - are zero-sum in total.
98. See Hirshleifer, supra note 90, at 572. On the other hand, Hirshleifer argued that
where a difference in beliefs exists among individuals, the individuals expend excessive re
sources in disseminating their own private information to the public domain to profit from
an induced change of price. See id. at 569.
99. See id. at 570-72 (noting that "[t)here is no logically necessary tie between the size
of the technological benefit on the one hand, and the amplitude of the price shifts that cre
ate speculative opportunities on the other"); see also Robert G. Hansen & John R. Lott, Jr.,
Profiting from Induced Changes in Competitors' Market Values: The Case of Entry and En
try Deterrence, 43 J. INDUS. ECON. 261 (1995) (expanding on Hirshleifer's insight to show
that economic actors may be motivated through speculative trading profits in the securities
of a wide variety of related companies affected by the economic actors' decisions).
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Despite the possibility that individual investors may choose to en
gage in either too much or too little securities research from a social
welfare perspective, regulators have generally left the decision to en
gage in such research free of regulation. The next Part discusses the
areas in which regulators within the United States in fact have focused
on outsider trading, assessing the efficacy of such provisions given the
Article's informational effects framework.
III. TH E PRESENT U.S. REGULATION OF OUTSIDER TRADING
Securities regulators within the United States have until relatively
recently focused primarily on the trading advantage that insiders of
companies may enjoy in the secondary market with respect to their
own companies' securities. Referred to as "classical" insider trading
doctrine, trading prohibitions placed on insiders are well developed
within the securities laws.100 Eschewing a general approach to all in
formational disparities, classical insider trading doctrine encompasses
trading information derived from the traded firm that a specified set
of investors, insiders, use to their advantage in the markets.
Despite the narrow focus of classical insider trading doctrine, the
securities laws have since branched more generally to address the
trades of outsider traders. Today, outsider traders face securities law
prohibitions against transactions based on nonpublic material infor
mation in three primary areas:101 (a) the misappropriation theory of
insider trading; (b) Rule 14e-3 of the Exchange Act's ban on informed
trades during a tender offer based on information obtained from
either the target or acquiring company;102 and (c) Regulation FD's
limit on the ability of firms to disclose nonpublic, material information
selectively .103 This Part examines each doctrinal area and assesses the
efficacy of the regulations from the perspective of social welfare.
100. See Pritchard, supra note 13, at 18-19 (describing the "classical" theory of insider
trading).
101. Securities laws prohibitions also exist against two specific forms of secondary mar
ket abuses involving outsider trading: frontrunning and scalping. Frontrunning occurs when
a broker-dealer or investment advisor uses information on a. client's upcoming transaction
and trades ahead of the client. Scalping takes place when a broker-dealer or investment ad
visor first invests in a particular security and then second recommends the same security.
After the security price rises as a result of the recommendation, the broker-dealer or in
vestment advisor then sells the securities for a profit See David M. Bovi, Rule lOb-5 Liabil
ity for Front-Riinning: Adding a New Dimension to the "Money Game, " 7 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 103, 103-04 (1994) (defining frontrunning and scalping and discussing legal prohibi
tions). Similarly, the federal mail and wire fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2000) ,
may also apply to the misappropriation of intangible information. See RALPH C. FERRARA
ET AL., INSIDER TRADING AND THE WALL § 2.03 (2000).
102. See Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e)
(2000); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2001).
103. Because the information obtained through a selective information disclosure de
rives from the traded firm, Regulation FD may be viewed as a part of the classical insider
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A. Misappropriation Theory
From the perspective of capital market liquidity and investor wel
fare, all forms of informational disparities have common effects on the
risks uninformed investors face as well as the efficiency of the market
price. Although the present securities laws lack a general provision
dealing with informational disparities, one doctrine comes close: the
misappropriation theory of insider trading.104 Unlike classical insider
trading theory, the misappropriation theory focuses on all possible
sources of information giving traders an advantage over uninformed
investors. The misappropriation theory makes it unlawful for anyone
to trade based on information obtained through a breach of fiduciary
duty involving deception of the source of the information.105 The rule
assigns to the source a limited right to prohibit unannounced trades by
its agents on the basis of material, nonpublic information obtained
from the source.
Significantly, the misappropriation theory does not encompass all
forms of outsider trading advantage. Any original "source" of infor
mation, for example, may trade freely on that information. Any out
sider trader that obtains the information without breaching a fiduciary
duty may trade on the information.106 Even an outsider trader that
does breach her fiduciary duty to the source in obtaining information
may avoid misappropriation liability simply by disclosing the theft to
the source prior to engaging in trades. io7
One possible justification for the reach of the misappropriation
doctrine is that most misappropriated information represents an

trading prohibitions. Indeed, even prior to the promulgation of Regulation FD, tippees
(people receiving tips from insiders) were prohibited from trading on information on which
the tipper herself could not have traded at least to the extent the tipper violated her fiduci
ary duties (and received a personal gain) from providing the tip and the tippee either knew
or reasonably should have known of the breach. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662-67
(1983). Despite the derivation from the traded firm, informational advantages based on se
lective disclosures nevertheless affect the information environment in which outsider trad
ers find themselves and are therefore considered within our outsider trading framework.
104. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (upholding the misappropria
tion theory of insider trading).
105. See id. at 653-56. The misappropriation theory in essence prohibits "fraud on the
source." Ayres & Bankman, supra note 9, at 255.
106. See, e.g., Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regularion, supra note 21, at 1621 (arguing
that removing the fiduciary duty requirement and taking a property rights approach would
allow insider trading prohibitions to reach the "complete stranger" that purloins informa
tion from a source).
107. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655 ("[F]ull disclosure forecloses liability under the mis
appropriation theory . . . if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to trade on the
nonpublic information, there is no 'deceptive device' and thus no § lO(b) violation . . . . ).
The source, nevertheless, may bring a suit under state law for breach of fiduciary duty. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 & cmt. c ( 1957).
"
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unerodable advantage for the outsider trader.108 To the extent misap
propriated information otherwise would not be available to the gen
eral securities markets (regardless of any lawful effort . expended in
duplicating such information), outside investors may lose confidence
in the market. Moreover, to the extent the unerodable advantage is
typically casually acquired, banning the use of such information in
trades will not adversely affect incentives to generate new informa
tion.109
The focus on whether information is unerodable, however, ignores
several effects of informed trading upon social welfare. First, trades
based on even unerodable advantages may increase social welfare as
the trades incorporate new information into the stock market price.
When a state lottery selects a specific manufacturer to provide video
poker machines in the state (and keeps the information confiden
tial),110 trades on the part of a misappropriating lottery official may re
sult in a shift in the stock market price of the manufacturer (and its
competitors) to reflect such information indirectly. Second, trades
based on erodable advantages are not always beneficial from a socie
tal perspective. To the extent multiple investors compete with one an
other in a race to obtain an erodable advantage (even for a short pe
riod of time), they will incur potentially costly and duplicative
research costs.
Another justification for the misappropriation doctrine is the need
to protect the original source's ability to profit from the use of infor
mation. In the literature this is sometimes referred to as the "property
rights rationale."111 Without such protection, the original source may
108. See Brudney, supra note 15, at 354 (setting forth the unerodable advantages theory
of insider trading liability); see also supra note 22 (detailing how the present misappropria
tion doctrine does not precisely track the unerodable advantages theory).
Not all information that would fall under the misappropriation theory, however, meets
the definition of an unerodable information advantage. For example, Fidelity may expend
resources in developing information on the correct valuation of IBM. Such information is
erodable in the sense that others in the market may lawfully (with a similar expenditure of
resources) duplicate the information. Nevertheless, when a Fidelity analyst engages in per
sonal trades based on such information in breach of her fiduciary duty (hiding the trades
from Fidelity), she will run afoul of the misappropriation doctrine.
109. See supra note 15 (discussing Brudney's limitation on the concept of unerodable
advantages to only casually acquired advantages); see also Brudney, supra note 15, at 362
(arguing that unerodable information advantages based on information related to a trader's
"knowledge of the price impact of his contemplated later purchases or sales" should never
theless be allowable because prohibiting such an advantage "would require a sharing of
valuations and judgments, and pro tanto reduce the rewards for risks undertaken by buyers,
without reducing the risks or allocating the diverted part of the reward to a new risk
taker").
110. See supra note 7 (describing the United States v. Bryan case).
1 11. See, e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 , 576-77 {2d Cir. 1991) (en bane)
(Winter, J., dissenting) ("Information is . . . expensive to produce, and, because it involves
facts and ideas that can be easily photocopied or carried in one's head, there is a ubiquitous
risk that those who pay to produce information will see others reap the profit from it. . . . If
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have a reduced incentive to generate the information.1t2 If protecting
the source justifies the misappropriation theory, however, puzzles re
main. The doctrine's emphasis on fiduciary duty, for example, allows
thieves and eavesdroppers to make use of purloined information.113 In
response, Stephen Bainbridge has argued for a more explicit property
rights approach, arguing that the misappropriation doctrine should
turn on a simple question: "did the defendant convert nonpublic in
formation belonging to another for personal gain?"1 14 In the case of a
thief, the misappropriation theory would apply under Bainbridge's
proposal to the extent the thief violated the relevant state law prohibi
tions against theft of confidential information.115 Sources of informa
tion would then be able to retain the benefit from information produc
tion, encouraging such production.
Our earlier internalization analysis suggests, however, that the
property rights rationale gives an investor - assuming the investor is
the source of its own information advantage - incomplete incentives
from a social perspective in deciding how much to engage in informa
tion research. Each individual investor internalizes only its expendi
tures to obtain information and its expected benefit from the use of
this information, ignoring the cost to uninformed shareholders as well
as the benefit to such shareholders (as well as to third parties) from
the increase in accuracy due to informed trades. In addition, many
sources of information may already enjoy sufficient incentives to cre
ate information even without property rights-type protection. Casually
the law fails to protect property rights in commercial information, therefore, less will be in
vested in generating such information."); see also Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law, su
pra note 12, at 1252-57; Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation, supra note 21, at 1 591
("The insider trading prohibition ought to be viewed as a means of protecting property
rights in information, rather than as a means of preventing securities fraud."); Dennis W.
Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. R EV. 857, 861
(1983); Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 683, 718-19 (1980).
1 12. Note, however, that the misappropriation theory may generate insider trading li
ability for breaches of a wide variety of relationships of trust and confidence that have little
to do with the generation of information. For example, the misappropriation theory applies
to breaches of "family" relationships of trust. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2001). Breach of
the relationship between a psychiatrist and patient may also give rise to misappropriation
theory liability. See, e.g., United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
1 1 3. In considering the rare complete stranger case, Bainbridge states "one thinks of
the scene in WALL STREET in which Charlie Sheen's character breaks into an office."
Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation, supra note 21, at 1621.
114. See id. On the other hand, to the extent the source of information has an incentive
to protect its own information and state laws exist to prohibit the theft of information, the
magnitude of information misappropriation that occurs through theft and eavesdropping
may not amount to much.
1 15. Id. Bainbridge's approach would therefore do away with odd results stemming
from the O'Hagan opinion. For example, under O'Hagan, Bainbridge notes that the "bra
zen misappropriator" that takes information from the source and then simply discloses the
theft to the source may trade without violating insider trading laws. See id. at 1633-34.
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acquired non-trading information, for example, will continue to be
produced regardless of legal protection under the misappropriation
theory.116 While it is superficially attractive to protect the hard-earned
profits of a source that deliberately acquired the information, it is
simply not the case that trading on such information will necessarily
increase social welfare.
Others have moved away from focusing on property rights-based
rationales to consider the capital market impacts of information ad
vantages in the context of the misappropriation theory. Adam
Pritchard, for example, has made the argument that the present mis
appropriation doctrine in fact protects "the integrity of the stock mar
ket" and thereby capital formation and liquidity in the markets.117 Fo
cusing on investor confidence as important to capital formation and
market liquidity, Pritchard argues that information advantages differ
based on how a trader obtains the information. Where the trader ob
tains an information advantage through a fiduciary breach and not
through her own hard work and diligence, other investors will lose
systematically and demand a greater price discount at the time they
initially purchase shares.118 Market makers, similarly at a disadvan
tage, will increase their bid-ask spread to the detriment of all inves
tors.119 On the other hand, Pritchard argues that traders who obtain an
information advantage through their own hard work should be able to
profit from such an advantage. Through such efforts, the market's in
formational efficiency is enhanced.120 Pritchard then supports the pre
sent misappropriation theory with the argument that the theory's fo
cus on the presence of a fiduciary duty breach divides traders into

116. See Hirshleifer, supra note 90, at 570-72; see also Brudney, supra note 15, at 356-57
(arguing that "[i]nformation about the value of securities that is legitimately acquired in
circumstances that preclude the acquirer from disclosing it or suggest that his source will not
disclose it to others is not generally accumulated for use by its possessor in personal trading
in securities . . . and therefore the incentive for personal gains from trading is not necessary
to induce those few to pursue it").
117. Pritchard, supra note 13, at 48. Pritchard also supports the misappropriation doc
trine as a sensible interpretation of Section lO{b) of the Exchange Act See id. at 54 ("The
disclosure duties imposed by the common law of agency provide a rational, comprehensible
basis for determining whether an agent's breach of duty constitutes a deception within the
meaning of § lO(b).").
1 1 8. See id. at 49 ("Investors are reluctant to play in what they perceive to be a rigged
game. At a minimum, they must be compensated for bearing the risk that the game is
fixed.").
119. See id. at 50.
120. See id. at 51 ("These [information-related research) efforts are essential to the in
formational efficiency of the stock market. Accordingly, the misappropriation theory does
not interfere with the legitimate processes that lead to efficient pricing of securities in the
way that a broader parity of information theory might.").
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those who engage in beneficial information research and those who do
not.121
Pritchard's arguments, nevertheless, are vulnerable to at least
three possible criticisms. First, not all information obtained without a
breach of a fiduciary duty is due to the hard work of the trader; for
example, a casual eavesdropper is not covered under the present mis
appropriation doctrine.122 Moreover, because the misappropriation
theory is based on deception, a person may trade on information ob
tained through a fiduciary duty breach so long as they are open about
the breach with the source of the information.123
Second, even information obtained through a breach of fiduciary
duty and used in securities transactions may help enhance the infor
mational efficiency of the markets. Consider Frank. Frank works for
the Axlon Inc. and learns about a confidential product strategy shift
on the part of Axlon that casts a positive light on Texon's valuation.124
Suppose that Frank expends $2 to steal the Axion product shift infor
mation.125 Moreover, Frank gains $100 from using the information in
trades with uninformed Texon shareholders. Conversely, uninformed
Texon shareholders lose $100. Trades based on the information also
increase the accuracy of Texon's stock, resulting in a $10 overall gain
to investors and third parties. Even though Frank expends only $2, to
the extent his theft does not affect Axion's shift in product strategy,126
Frank's activities have resulted in a net social gain of $8.
Third, even information obtained through hard work may not in
crease social welfare. Traders may engage in costly duplicative re
search to obtain an advantage over one another.127 Traders competing
•

121. See id. at 51 ("At the same time, however, the misappropriation theory has natural
limits, implicit in the common law of agency, that make its application predictable and pre
vent it from becoming the 'parity of information' theory that Powell feared. By limiting the
misappropriation theory to information obtained in breach of a duty, the common law of
agency protects individuals who have gained their informational advantage through supe
rior insight or hard work."); cf Kronman, supra note 12, at 9-18 (making the argument in
the contract law setting that parties should not be forced to disclose information where the
disclosure would undermine their incentives to engage in socially beneficial information
research).
1 22. See supra note 113.
1 23. See supra note 115 (discussing the "brazen" misappropriator).
124. Information generated on the product strategy shift is an example of what this
Article terms "non-trading information." Such information is created without regard to the
trading profits from such information. See text accompanying note 85; Kronman, supra note
1 2.
125. For example, Frank may have to stay late at work to purloin the information with
out knowledge of anyone else at Axion, imposing a personal cost of $2 on Frank.
126. For example, even though Frank trades Texon's securities based on the informa
tion, the information may remain confidential enough to allow Axion to move forward with
its new product strategy.
1 27. See Eugene F. Fama & Arthur B. Laffer, Information and Capital Markets, 44 J.
Bus. L. 289 (197 1 ); Hirshleifer, supra note 90, at 572.
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with one another will dissipate their trading profits, ignoring the nega
tive effect their activities have on other traders.128 Moreover, where
the information would otherwise have entered into the public capital
markets in any case, such information expenditures result in little ac
curacy benefit. Indeed, the less spent in providing information to the
market, all other things being equal, the higher is the social welfare.
In sum, Pritchard's justification for privileging a source's hard
earned investments in material, nonpublic information is unpersuasive
because the outside source acting privately is not well placed to decide
whether the research and informed trading is on net socially benefi
cial. Counter to Pritchard's argument, it is not even clear whether the
outside source (operating in the absence of the traded firm's consent)
is better placed than the agent in deciding whether to engage in in
formed trading.
Kimberly Krawiec, like Pritchard, has tried to assess the misap
propriation theory taking into account the needs of investors and the
capital markets.129 But in contrast with Pritchard, Krawiec argues that
insider trading prohibitions should apply only to corporate insiders,
constructive insiders, and tippees of such insiders.130 Everyone else,
under her system, would be deemed "corporate outsiders" and enjoy
full freedom to engage in trades regardless of the source of informa
tion. 131 Thus, an eavesdropper would have the ability to use informa
tion she obtained from a firm to engage in trades in the firm's securi
ties. Likewise, a reporter would be able to take information from an
upcoming newspaper article and trade based on the information even
without the newspaper's consent.
In essence, Krawiec's proposal eliminates the misappropriation
theory in its entirety, leaving only the classical insider trading doc
trine. In doing so, Krawiec contends that the lack of insider trading
prohibitions for misappropriated information will not necessarily re
sult in the rampant theft of information. Rather, Krawiec's proposal
simply shifts the burden of protecting the source's property rights to
the source itself through private contract.132 Moreover, Krawiec argues
that her proposal brings clarity to insider trading law through the

128. One could respond that the net social harm from duplicated information expendi
tures is therefore self-limiting. Nevertheless, the duplicated information research costs nec
essary to reach zero economic profits (and thus the self-limiting point for research) may be
substantial. See text accompanying notes 93-96.
1 29. See Krawiec, supra note 22.
130. See id. at 498.
131. See id.
132 See id. at 498-99. Jill Fisch, similarly, recognizes that alternative remedies exist for
misappropriation. See Fisch, supra note 9, at 207 (noting that "standard criminal laws" in
cluding laws dealing with embezzlement can deal with instances of misappropriation).
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complete elimination of insider trading prohibition where outsider
trading does not involve an insider tip. 133
But as discussed above,134 allowing outsider traders to engage
freely in trades does not guarantee the optimal level of information
production. Outsider traders may engage in duplicative information
research from a societal perspective. Even where outsider traders do
not engage in duplicative research, they ignore the loss to uninformed
investors from their trades. Outsider traders also ignore the accuracy
benefit their trades have for securities market prices. 135
Because outsider traders sometimes have an incentive to engage in
too much or too little research, it is difficult for regulators to decide ex
ante which types of outside informed trading are socially beneficial
(and hence permitted) and which types are socially detrimental (and
hence prohibited). Determining what informational disparities maxi
mize investor welfare is specific to particular traded firms and depends
on the situation surrounding a particular disclosure. For example,
small investors may not suffer great harm to the extent they may sim
ply invest through large institutional investors, essentially purchasing
the informational resources of the institutional investors. Careful bal
ancing of the harm to small, uninformed investors from being at an in
formational disadvantage against the benefits to stock price accuracy
and information production from allowing such advantages is there
fore required. The misappropriation theory fails to make this balance
through its blanket prohibition of some types of outside information
advantages but not others. But in any event, those that support the
misappropriation theory ignore the 800-pound gorilla sitting in the

133. See Krawiec, supra note 21, at 499 (stating that "privatizing the law of outsider
trading lends clarity to the regulatory scheme by permitting under federal law all outsider
trading that does not involve an insider tip").
134. See supra Section II.A {discussing the social costs and benefits of outsider informa
tion research).
135. Jill Fisch also recognizes the limits of both classical and misappropriation insider
trading theories in failing to reach all problematic instances where an information advan
tage exists in the securities markets. See Fisch, supra note 9, at 216-17 (noting that a supplier
trading the securities of a corporation using information obtained from the supplier's rela
tionship with the corporation may pose the "same dangers of manipulation of corporate
events and harm to the corporation as trading by insiders"). In dividing problematic infor
mation advantages from nonproblematic advantages, Fisch relies on the notion that corpo
rate insiders of public corporations owe a duty to the marketplace. See id. at 227-28 (arguing
that such a duty is fair given that "the corporate insider's superior access, due to his posi
tion, may be partially attributed to government and public participation in the markets").
Fisch argues that her focus allows insider trading liability to focus on ensuring the integrity
of the mandatory disclosure system, limiting the incentive of managers to manipulate the
disclosure of corporate information to increase insider trading profits, and on maintaining
"objectives of market fairness". Id. at 239. Fisch's notion of fairness, however, derives from
Brudney's theory of "unerodable" information advantages, see supra notes 15-24 and ac
companying text, and therefore ignores the various costs and benefits of information re
search discussed in this Article.
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room136 - that is, the traded firm itself, which is much better situated
to decide whether particular classes of informed trading are socially
beneficial but are disenfranchised under the present regime.
B.

Rule 14e-3 Tender Offer Rule

When any person initiates a tender offer for an Exchange Act re
porting company's stock,137 a special prohibition against the use of
nonpublic material information goes into effect under Rule 14e-3 of
the Exchange Act.138 Once a tender offer is initiated, Rule 14e-3 pro
hibits any person other than the potential acquirer from trading based
on nonpublic material information obtained from the target company,
the acquirer, or an officer or director of either, among others.139 Un
like the misappropriation theory, the prohibition extends regardless of
the presence of deception or the breach of a fiduciary duty.
Rule 14e-3's specialized approach with respect to tender offers,
in turn, might be justifiable to the extent the SEC has to make an
all-or-nothing command and control decision. In the absence of
Rule 14e-3-like restrictions, affected firms might have to invest exces
sive resources in maintaining security to ascertain that outsiders did
not obtain information about a tender offer. Like the inefficiency of
excessive locks in the absence of burglary laws,140 the absence of
outsider trading restrictions would likely induce excessive victim
precaution to insure that Gordon Geckos of the world did not disrupt
or free ride on an acquirer's acquisition plans.141 Mere reliance on
136. Neither author has actually ever been in a room with an 800-pound gorilla. It must
be noted that the average weight of a male gorilla is actually between 300 and 500 pounds.
See About Gorillas, at http://www.koko.org/about/facts.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2002).
137. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 imposes periodic information reporting re
quirements for certain issuers, commonly known as "Exchange Act reporting companies".
Companies listed on a national securities exchange must register and comply with the SEC's
periodic information disclosure requirements. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 78l(b) (2000); see
also 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(l) (2000) (defining "exchange" for the purposes of the Exchange
Act). Companies whose total assets exceed $10 million and have a class of equity security
(other than an exempted security) held of record by more than 500 shareholders must regis
ter the securities under the Act and thereby come under the periodic reporting require
ments of 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a). See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l(g), (I);
see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (2001) (raising the asset requirement to $10 million).
138. Rule 14e-3, takes effect when "any person has taken a substantial step or steps to
commence, or has commenced, a tender offer . . . . " 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2001).
139. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2001). Note that the acquirer is not included within the
reach of Rule 14e-3. Nevertheless, the Williams Act imposes other restrictions on the ability
of the acquirer to purchase stock that increase the acquirer's ownership above five percent
in the target company. The rule prohibits trading in the stock of the target company in a
tender offer, but does not prohibit informed trading on related firms. See Ayres &
Bankman, supra note 9, at 243.
140. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 204 (3d ed. 1986).
141. Gordon Gecko, of course, is a reference to the 1987 movie Wall Street starring
Michael Douglas and Charlie Sheen. See WALL STREET (Twentieth Century Fox 1987).
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misappropriation restrictions would not be sufficient because as
adumbrated above, outsiders (like the casual or deliberate eavesdrop
per) who are not in contractual privity with the affected firms are not
covered by misappropriation trading restrictions.
But even here the SEC does not need to make an all-or-nothing
command and control decision. Even our realization that misappro
priation doctrine is insufficient is not the same as saying that
Rule 14e-3 liability needs to be mandatory. We could imagine an al
ternative regime in which the Rule 14e-3 trading restrictions were
merely defaults that could be waived by board resolution of the ac
quiring and target boards.142 Consistent with the general thrust of this
Article, if the affected firms consented to such outsider trading (and
they had publicly disclosed that they had consented to such outsider
trading), we can see no reason why the trading should not go for
ward.143 Let us quickly add that we predict that such consent by both
the acquiring and traded firms would rarely be forthcoming,144 so on a
pragmatic level we do not see much of an efficiency loss involved in
making the Rule 14e-3 trading restrictions waivable by the affected
firms.
C.

Regulation FD

The securities laws also attempt to move beyond classical insider
trading prohibitions to take a more expansive approach to informa-

142. We would subject to much higher self-dealing scrutiny opt outs that allowed man
agers to trade on the basis of tender offer information. See infra Section IV.A.2 (discussing
methods of dealing with the problem of managerial self-dealing under the Article's pro
posal).
143. Adam Pritchard, on the other hand, has made the observation that Rule 14e-3's
prohibitions against trades in the target firm's stock should not be waivable by a potential
acquirer. Without Rule 14e-3, a potential acquirer could tip off favored arbitrageurs in re
turn for the agreement on the part of the arbitrageurs to tender their shares to the acquirer.
Arbitrageurs that fa iled to tender would not receive a tip the next time the acquirer seeks to
make an acquisition, leading to the possibility of coercive tender offers. See E-mail from
Adam Pritchard to authors (Oct. 2, 2001) (on file with authors). To the extent we would
require waiver on the part of the target company to reduce the scope of Rule 14e-3, how
ever, our proposal avoids the problem of coercive tender offers that Pritchard mentions.
144. The acquiring firm would rarely waive because doing so would drive up the cost of
acquiring a toe-hold position in the target. We would not allow a target firm to unilaterally
waive the Rule 14e-3 duty against informed tender trading because doing so might entrench
management by reducing the prospective profitability of a takeover.
Waiving the trading restriction might create possible benefits to the traded firms in
terms of stock price accuracy. But we are skeptical that in a tender offer context that the
short term increase in price accuracy would outweigh the need for secrecy. A more impor
tant possibility is that the firms might grant limited waivers to entities that helped facilitate
the merger, but we are hard pressed to argue that granting trading rights would dominate
non-trading compensation.
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tional disparities through Regulation FD of the Exchange Act.145 Ap
plying only to Exchange Act reporting companies,146 Regulation FD
focuses on selective disclosures of nonpublic material information
from specified sourc�s within the traded firm to a delineated subset of
outside market participants. Top company executives as well as em
ployees whose primary responsibility involves communication with
shareholders, among others, are included among company sources
that fall within the ambit of Regulation FD.147 Outside market partici
pants that receive such selective disclosures and fall under Regulation
FD include securities brokers, investment analysts, investment com
panies, and any investor reasonably expected to trade based on the
information.148 When a specific company source makes a selective dis
closure to one of the delineated outside market participants, Regula
tion FD then works to make the disclosure unlawful to the extent the
company does not also disclose the information to the public securities
markets.149 Where the selective disclosure is intentional, Regulation
FD requires that the traded firm simultaneously make the disclosure
also to the entire market.150 If unintentional, the traded firm has the
lesser of twenty-four hours or when the NYSE commences trading to
disclose the information to the entire market.151
The Article's internalization framework, nonetheless, calls into
question the blanket prohibition on the use of nonpublic material in
formation within the traded firm to favor particular market partici
pants selectively. Although the provision of an information advantage
will certainly harm uninformed investors, selective disclosures may re145. See SEC, Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, supra note 5; see also supra
note 103 (discussing the relationship of Regulation FD and classical insider trading prohibi
tions including tipper·tippee liability).
146. See supra note 137 (defining Exchange Act reporting companies).
147. See Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.lOl(b) (2001), (defining "issuer" to encompass
primarily Exchange Act reporting companies); see also Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R.
§ 243.lOl(c) (2001) (stating that a " 'Person acting on behalf of an issuer' means any senior
official of the issuer (or, in the case of a closed-end investment company, a senior official of
the issuer's investment adviser), or any other officer, employee, or agent of an issuer who
regularly communicates with any person described in 17 C.F.R. § 243.lOO(b)(l){i), (ii), or
(iii), or with holders of the issuer's securities").
·

148. See Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.lOO(a) (2001) (requiring issuers to make pub
lic disclosures of nonpublic material information disclosed selectively to persons described
in Rule lOO(b)(l) of Regulation FD).
149. See id.
150. See Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.lOO(a)(l) (2001) (requiring simultaneous dis
closure in the case of intentional selective disclosure).
151. See Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a)(2) (2001) (requiring disclosure
"promptly" in the case of unintentional selective disclosures); Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R.
§ 243.lOl(d) (2001) (defining "promptly"). Note that Regulation FD specifically excludes
the possibility of private causes of actions based on violations of Regulation FD to reduce
the chilling effect from nuisance suits. See SEC, Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading,
supra note 5.

358

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 101:313

suit in non-trading benefits for the traded firm and its shareholders.
The promise of selective disclosures, for example, may induce an
analyst to initiate coverage of a particular company. Likewise, selec
tive disclosures may also help compensate an investor for taking on
the undiversified risk of assembling a block of shares in situations
where the block monitors management for agency problems.152
The key point is not that selective disclosures are always beneficial
to the traded firm and its shareholders. Indeed, opportunistic manag
ers may make use of selective disclosures to favor analysts and outside
block shareholders, in return for support of the managers' self
interested policies.153 Rather, selective disclosures may provide net
benefits in certain specific instances. Whether such disclosures are
used to induce an analyst to research the traded firm or to compensate
large block investors in forming their blocks of shares, the value of the
traded firm may increase. Particularly for selective disclosures, the
traded firm as the source of the information will internalize much of
the disparate effects. Once again, command and control prohibitions
based on regulators' decisions of what is right and what is wrong are
not the answer. Regulators, instead, should step back from prohibiting
the use of information as a mandatory matter and instead rely on the
traded firm (with appropriate safeguards against managerial self
dealing) to make such determinations.
IV.

INTERNALIZING OUTSIDER TRADING

Under the Article's framework, no single market participant inter
nalizes all the various effects from informed trading. But the trader
and the traded firm jointly internalize the vast majority of the effects
related to social efficiency. This Part sets forth the proposal that the
market, and not regulators, should determine the level of permissible
information advantages among investors.
A. The Outsider Trader Dilemma
The Article's analysis calls into question the laissez-faire approach
to outsider trading. Left to their own devices, outsider traders take
into account far fewer consequences from the decision to engage in
information research to profit from securities trades than a traded
firm would take into account in deciding whether to allow its insiders

152. See Ian Ayres & Peter Cramton, Relational Investing and Agency Theory, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 1033, 1062-63 (1994) (arguing that block shareholders with a long-term
relationship with management may serve to monitor for agency problems and help imple
ment optimal implicit contractual arrangements).
153. For a detailed discussion of the problem of managerial opportunism through selec
tive disclosures, see Choi, supra note 5.
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to engage in insider trading. Informed outsider traders, for example,
completely ignore the corresponding trading losses uninformed inves
tors receive due to the informed trades. And outsider traders also ig
nore any accuracy benefit from their trades on securities market prices
not only to third parties but to other investors in the traded firm. For
those that support the regulation of insider trading, therefore, outsider
trading should pose an equally appealing target for regulation.
We hesitate, however, to suggest that the government get involved
in the direct regulation of outsider trading. Government regulation it
self is not without costs. And the costs of government regulation may
be even higher for outsider trading compared with the regulation of
insider trading. In the insider trading context, regulators take a
"corner solution" approach and simply ban all insider trades based on
material nonpublic information.154 Such a one-size-fits-all approach,
however, is not presently taken in the outsider trading context. In
deed, Rule 14e-3 and the scope of the present misappropriation doc
trine provide a variegated landscape of allowable and disallowed types
of outsider trading.155 Firms with different types of investors and mar
ket capitalization, moreover, may prefer varying levels of informed
outsider trading.156 Regulators may lack information on the precise
level of outsider trading that maximizes a particular firm's value.
Regulators may also act only slowly to adjust the level of outsider
trading to changed circumstances in any particular firm. Moreover,
once regulators attempt to provide more tailored regulation for par
ticular firms, regulators may face an increased risk of coming under
the influence of the various securities market professionals, leading to
regulations less designed to increase overall social welfare and more
tailored toward the interests of such groups.157·
Instead, we look to another possible source of regulation: the
traded firm itself. This Article proposes that regulators should focus
on the traded firm as the agent for internalization. If the traded firm
consents ex ante to a particular type of informed trading and if the
154. Pritchard, supra note 13, at 18-19 (describing the "classical" theory of insider
trading).
155. See supra Part III (describing the present regulation of outsider trading).
156. See supra notes 135-136 and accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for
Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic
Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). In the securities law context, the secu
rities bar and underwriters have influenced what courts and the SEC have required for due
diligence under section 1 1 of the Securities Act of 1933. See Reinier H. Kraakman, Gate
keepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 83
(1986) ("Over the years, the securities bar and the underwriting community have honed the
chief Section 11 investigation - the underwriter's due diligence investigation - into model
verification procedures."); Jonathan R. Macey, A dministrative Agency Obsolescence and
Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909
{1994).
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outsider trader actually proceeds to trade on such information, then
their combined revealed preference strongly signals that such trading
is socially valuable. Some may question whether in fact a traded firm
will find it feasible to distinguish and restrict informed trading among
potentially thousands of secondary market trades daily. Nonetheless,
several possible mechanisms exist.158 Through trading delays coupled
with disclosure on intended trades, for example, regulators may force
those with information to signal their information to the market prior
to their trades, reducing the profit from informed trades.159 Those in
vestors who do not face a delay - pursuant to the traded firm's con
sent - may then profit from observing the trade signals of those fac
ing a trading delay. Moreover, compared with the insider trading
context, our proposal's reliance on the traded firm poses fewer third
party externality and managerial self-dealing problems. Before turn
ing to the details of our proposal, we discuss the two most serious lim
its to our internalization thesis: externalized benefits from informed
trading and self-dealing problems.
1.

Third-Party Externalities

The internalization proposal depends on the ability of the firm
whose securities are being traded to internalize all the different effects
of information disparities in the market. Firms, however, may ignore
the benefit of increased stock price accuracy to third parties that look
to stock price in making decisions.160 Competitors, for example, may
look to a rival firm's stock price in determining whether to enter a
new product market.161 Zohar Goshen and Gideon Parchomovsky,
similarly, argue that analyst-driven information research provides
positive externalities to the entire securities information market that
individual analysts and firms fail to capture.162 They argue, for exam
ple, that multiple analysts help build up a common information pool
that may assist other analysts in their efforts to value companies.163
158. We discuss these mechanisms more fully infra Section IV.B.3.
1 59. See text accompanying notes 280-296 (discussing the Article's delayed-trading rule
proposal).
160. See also supra note 58 (discussing various ways third parties may benefit from
more accurate securities prices).
161. On the other hand, externalities exist in all areas of social interaction. Suppose I
purchase a magazine in New Haven and then travel to Berkeley. When I throw that maga
zine away in Berkeley, I contribute to the trash in Berkeley without internalizing the impact
on the city's residents. Nevertheless, not all externalities necessarily require regulatory in
tervention. Regulators, for example, may suffer from a lack of expertise and therefore make
mistakes. The administrative costs of dealing with all externalities, as well, may be prohibi
tive.
162 See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 5.
163. See id.
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Greater amounts of freely flowing information also may induce more
investors to educate themselves about the financial markets, increas
ing confidence in the markets.164
There are, to our minds, strong answers to each of these criticisms.
First, an individual company will in fact internalize many of the posi
tive effects to its own investors from more accurate securities prices
for information research specific to that particular company.165 Where
having several analysts actively following the company generates su
perior information and a large reduction in each analyst's research
costs compared with a smaller number of analysts, the individual
company wiJI then have an incentive to induce multiple analysts to en
gage in informed trades. In some situations, in fact, a company may
wish to reverse the flow of cash, actively subsidizing the efforts of
analysts and other sources of information on the company's securities
through selective disclosures and other forms of compensation.166
Second, the magnitude of the positive information extemality is
crucial. Firms already take into account many of the benefits from
more accurate securities prices.167 Particularly to the extent the costs
and benefits to a firm's shareholders from allowing information re
search often varies, only a large positive externality (above the level
firms internalize) may lead one to think that always allowing analysts
to engage in research is worthwhile. Significantly, Goshen and
Parchomovsky ignore the possibility that too much information
research may reduce overall social welfare. Where two independent
analysts engage in duplicative information research, the additional ex
penses result in a social loss without any increase in informational effi
ciency.168 Having multiple analysts engaging in duplicative information
164. See id. Along a similar vein, Jack Coffee makes the argument that analysts per
form a valuable function in increasing market efficiency. See Coffee, supra note 92, at 72324 (stating that "most accounts explaining the stock market's efficiency assign a substantial
responsibility to the competition among analysts for securities information"). Analysts,
however, do not capture the full benefit of their activities because information is a public
good. See id. at 726. Coffee therefore advocates mandatory disclosure as a means of subsi
dizing the research efforts of market analysts. See id. at 729. Nevertheless, absent positive
externalities that affect the research of other firms, it is unclear why firms do not already
internalize the benefit from a more efficient stock market price and therefore have close to
full incentives to subsidize the efforts of analysts voluntarily.
165. See text accompanying notes 53-58; see also Romano, supra note 58, at 2368 (ar
guing that investors with diversified portfolios will internalize the benefit of accurate securi
ties prices across all firms in their portfolio).
166. A small company, for example, may use selective disclosures to entice analysts to
initiate coverage of the firm. Analysts incur a fixed cost to cover any particular firm. Small
firms provide the analyst a lower securities volume and clientele interest level upon which
to spread the fixed cost. Selective disclosures therefore may help subsidize the analysts
fixed costs to cover the firm. See Choi, supra note 5, at 545.

167. See text accompanying notes 53-58.
168. See text accompany notes 91-96 (discussing the possibility of duplicative informa
tion research costs among outside investors).
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research, moreover, may not add much to the common pool of avail
able information. Not all information provides the same benefit to the
common pool; while a piece of unique, previously unknown informa
tion may greatly enhance the pool, duplicative information may not
have as great a positive impact.169
Measuring the social benefit of this externality should tum on the
potential improvement in allocative efficiency and not in the potential
for profitable trading opportunities on other stock. The question
should be whether the more accurate pricings lead to better substan
tive decisionmaking in how to deploy or create physical capital. These
potential allocative benefits of enhanced pricing are especially likely
to be small if the outsider trading works merely to incorporate new in
formation into stock prices shortly before it otherwise would have
come to light. Frontrunning the public disclosure of information even if it affects several stocks - is unlikely to enhance social welfare.
Even where externalities are significant, this does not justify re
taining the present outsider-trading regime that gives outside investors
and analysts free reign to engage in informed trading aside from nar
rowly defined exceptions.17° For nonpublic information that is likely to
be known by the traded firm, positive externalities perhaps militate
toward requiring mandatory disclosure by the traded firm - not
laissez-faire outsider trading rights.171 For such inside information,
Jack Coffee, among others, has argued that the existence of strong
positive externalities justifies mandatory disclosure rules.172 If traded
firms are privy to nonpublic information that produces net social
benef�ts because of positive third-party externalities, it is better to
mandate disclosure than to leave it up to unregulated trading by out
siders. Indeed, the strongest case for our internalization proposal con
cerns nonpublic information that the traded firm already knows but
which the government has deemed inappropriate to mandate disclo
sure. An outside trader who expends effort to learn what the traded
firm already knows (and intends to reveal to the market) produces
169. There may be a verification benefit to some duplication (as reflected in the adage
"measure twice, cut once"). But the traded firm will internalize most of the benefits of veri
fication and hence will have the incentive to allow the optimal level of duplication.
1 70. See supra Part I l l (discussing the misappropriation, Rule 14e-3, and Regulation
FD limits on informed outsider trading).
171. Interfirm externalities encompass positive impacts on competitors when one firm
discloses inside information to the market. A competitor, for example, benefits from learn
ing about the disclosing firm's costs of production. For a discussion of interfirm external
ities, see Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is
Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1345-46 (1999) [hereinafter Fox, Retain
ing Mandatory Securities Disclosure]. One of us, nevertheless, has made the argument that
even with the possibility of externalities, mandatory disclosure is not justified See Stephen
J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of
Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998).
172. See Coffee, supra note 92, at 723-33.
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few third-party benefits. The outside trader in this circumstance sim
ply profits by "frontrunning" - trading on the nonpublic information
before the firm makes it public. A common example of this concern is
the frontrunning of a traded firm's periodic disclosure of its sales or
profits. If society is better off having more than quarterly reports of
financial statements, government can easily require it. But in the
absence of such a requirement, a traded firm should be able to
prohibit frontrunning on information that it already possesses but has
chosen not to disclose. In the absence of a mandatory disclosure solu
tion, outsider traders have poor incentives to trade only on outside
information that is likely to be socially beneficial.
There may exist a narrow category of deliberately-acquired, non
public information to which the traded firms are not privy that are ex
pected to produce positive third-party externalities (not captured by
the traded firm or the outsider trader). Allowing outsider trading on
such information is likely to be on net socially beneficial. With regard
to this circumscribed category, mandatory disclosure requirements are
not likely to be effective because the traded firm does not have access
to the information and because the outsider trader will not acquire the
information if it is required to disclose it before trading. There is a
theoretical argument for restricting traded firms' ability to limit out
sider trading with regard to such information. The traded firm - by
not internalizing the informational spillovers that benefit third parties
- may impose socially inefficient trading restrictions on outsiders.
For example, outside analyst forecasts of the weather or future com
puter chip demand are not firm-specific research but instead may cre
ate informational spillovers that enhance allocational efficiency by in
creasing stock price accuracy of several stocks.
The optimal regulatory response to these potential third-party
benefits, however, is not to give outsiders unfe ttered freedom to trade
on any type of nonpublic information. Instead of completely displac
ing the right of traded firms to restrict informed outsider trading, op
timal regulation should merely attempt to limit the ability of traded
firms to block outsider trading that is likely to impose net social bene
fits because of non-internalized third-party benefits.
Traded firms should still have the ability to limit trading on infor
mation that is within the traded firm's own possession. If the airing of
such information is deemed to be socially beneficial it should be pro
duced for the market by mandatory disclosure and not by the duplica
tive efforts of outsiders trying to unearth what the traded firm already
knows. In particular, we see no reason why a traded firm should not
have the right to restrict outside traders from frontrunning on finan
cial information that is already subject to quarterly mandatory disclo
sure.
We believe that traded firms should also have the ability to limit
trading on information that will be made available to the market
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within a reasonable period of time. Even unearthing information that
is not currently within the traded firm's possession may provide few
third-party benefits if the information is of a type that will naturally be
made public to the market. Thus, for example, we believe that a
traded firm should have the right to restrict outsider trading on the
basis of nonpublic information concerning impending government de
cisions. Frontrunning by a few days the disclosure of a patent award or
a Delaware court decision is likely to produce relatively few third
party allocative benefits.
Lastly, we believe that traded firms should have the ability to limit
trading based on "immaterial" information. So-called "noise" traders,
who trade on information that is not related to the underlying funda
mentals of a traded firm, can reduce stock price accuracy if they ex
hibit herd behavior and drive the stock price values away from fun
damentals.173 Noise trading can hurt both the traded firms'
shareholders and third parties. Thus, while we have normally couched
our proposal to allow traded firms to control outsider trading based
on material nonpublic information, we believe there is an even
stronger case for allowing a traded firm to restrict outsider trading
based on immaterial nonpublic information.174
Hardcore supporters of unfettered outsider trading on the grounds
of ubiquitous third party benefits are hard pressed to explain the pres
ence of limits on outsider trading imposed through, among other pro
visions, Rule 14e-3 of the Exchange Act.175 Rule 14e-3's prohibition
against informed outsider trading relating to a tender offer reduces
stock price accuracy and thus refutes the idea that third-party price
accuracy benefits must everywhere and at all times trump other con
siderations. Consonant with our foregoing theory, the third-party
benefits from outsider trading are likely to be small in the tender offer
context because the tender offer will be publicly announced in a rea
sonably short time.
There is no reason to think that Rule 14e-3 exhausts the class of
cases where the social benefits are outweighed by other factors.
Allowing outside traders to front run a tender offer announcement
inefficiently and inequitably transfers values from the tender offer to
the outside trader. Allowing outside traders to front run a quarterly
report inefficiently and inequitably transfers value from the traded
firm's shareholders to the outside trader.
Indeed, hardcore supporters of unfettered outsider trading should
be driven to call for a suppression of what we have called the

173. See Andrei Shleifer & Larry Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to Finance, 4 J .
ECON. PERSP. 19 (1990).
174. We are grateful to Joe Bankman for providing this idea.
175. For a discussion of Ri.de 14e-3, see supra Section 111.B.
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"Laidlaw rights" of uninformed traders. Just as : Laidlaw famously
asked a seller whether "there was any news which was calculated to
enhance the price or value of the article about to be purchased,"176
uninformed block traders often require their trading partners to
reveal the identity of the true party in interest and to warrant that
they do not possess any nonpublic information. But allowing
uninformed traders to extract warranties of this kind restricts the
ambit for profitable outsider trading on the basis of nonpublic infor
mation and thus dampens the potential third-party pricing benefits of
such trades. Strong-form belief in third-party benefits drives one to
suspend Laidlaw rights as well as Rule 14e-3 duties.177 The absence of
such proposals, however, indicates that few people truly believe that
third-party pricing benefits are ever present.
In sum, we concede the existence of some positive pricing exter
nalities that are not likely to be considered by the traded firm. But it is
implausible to think that the optimal regulatory response is to grant
unfettered outside trading rights. Instead, we think optimal regulation
will prohibit traded firms from restricting types of outsider trading
where external benefits are likely to be large, but will retain the ability
of firms to regulate outsider trading where the third-party benefits are
likely to be small. As an empirical matter, we believe that the pricing
externalities that are not susceptible to mandatory disclosure by the
traded firms are likely to be of tertiary importance. 178 Traded firms
and outsider traders jointly internalize the vast bulk of socially rele
vant costs and benefits and therefore using their joint consent to filter
whether informed trading takes place is likely to provide a very strong
second-best solution. Moreover, relying on the traded firm to deter
mine the scope of outsider trading does not mean that regulators must
delegate full discretion to the traded firm. Instead, even giving traded
firms the ability to opt out of the present laissez-faire regime and im
pose limited restrictions on outsider trading based on particular
·

176. Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178, 183 (1817).
177. We do not think that an uninformed trader's Laidlaw rights should be suspended
by either the government or by the traded firm itself. Under our proposal a traded firm that
grants informed trading rights to a single outsider might want to facilitate that trader's
trading opportunities by suspending the ability of uninformed block traders to extract
Laidlaw warranties. One could imagine a regime where the traded firm had the ability to
render such warranties (between two different parties) unenforceable. But we do not think
this would be wise public policy. While the uninformed block trader does not internalize all
the social costs and benefits of extracting a Laidlaw warranty, to allow traded firms to sus
pend the enforceability of such warranties is likely to dry up too much liquidity in the block
sales market. In essence, our proposal would allow both the traded firm and the uninformed
block trader to independently decide how much to resist the transfer effects of informed
trading. We are grateful to Bill Wang and Steve Thel for independently alerting us to this
issue.
178. As Richard Painter pointed out to us, the United States lived under the threat of
SEC prosecution against all informed outsider trading for roughly twenty years after
Chiarella without a noticeable decline in stock market efficiency.
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classes of information - similar to the approach under Rule 14e-3 may improve social welfare without greatly reducing the amount of
information production in the capital markets.179
2.

Managerial Opportunism

The Article puts forth the argument that regulators may assist the
ability of a traded firm to internalize the costs and benefits of outsider
trading through a shift in the right to control informed outsider trad
ing to the traded firm. On one level, the Article mirrors the argument
first advanced by Henry Manne that a traded firm internalizes the
costs and benefits of insider trading.180 The argument for allowing
traded companies to control outsider trading is stronger than Manne's
insider trading proposal. With insider trading, critics may contend that
managers in control of a publicly-held traded firm181 may force the
firm to allow insider trading even when it is not in the best interests of
overall corporate welfare.182 The comparative attraction of the Arti
cle's internalization proposal for outsider trading lies in the relative
lack of opportunism in a traded firm's decision to allow such trading.
The possibility exists, of course, that managers of traded firms may
have self-dealing incentives (which diverge from the shareholders' in
terests) to grant informed trading privileges to particular outsiders for example, only to securities firms with "corrupt" analysts willing to
do the bidding of managers.183 We question the magnitude of such in
centives in the area of outsider trading, however. While managers of a
publicly-held firm will control the decision to allow outsider trading,
they will find it difficult to profit directly from the decision. Absent
some explicit or implicit relationship between the managers and the

1 79. See text accompanying note 218.
1 80. See Manne, supra note 27.
181. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory ofthe Firm, 88 J. POL.
ECON. 288, 288-89 (1980); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership
and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling,
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN.
ECON. 305, 308-10 (1 976); Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of A merican Corporate Finance,
91 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 26-27 (1991) (noting a variety of legal impediments facing share
holders who desire to build up a large block of shares).
182. This is particularly a problem where managers may force firms to engage in a
"mid-stream" shift See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1 549, 1573 (1989) (a "mid-stream" change to corporate governance is one
imposed by a board of directors - and possibly in the board's self-interest - after the ini
tial incorporation of the firm).
183. The problem of corrupt analysts willing to recommend a traded firm even where
not warranted has recently taken center stage in the financial press. See, e.g., Charles
Gasparino & Scot J. Paltrow, SEC Joins Pack, Opens Inquiry Into Analysts, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 26, 2002, at Cl (describing Eliot Spitzer's investigations into analyst recommendations
at Merrill Lynch & Co. and other securities firms as New York's Attorney General).
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outsider trader, the outsider trader will not share its profit with the
managers from engaging in informed trades. The fee the outsider
trader may pay to engage in such trades goes directly to the firm.
Managers may seek to expropriate some of the fee directly from the
corporate treasury. However, direct embezzlement is more observable
and therefore more easily punished through state law than other
forms of self-dealing.
Managers, of course, may seek a hidden implicit deal with an out
sider trader to give the trader the right to engage in informed trades at
a discounted price in return for a cut of the trader's profits paid di
rectly to the managers. The risk of such under-the-table transactions,
nevertheless, is present in all forms of corporate transactions and is
not unique to the sale of the right to engage in informed trades.184 Just
as they do in other self-dealing transactions, state corporate law fidu
ciary duties provide a general deterrence to hidden side deals between
managers and outsider traders.185 Moreover, compared with insider
trading, managers face more hurdles to profit from a hidden side deal
with an outsider trader. Managers, for example, must worry that the
outsider trader may renege on their implicit agreement. Managers
must also contend with the possibility that the payment of funds from
the outsider trader to the manager will be detected.186

184. Goshen and Parchomovsky make a similar point in making the argument that the
market (and not the government) should regulate selective disclosures at least for small,
illiquid traded firms. See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 5, at 1272 ("Given that en
forcement is the key issue, the potential for abuse of selective disclosure is no different than
that of any other fiduciary duty or illegal insider trading.").
185. State corporate law provides the general duty of loyalty under which managers of
a corporation operate. Under the duty of loyalty, managers may not profit at the expense of
the corporation and shareholders. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928)
(stating that the duty of loyalty involves the exercise of "the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive"). See generally ROBERT c. CLARK, CORPORATE LAw 798-800 (1986) (describing
the duty of loyalty under state corporate Jaw). Once managers are engaged in self-dealing,
courts review such transactions under the stringent entire fairness standard, placing the
burden of proof on the defendants, rather than apply the business judgment rule. See, e.g.,
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710-11 (Del. 1983). Delaware provides a variety of
procedural means, nevertheless, for directors to cleanse a self-dealing transaction. See D EL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 1 44 (1991). Disclosure and approval by disinterested directors or by
disinterested shareholders, for example, are both acceptable means of removing the taint
from a self-dealing transaction. See id.; Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976) (re
quiring the demonstration of the "fairness" of a self-dealing transaction when the votes of
interested shareholders determined a ratifying shareholder vote). For the view that state
corporate law fiduciary duties do not effectively control the incentives of managers to profit
at the expense of shareholders, see Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Li
ability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analy
sis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 292 (1986) (stating that "[m]any analyses of corporate law
assume that liability rules enforced by derivative suits play a fundamental role in aligning
the interests of managers and investors. We have shown that this widespread assumption is
not supported by either the theory of liability rules, the available empirical evidence, or the
structure of corporate law").
186. On the other hand, managers may seek compensation in a more indirect form. For
example, managers may grant a large block shareholder the right to engage in informed
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In certain specific situations, nevertheless, managers may profit
from their ability to control the scope of outsider informed trading.
First, we can imagine managers granting informed trading rights as a
defensive tactic to ward off a hostile takeover.187 In such contexts,
courts should scrutinize the targeted grant of informed trading rights
with higher scrutiny (requiring elevated showing of substantive and
procedural fairness) to assure that the grant was likely to further the
interest of the traded firm's shareholders. Because of standard con
cerns about managerial entrenchment, we would also not allow a firm
to restrict informed trading by an acquirer. Just as Rule 14e-3 carves
out an informed trading exception for acquirers,188 we would impose a
mandatory rule allowing acquirers (to whom Rule 14e-3 presently ap
plies) to trade on the basis of nonpublic information that they were
about to launch a tender offer regardless of what limits traded firms
place on general informed trading (limited by requirements of the
Williams Act and the Hart-Scott-Rodino premerger notification pro
gram).1s9
Second, as a general matter, managers may prefer to obscure in
formation about their own poor performance. One of the dimensions
along which the Article proposes that traded firms may tailor the right

trades in return for the large block shareholder's support of managers' control over the
firm. This support, in turn, may allow managers to engage in higher levels of self-dealing
and other rent-extracting activities from the firm. One of us, nevertheless, has argued that
allowing managers to favor shareholders selectively may result in higher aggregate corpo
rate welfare from an ex ante perspective. See Choi & Talley, supra note 45.
187. Managers, for example, may deny an acquirer the right to engage in informed
trades, requiring the acquirer to disclose any intention of pursuing a tender offer upfront,
potentially increasing the price of the target's shares and thereby the cost to the acquirer of
engaging in the takeover.
188. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (2001) (imposing trading restrictions on "any other
person" aside from the "offering person"); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(c) (2001) (excluding bro
kers and other agents of the "offering person" from Rule 14e-3's trading restrictions).
189. The Williams Act, an amendment to the Exchange Act, is contained in §§ 13(d)
(e) and 14(d)-(f) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e) and 78n(d)-(f) and the
regulations thereunder, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-l to 13e-101, 240.14a-l to 14f-1 (2002). The
Williams Act imposes a variety of regulations on a tender offer including mandatory disclo
sure and antifraud provisions as well as procedural restrictions. The Williams Act, for ex
ample, requires that all shareholders receive "equal treatment." See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10
(2001) (requiring that the "tender offer is open to all security holders of the class of securi
ties subject to the tender offer" and that "the consideration paid to any security holder pur
suant to the tender offer is the highest consideration paid to any other security holder dur
ing such tender offer").
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Improvements Act of 1976 established a premerger notification
program requiring parties to a merger or the acquirer in a tender offer meeting certain size
requirements to notify the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission prior to completing the transaction. See § 7A of the Clayton Act (codi
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2000)); see also William J . Baer, Reflections on Twenty Years of
Merger Enforcement Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 825 (1997) (as
sessing the impact of the Hart-Scott-Rodino premerger notification program).
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to engage in informed trading is the scope of information.190 In select
ing the scope of allowable information, managers may force the
traded firm to restrict outsider trades based on negative information
on managerial quality. Regulators, therefore, may wish to impose a
blanket limit on the ability of traded firms to block selectively the use
of negative manager-related information in trades. Regulators might
even want to prohibit traded firms from restricting informed short
sales because of the concern that managers may only be restricting
short sales to cover up their bad management. But conversely, we do
not see how restrictions on long purchases would serve to entrench
managers,191 and such restrictions by traded firms' management should
accordingly receive less scrutiny.
Third, because of concerns with the inefficiency of monopoly
pricing, we would impose a narrow mandatory rule that prohibited a
monopolist (or market dominant) producer from blocking a rival's
ability to sell the monopolist's shares short. Richard Hansen and John
Lott have shown that giving entrants the ability to sell an incumbent's
shares short just before entering the market may facilitate socially
beneficial entry.192
Moreover, we view these mandatory exceptions to a traded firm's
sovereignty over informed trading as being consistent with our
broader internalization framework. Managers' self-interest in pre
serving their jobs in certain specific situations may undermine our
confidence in a firm's decision to block the right of outsiders to en
gage in informed trades.193 Aside from these narrow contexts, how
ever, outsider trading provides few opportunities for self-interested
managers.

190. See text accompanying notes 272-273.
191. Howell Jackson pointed out to us that managers may wish to curtail all outsider
trading to give them more room to profit from insider trading. By disabling the ability of the
palace guards just outside the firm to compete for informed trading profits, inside managers
could potentially make more money. But we would rely on the current prohibitions on in
sider trading (or, under a Manne regime, on a substantive scrutiny of the price insiders paid
for the trading rights) to handle this inefficiency.
192. See Hansen & Lott, supra note 99, at 263-67 (setting forth a model demonstrating
that the possibility of an entrant shorting an incumbent's stock prior to entry increases the
likelihood of entry when the perceived probability of entry is less than 50% ); see also JOHN
R. LOTI, JR., ARE PREDATORY COMMITMENTS CREDIBLE?: WHO SHOULD THE COURTS
BELIEVE? (1999) (providing historical examples of one company short selling another com
pany's stock).
193. An argument exists, nonetheless, that firms at the time they go public will take
into account the possibility of managerial self-dealing and impose limits in the corporate
charter restricting the ability of the traded firm to restrict informed outsider trading into the
future. See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 79, at 305-07. But see Gordon, supra note
182, at 1573 (arguing that, because drafting a complete corporate contract at the time a
company initially goes public is prohibitively expensive, firms will necessarily build in a
process for amendments to the corporate charter in the future that may lead to possible op
portunistic amendments on the part of managers).
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B. Internalization Proposal
The present securities regime effectively grants all outsider traders
a "property" right to engage freely in information research.194 Ex
cluding inside information and information obtained through a fiduci
ary breach, an outsider trader is free to make trades based on an in
formation advantage. As discussed above, however, outsider traders
individually ignore several effects of their informed trades on other
market participants. On the one hand, informed traders may ignore
the losses they impose on the other side of the transaction and the
higher bid-ask spreads they impose generally on the shareholders of
the traded firm.195 On the other hand, outsider traders may ignore the
benefit they provide market participants from the increase in stock
price accuracy resulting from their trades (among other impacts). De
pending on the particular company, outsider trading may generate ei
ther too little or too much information research.
In theory, the traded firm might bribe outsider traders to internal
ize effects that the traders would otherwise ignore.196 Although indi
vidual outsider traders may ignore the positive and negative effects of
their trades on other market participants, the traded firm potentially
will take such effects into account. In a world without transaction
costs, the traded firm may then contract and negotiate with individual
outsider traders to determine the optimal amount of informed trading.
Even where the right to engage in informed trades rests with outsider
traders, Coase's theorem provides that the traded firm should be able
to pay off the outsider traders.197 To the extent the cost from the in
formed trades to the traded firm's shareholders exceeds the individual
benefit to the outsider traders, a value-increasing transaction that in-

194. See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 5 (providing a justification for this prop
erty right).
1 95. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text (delineating the harmed parties from
informed trades).
196. Later, infra Section IV.B.2, we will also discuss the possibility that the traded firm
could issue restricted shares that would prohibit informed outsider trading and thereby in
duce outsider traders to bribe the traded firm for the right to engage in informed trading.
Traded firms may also attempt to disclose information to reduce the amount of possible in
formation advantage possible through outside research. Not all information relevant to the
firm is contained inside the firm, however. Likewise, the traded firm may contract with an
outside analyst to engage in information research and then publicize such research freely to
reduce the benefits from outside information research. However, even where the traded
firm contracts with an outside analyst to provide outside research freely to the market,
other outsider traders may still believe (perhaps rightly) that they can research and analyze
outside information with more speed and skill than the particular analyst with whom the
traded firm contracts.
197. See Coase, supra note 31 (setting forth the argument behind the Coase theorem).
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ternalizes many of the impacts from information research is possi
ble.198
Potential informed traders and the traded firm, however, do not
operate in a perfect Coasean world. An extremely large, amorphous
and replenishing set of potentially informed traders exists in the mar
ket. The very fact that outsider trading often concerns an "erodable"
information advantage - that is, an advantage that anyone (or a large
class of people) had an equal opportunity to garner ex ante through
hard work199 - means that the traded firm would need to negotiate
successfully with a vast class of potential outsider traders. Take the
situation where outsider traders are honest when asked if they would
in fact engage in information research pertaining to the traded firm.
The traded firm then faces the severe transaction cost of tracking
down and identifying all such outsider traders.200 Moreover, even if the
traded firm succeeded in striking deals with the current class of in
formed traders, one would expect other investors to emerge to take
their place (and reap returns from the informed trading). The class of
potential informed traders, while not all-encompassing, might literally
run into the thousands.201
In the situation where outsider traders may lie about their motives,
the traded firm faces even greater obstacles. Even if the traded firm
seeks to pay potential informed traders not to engage in information
research, it may be unable to distinguish between those outsider trad
ers that would engage in research and those that have no such inten
tion. The traded firm may then face the possibility of paying off an
overly large set of potentially informed traders, leading it not to make
198. Consider Texon again. Imagine that information research will give Helen, an out
side investor, an expected trading benefit of $100 at an expenditure of $40. Uninformed in
vestors suffer an expected trading loss of $100. The informed trades, in turn, result in an
increase in stock price accuracy benefiting Texon's shareholders by $10 and third parties by
$2. The net social loss from information research therefore equals $28. Helen, however, will
take into account only her own net benefit of $60 from engaging in informed trades. To the
extent Texon is able to find and successfully negotiate with Helen, Texon will have the
ability to pay Helen not to engage in information research. Texon takes directly into ac
count the $100 loss to its uninformed investors and the $10 accuracy benefit, leaving Texon
willing to pay up to $90 to Helen. For any payment above $60, in fact, Helen will agree not
to engage in securities research.
199. See Brudney, supra note 15, at 354 (setting forth the unerodable advantages theory
of insider trading liability).
200. Carol Rose makes a similar point in noting the difficulty of identifying who owns
what entitlements (which she refers to as a "Type I" transaction cost). Rose refers to the
costs associated with reaching an agreement once the bargainers and the subject matter are
identified as "Type 11" transaction costs. See Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of the Cathedral,
106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2184 (1997).
201. For example, imagine that there are ten outsider traders who for a research cost of
$40 might each uncover some nonpublic piece of information about Texon that is expected
to generate a total trading profit of $100. Even if such trading harms Texon by $90 ($100
trading loss -$10 increase in stock price accuracy), Texon will have difficulty stretching the
$89 (the most it would be willing to use as bribes) to deter all ten from trading.
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such a payment even where information research reduces overall so
cial welfare.202
Finally, even if the traded firm succeeds in paying each potential
informed trader not to engage in research, it may lack a mechanism to
monitor compliance wit.h the "no informed trading" contracts. Any
specific trader may trade on information and then simply claim that its
higher returns are due to luck rather than any information advan
tage.203
This Article proposes that regulators assist internalization by re
assigning the right to control whether informed trading may take
place.204 Rather than allow any trader to decide unilaterally whether to
engage in informed trades, regulators should grant only to the traded
firm a transferable right to control whether outsiders may engage in
informed trades. Pursuant to the newly created right, the traded firm
would enjoy the ability to prohibit any party from engaging in in
formed trades in the traded firm's securities. Outsider traders would
then contract with the traded firm to obtain the right to engage in in
formed trades. Once connected through contract with outsider trad
ers, the traded firm will then internalize the net benefit to such parties
from engaging in informed trades.
Internalization through the traded firm provides further social
benefits to the extent multiple potential informed traders may other
wise compete for an information advantage. The traded firm, for ex
ample, will internalize the social loss from duplicated information re
search and wasteful races to obtain an information advantage ahead in
time over other investors. Rather than allow multiple investors to en
gage in such costly duplicative information research, the traded firm
may auction off the right to engage in informed trades to a limited
number of outsider traders.205 Where sufficient traders are present in
202. For example, Helen may consider engaging in information research in Texon at a
cost of $40 to the extent that such research is expected to generate a benefit of $50. Bruce,
on the other hand, may have a cost of $60 to undertake similar research with an expected
payoff of $50. Where Helen may profit from research, Bruce will not. Bruce nevertheless
may represent to Texon that without a payment he will engage in research in order to ex
tract such a payment. Without the ability to distinguish between investors such as Helen and
Bruce. Texon may fa il to implement a payment program to reduce costly information re
search.
203. One possible response would be for companies to rely on more procedural devices
to constrain informed trading, such as the delayed-trading rule we propound in Section
IV.B.3.
204. Admittedly, the Article's proposal works a radical shift to the present securities
regulatory regime. Congressional legislation would likely be needed to put the proposal into
effect.
205. Any one company, nevertheless, may find it costly to inform investors about the
auction and to run the auction itself. Regulators may therefore set up a centralized system
to obtain information on auctions and to conduct the auctions. Some companies may also
wish to bundle with other companies the right to engage in informed trades. Particularly
smaller companies seeking to auction the right to engage in informed trades may fail to at-
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the market, the winning bid will approximate the bidder's expected
profit from information research. The auction therefore limits the
number of parties engaged in information research, reducing duplica
tive information expenditures. Because the traded firm receives pay
ments for the right to engage in informed trades, the traded firm then
internalizes the net benefit to traders of engaging in such trades.206
But we are quite agnostic about the types of informed trading re
gimes that trading firms may ultimately adopt.207 Some might prohibit
informed outsider trading altogether; others may restrict trading of
certain types of information similar to Rule 14e-3's prohibition on
trades related to a tender offer; others might sell informed outsider
trading rights to a limited set of traders;208 still others might maintain
the current laissez faire regime under which outsiders may freely en
gage in trades subject to the limits imposed through the misappropria
tion theory, Rule 14e-3, and Regulation FD.

tract the attention of any one investor. Bundling together with several smaller companies
may then generate greater interest among investors. Regulators may assist the bundling
process through the establishment of clearinghouses where companies may negotiate with
other companies to bundle their trading rights.
An auction for informed trading rights will have some aspects of a common value auc
tion as different potential traders will bid for trading rights the value of which will be condi
tional on obtaining material nonpublic information related to the traded firm. To the extent
different potential traders have the same expectation as to the value of the material, non
public information they will uncover, they will each expect a similar trading profit. There
are also likely some private value aspects, as different traders are likely to have different
costs of acquiring information. The value of "winning" the auction, therefore, will vary
across traders. For an extended discussion of the difference between common and private
value auctions, see Peter Cramton & Alan Schwartz, Using Auction Theory to Inform Take
over Regulation, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 27 (1991). It is often efficient in common value auc
tions with fixed costs of participation to restrict the number of bidders. See id. And simi
larly, here it may be efficient for a traded firm to limit the number of firms that may in the
end have the ability to engage in informed trading.
206. One consequence of this internalization is that firms will then balance the benefit
to outside analysts from engaging in information research and informed trading in deter
mining whether or not allowing insider trading is valuable. Haddock and Macey, for exam
ple, make the argument that outside shareholders may prefer to allow insider trading be
cause such trading will reduce the amount of other compensation insiders may demand. See
Haddock & Macey, supra note 96, at 1463. In comparison, when insider trading is prohib
ited, to the extent non-shareholder investment analysts are the next-best market participant
at utilizing firm-specific information advantages, the outside shareholders remain at an in
formation disadvantage and, in addition, must compensate managers more for their lost in
sider trading profits. See id. Nevertheless, once firms are able to control the ability of in
vestment analysts to engage in informed trades, outside shareholders then benefit to the
extent of the investment analyst's expected profits from such trades. In such a situation, a
firm may very well choose to ban insider trading to increase the profit potential to outside
investment analysts, and thereby the amount the firm may receive at auction from analysts
seeking the right to engage in informed trades.
207. We discuss various ways that a traded firm could adopt to control informed out
sider trading in its securities infra Section IV.B.3.
208. Alternatively, traded firms might even give outside trade rights to particular out
siders as an inducement to produce more stock analysts to follow their firms.
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But the core idea is to shift the outsider trading right to the party
where the expected transaction costs to negotiate contracts resulting
in internalization are lowest. While it might seem that the transaction
costs of Guido and Ronald cutting a deal would be the same whether
we gave an initial entitlement to Guido or Ronald, this is not the
case.209 First if you give the entitlement to the person who would have
ended up bargaining for it anyway, you can obviate the need to nego
tiate at all. Second, the costs of identifying the person with whom one
needs to bargain can vary with the law's assignment of the initial
property right. Third, the costs of negotiation can be lower if the
property right is concentrated in a single bargainer instead of being
dispersed among a large class of dispersed owners. Thus, for example,
it is easier to solve over-fishing problems if one person controls the
fishing rights, rather than if hundreds of people have an equal right to
fish.210
In the informed trading context, the traded firm serves as a central
focal point for market participants to negotiate for the right to engage
in informed trades. Because each individual potential informed trader
must self-identify itself to the traded firm to obtain the informed
trading property right, the overall identification costs of uncovering
the informed traders are minimal. And the concern of a replenishing
class of potential investors is eliminated because the traded firm (after
potentially granting informed trading to a limited class of outsiders)
has the right to prohibit the entire amorphous and replenishing class
from engaging in such trading. Finally, reassigning this initial right to
the traded firm solves the aforementioned problem of faux outsider
traders (who in fact would not find it profitable to invest in research
ing the traded firm but, who) nonetheless seeking a bribe from the
traded firm to refrain from informed trading. Because potential in
formed traders might now pay for the right to engage in such trades,
only informed traders that truly find ownership of such a right valu
able will make the payment.
Reassigning the right to the traded firm to control whether in
formed outsider trading takes place also better comports with equita
ble notions of just deserts. An outsider trader may have a Lockean
209. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 200, at 2184 (discussing costs of identifying contracting
parties and costs of actually negotiating the contract); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass,
Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 20-26, 45-46
(1985) (arguing that judicial "reasonableness" tests help overcome the high costs of identifi
cation and bargaining related to nuisances).
210. Where hundreds hold the right to fish, each will ignore the cost they impose on
others from depleting the number of fish in the common pool. See, e.g. , Ian Ayres & Eric
Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104
YALE L.J. 1027, 1029 (1995) (noting the conventional wisdom that divided entitlements may
lead to inefficient strategic behavior). Ayres and Talley, nevertheless, argue that in certain
circumstances, splitting an entitlement may lead to efficient transactions when parties hold
private information. See generally id.
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ownership of the information that she has deliberately acquired but
this ownership does not as an equitable matter imply a right to trade
in another company's stock. It is a traditional move in property to dis
aggregate the bundle of sticks that might pertain to a particular tangi
ble entitlement.211 But it is particularly odd that legal scholars have so
readily jumped to the conclusion that discovering by one's own hard
work a relevant fact about a company's future prospect necessarily en
titles one to profit by trading against the less informed.212 The idea
that owning such information entails a right to trade probably is a by
product of our dominant image of stocks trading on an unrestricted
basis. But there is no equitable reason why "equities" could not be is
sued on a restricted basis as restricted shares that limit the ability to
buy or sell shares only on the basis of publicly available information.213
In private contracting, a buyer or a seller is always free to demand a
warranty that the other side must disclose any material nonpublic in
formation as a precondition of giving her consent. The seller came
close to doing just this in Laidlaw v. Organ.214 Of course, the other side
211. See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1362-73 (1993)
(describing the different standard bundles of land rights).
212. See Alan Strudler, Moral Complexity in the Law of Nondisclosure, 45 UCLA L.
REV. 337, 375 (1997) (arguing that information one has acquired by the dint of one's labor
or through other legitimate means is information which one has a presumptive right to use
and which may give one a "deserved advantage" in market transactions); see also MARVIN
A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 75 (4th ed.
1998) (arguing that "an individual who spends time and money developing information
about the intrinsic value of certain property does not and should not have a legal duty to
disclose her findings to the property's present owner"). For general philosophical accounts
of the moral principle of desert, see LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE § 27, in Two
TREATISES, supra note 20 ("Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that nature hath
provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his
own, and thereby makes it his property."). Locke's labor theory of property, however, was
conditioned on his famous proviso ("at least where there is enough, and as good left in
common for others"). This proviso has often produced the most difficult problems for
Locke's theory. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1978). From
an ex post perspective, Locke's proviso does not particularly militate for or against giving
the trading rights to the outsider vs. the traded firm. Granting the right to control outsider
trading to either the outsider or the traded firm leaves "less and not as good" for the other.
But from a perspective that is sufficiently ex ante, the proviso cuts in favor of granting con
trol to the traded firm, because the traded firm's effort to create the firm must a priori come
before the outsider's efforts in acquiring information about the firm.
See also Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law, supra note 12, at 1252-57; Bainbridge, In
sider Trading Regulation, supra note 21, at 1605-11 (making the argument for a property
rights approach to insider trading prohibitions based on the need to give those that expend
effort in creating information the incentive to do so); Pritchard, supra note 13, at 51 (noting
that "[b]y limiting the misappropriation theory to information obtained in breach of a duty,
the common law of agency protects individuals who have gained their information advan
tage through superior insight or hard work. These efforts are essential to the informational
efficiency").
213. For a discussion of the ability of a corporation to issue restricted shares, see infra
Section IV.B.2.
214. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817). For a discussion of Laidlaw, see supra note 32. Fo
cusing on the Laidlaw case, Dean Kronman has argued that parties that purposefully ac-
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may refuse. But the point is that having nonpublic information about
a valuable trading opportunity does not mean as an equitable or legal
matter that you will have a right to trade on it without prior disclo
sure. The source of the information may have worked hard to obtain
the information, but other people worked hard to create the firm and
have an equitable, Lockean right to control the terms on which its
shareholders trade.
Some commentators have argued that as a categorical matter it is
unfair for an uninformed buyer or seller to be exposed to the possibil
ity of trading with a superiorly informed counterpart with an
"unerodable" advantage.215 They might contend, for example, that the
possibility of facing such an informed trader would undermine the
confidence of investors in the market.216 We disagree. As long as unin
formed traders are put on notice that a particular firm has consented
to particular types of informed trading, they can protectthemselves by
trading only on firms' stock in which informed trading is prohibited. If
sufficient numbers of investors care about an equal informational
playing field, they could even organize entire stock markets that re. quire listed firms to prohibit informed trading.217 We, however, imag
ine that most traders would be willing to accept, say, a 10% chance
that they would face an informed trader when they buy or sell in re
turn for the higher dividends that would accrue due to the fees that
outsider traders are likely to pay for their privileged right to trade.
And even if one (counter to the foregoing argument) rejected the
utility of allowing firms to grant informed trading rights to a limited
number of outsiders, then a variant of our proposal should still be at
tractive. Remember that the current law openly countenances in
formed trading by outsiders. People who favor equality at all costs
should at the very least want to allow traded firms to prohibit broader
classes of outside informed trading. Currently Rule 14e-3 imposes a
mandatory prohibition on all outsider traders not to trade based on
nonpublic tender offer information.218 But there is little reason to stop
traded firms from broadening the class of information subject to Rule
14e-3's no-trade rule to encompass other types of private information
(say, relating to the existence of nonpublic patents or "bet the firm"
quire an information advantage should enjoy a nondisclosure rule. The nondisclosure rule
gives such parties the ex ante incentive to research and uncover new information. See
Kronman, supra note 12, at 12-18.
215. See Brudney, supra note 15, at 354-55.
216. See id.
217. Alternatively, the existing securities exchanges may make the absence of restric
tions on informed outsider trading an explicit listing requirement for shares. See infra note
252 (discussing the limits the securities exchanges presently apply to shares with alienability
restrictions).
218. See supra Section IIl.B.
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litigation). In sum, the idea of reassigning the right to control whether
outsiders have an opportunity to engage in informed trading can be
tailored to further both efficiency and a variety of conceptions of eq
uity and deserts.
It might strike some that our proposal is more "regulatory" than
the current "laissez faire" regime. It is important, however, to empha
size that we are only reassigning to the traded firm the right to control
whether outsiders trade on the basis of nonpublic information. We are
not granting the traded firm any right to control whether outsiders ac
quire nonpublic information or employ it for other purposes (includ
ing disclosing directly to the market). Directly monitoring and speci
fying the research activities of ·myriad market parties require
tremendous resources. Moreover, information research often gener
ates information relevant to the valuation of more than one com
pany's securities. Allowing one company to control information re
search related to the company may adversely affect other companies
as a result. Fortunately, such a level of control over individual securi
ties market participants is not necessary for the Article's proposal.
Rather, the traded firm only needs control over the trading activity of
its investors.
Our proposal relies just as much on the market to determine the
level of information trading as today's laissez faire system. Unlike to
day's laissez faire system, however, the Article's proposal places the
right to engage in informed trades squarely with the party that mini
mizes the search and contracting costs for all market participants
seeking to transact in the informed trading right. The current system
might require the traded firm to bribe the potential trader not to
trade; in contrast, our regime requires the trader to bribe the traded
firm for the right to trade. As a theoretical matter, our proposal is
equally consistent with contractual freedom and autonomy, and as a
practical matter, likely to be even more consistent as there is likely to
be a greater capacity for Coasean dealmaking.
But while we have shown the superiority of giving the traded firms
an alienable right to control the extent of informed outsider trading,
we have left a host of issues unanswered. Chiefly, we have not ad
dressed what should be the default meaning of a traded firm's silence.
It is also necessary to say more about how a traded firm could opt into
an alternative outsider trading regime. The next sections address these
issues. We argue that regulators can and should assist in providing a
mechanism for traded companies to transact with potential informed
traders to transfer the right to engage in informed trades.
1.

Choosing the Right Default

The most basic question is whether a traded firm's silence should
be taken as indicating that it does or does not consent to informed

378

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 101 :313

outsider trading. Of course, if Bernie Black's triviality thesis holds,
then the default choice will not matter because traded firms will al
most costlessly opt for whatever trading regime they desire regardless
of the initial state-imposed default.219 In this context, at least, we are
skeptical of any strong form triviality complaint and instead think that
there is likely to be some inertia - by which we mean that we are
likely to see more consent in equilibrium - if consent (rather than
some form of nonconsent) is the default.220 Default choice is likely to
be nontrivial in the straightforward sense that different defa ults are
likely to give rise to different contracting equilibria.
We do not see much of a justification for "penalty" (also known as
"information forcing") defaults that penalize a contractor in order to
induce express contracting that may signal information about the con
tractor type or the law.221 Because we will ultimately require all firms
to disclose publicly any attempts at contracting around the default,
outsiders will be able to infer a company's informed trading rules by
their silence or by their affirmative statements to the contrary. Simi
larly, we would shy away from adopting "minoritarian" defa ults,
which set the default at what only a minority of firms would want, be
cause those firms would incur high costs of contracting around or
higher costs of failing to contract around an alternative default.222
Accordingly we are searching for a "majoritarian" rule as the pre
sumptively most efficient default. If there is likely to be inertia in th�
shadow of alternative defaults, better to have the inertia around a de
fault rule for which a majority of traded firms would ideally contract.
An ahistorical application of our internalization framework would
suggest that some form of nonconsent default would be an attractive
majoritarian candidate. Remember that laissez faire outsider trading is
likely to expose the shareholders of traded firms to uncompensated
trading losses, higher bid-asks spreads as transaction costs and the
possibility that trading of informed outsiders will effectively leak to
the market sensitive proprietary information that the traded firm
would rather keep nonpublic. We find it highly unlikely that the bene
fits of increases in stock price accuracy would outweigh these costs. If
219. See Bernard S. Black, ls Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analy
sis, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 542 (1990) (arguing that the choice of may corporate defaults is
"trivial" in the sense of not affecting the equilibrium governance of firms).
220. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN.
L. REV. 1591, 1599-1600 (1999) [hereinafter Ayres & Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian
Defaults] (discussing the possibility of inertia where consent is the default).

221. For a discussion of the use of penalty defaults, see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner,
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YA LE L.J.
87, 91-93 (1989).
222 See Ayres & Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, supra note 220, at
1593-1606 (discussing a host of non-information forcing reasons why minoritarian defaults
might be more efficient than majoritarian defaults).
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nothing else, many traded firms would want to limit informed trading
so that they had the opportunity of being able to negotiate to be com
pensated for some of their costs with part of the outsider trading prof
its.
However, it is extremely difficult to assess exactly what type of re
striction on outsider informed trading would be favored by a majority
of traded firms. An absolute and all encompassing prohibition against
every conceivable type of informed outsider trading (including supe
rior business acumen) would itself impose devastating costs on the
shareholders of the traded firm in the form of reduced liquidity.223 In
deed, there might be no single majoritarian rule. Some firms might
want to expand the current Rule 14e-3's prohibition on trading based
on nonpublic material information during a tender offer to other
classes of confidential information. Others might want to restrict
trading based on the identity of specific outsider traders. One method
of doing so would be to require all other buyers and sellers of large
blocks to announce their intent to transact and to delay trading for a
short period. We are especially attracted to this delayed-trading rule
(which we will discuss in more detail below) in part because it is a
more enforceable procedural restriction.224 If we were forced to pick a
"plurality" default rule guided by theory alone, we would favor some
kind of delayed-trading rule - which would force outsiders who want
to potentially engage in large-volume trades to bargain for the traded
firm's consent to non-delayed (and therefore more secret) trading.
But we are not limited to theory alone. Experience leads us in
stead to propose retaining the current outsider trading rules as de
faults. This would mean that in the absence of words by the traded
firm to the contrary (which, as discussed below, would be publicly dis
closed in a traded firm's annual Form 10-K filing with the SEC) out
siders would have an absolute right to trade the securities of the
traded firm constrained only by the possibility of (1) a misappropria
tion fiduciary duty to the source of the information; (2) a Rule 14e-3
duty not to trade on tender offer information regardless of fiduciary
duty; and (3) a Regulation FD duty on firms not to disclose nonpublic,
material information selectively.
We adopt the current outsider trading rules as defaults for a num
ber of reasons. First, and foremost, we are risk-averse. We predict that
many traded firms would beneficially modify these defaults to restrict
additional forms of outsider trading (at least as a precursor to com223. See Jonathan R. Macey & Hideki Kanda, The Stock Exchange as a Firm: The
Emergence of Close Substitutes for the New York and Tokyo Stock Exchanges, 75 CORNELL
L. REv. 1007, 1012-14 (1990) (noting that increased liquidity reduces the transaction costs
associated with holding shares and the information costs facing market participants).
224. See infra Section IV.B.3 (discussing the Article's proposed delayed-trading rule
alternative).
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pensated consent). But we worry that if policy makers were to impose
trading restrictions that went too far (and if the traded firms failed to
respond quickly to relax these restrictions), the shareholders of the
traded firms would bear unacceptable losses in liquidity. Instead of an
ahistorical default choice, we favor changing the status quo to a de
fault for the simple reasons that we know that the status quo rules
have proven to be reasonably workable. We prefer to maintain the
status quo as a benchmark from which individual firms by consenting
to alterations can move forward.
Second, we are agnostic about how firms would restrain informed
outsider trading (in the absence of explicit contracts with the outsider
traders). Instead of funneling firms through a particular constraint, we
will discuss below a menu system that facilitates firms' choices among
a variety of different types of substantive and procedural trading re
straints. Finally, maintaining the current outsider trading rules as de
faults (which the traded firm can contract around) is arguably most
consistent with current law: as we will discuss in the next section,
traded firms might already be able to contract effectively for more
control of informed outsider trading by issuing various types of re
stricted stocks.
We should also say a word about our choice to retain the three re
strictions on outsider trading (pertaining to misappropriation, Rule
14e-3 and Regulation FD) as default restrictions. Our proposal would
still give outside sources the opportunity to contract with their agents
against misappropriation. But in addition to this misappropriation re
striction, an agent would have to see whether the traded firm permit
ted this type of informed trading.225
For us, retaining the tender offer and selective firm disclosure re
strictions (of Rule 14e-3 and Regulation FD) presents a much closer
case. As a historical matter, the market worked reasonably well both
with and without these rules. Thus, risk aversion about worst case sce
narios need not play as an important role in our analysis. Because
most firms involved in a takeover would want to prohibit uncompen
sated informed trading by outsiders (and might otherwise expend ex
cessive resources to maintain secrecy about such information), we are
comfortable with retaining the Rule 14e-3 restriction as at least a de
fault rule, requiring both the acquirer's and the target's consent to
waive. We would also make the Regulation FD restriction on selective
disclosures a default rule, allowing a disclosing firm to waive the re
striction if it publicly discloses ex ante in its quarterly Form 10-Q re
port to the SEC that it might make a particular type of selective dis
closure. In sum, our proposal would change the current system into a
225. For example, under the Article's proposal, if the traded firm opted not to allow
any informed outside trades then the agent would lack the ability to engage in such trades
even with the complete knowledge and approval of the source.

November 2002]

Internalizing Outsider Trading

381

regime of default trading restrictions (regarding tender offer, misap
propriated and selectively disclosed information) and default trading
permissions (with regard to all other informed outsider trading)
around either of which the traded firm would be allowed to contract
unilaterally to increase or decrease the types of permitted informed
trade.226
2.

Current Opportunities for Traded Firms to Control Informed
Trading

Before moving on to discuss how regulators might facilitate the
traded firms' ability to opt for broader or narrower trading restric
tions, it is important to pause briefly to consider whether firms could
move privately to restrict the current outsider trading that is counte
nanced by U.S. securities regulation. Earlier we said that current law
effectively assigned to the outsider source the right to control unilat
erally whether informed outsider trading takes place. However, there
are ways that the traded firm already might dampen the opportunity
for such outsider trading.
One way for a traded firm to accomplish this is to disclose non
public information more quickly to the market.227 There is some evi
dence that firms have pursued this strategy, disclosing sales data and
other corporate performance data through general conference calls
and other forms of public disclosures on shorter periodic bases.228 But
there are two limits to this strategy. First, early disclosure to the mar
ket is at times inimical to the firm's other goals. Think SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur.229 Disclosing that Texas Gulf Sulphur had discovered a
rich copper field in Canada would have preempted informed trading
in the company's securities, but would have made it harder to buy

226. We can imagine a possible exception to this pure default system of traded firm
control. We might want to impose a narrow mandatory rule that prohibited monopolist (or
market dominant) producers from blocking a rival's ability to sell their shares short See text
accompanying note 192.
227. Cf Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating How Corporations Speak to the Market,
77 VA. L. REV. 945, 995 (1991) (noting that firms may prefer to engage in broad based dis
closures to preempt the ability of both insiders and outsiders to profit from an information
advantage).
228. See Jonathan Fuerbringer, When Companies Talk, Who Gets to Listen?, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 20, 2000, at C1 (noting that "broadcasting of Wall Street analysts' meeting on
the Internet, what is known as Webcasting, is already becoming standard procedure and will
grow, as will public access to confe rence calls that companies use to brief analysts").
Fuerbringer reports that the National Investor Relations Institute estimated that "86% of
its member companies that hold earning conference calls allowed individual investors to
listen in, up from 29% two years ago. About 74% let the news media listen in, up from
14%." Id.
229. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
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land surrounding the field on the cheap.230 Second, the traded firms
themselves may not know the information on which the informed out
siders are trading. A rival who knows it has just won or lost a patent
race or an analyst who knows about a likely regulatory change may
have material nonpublic information which the traded firm itself could
not disclose even if it wanted to.
A more direct way for a traded firm to impose legal restrictions on
informed outsider trading is by issuing restricted stock.231 Today,
closely held corporations routinely make use of restrictions on the
ability of their shareholders to transfer their shares. The most com
mon forms of restrictions are rights granting the corporation or one of
its shareholders the right of first refusal on the purchase of a selling
shareholder's shares.232 Corporations have limited the ability of share
holders to sell shares to others outside the group of current share
holders and imposed requirements that shares must be sold back to
the corporation after the death of a shareholder.233 Corporations may
also use transfer restrictions to limit the fraction of shares that any
person or group of persons may own.234 Even public corporations have
placed restrictions on shares sold to employees allowing the corpora
tion to repurchase the shares at the end of employment.235 Public cor
porations have also placed restrictions on the ability of shareholders
to sell to foreign entities that already hold a significant stock owner
ship.236 More procedural restrictions exist. Corporations, for example,
may require shareholders seeking to transfer their shares to obtain the
consent of the corporation or of a particular shareholder.237
230. The Texas Gulf Sulphur case involved the timing of the release of information in
volving the discovery of a major copper and zinc ore strike in Canada. See id. at 845-46.
231. Corporations generally may impose restrictions on the transferability of their own
stock in the corporate charter or by-laws. Delaware's General Corporation Law, for exam
ple, provides corporations the ability to place restrictions on the transferability of shares to
the extent certain prerequisites are met DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202 (2001 ). Among other
requirements, restrictions must be written and "noted conspicuously" on the stock certifi
cate. Id. § 202(a). Restrictions must also be imposed either through the certificate of incor
poration, the corporate bylaws, or through an agreement among any number of security
holders and the corporation. Id. § 202(b). Section 8-204 of the Uniform Commercial Code
also provides that a transfe r restriction will only be effective against shareholders with ac
tual knowledge of the restriction unless the restriction is conspicuously noted on the secu
rity. U.C.C. § 8-204 (1999); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202(a) (2000) .
232. § 202(c)(l) of the Delaware Code expressly permits the creation of first refusal
right restrictions. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202(c)(l) (2000).
233. See, e.g., R. FRANKLIN BALOTII & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, 1 THE DELAWARE
LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS § 6.6 (3d ed., 2001 Supp.).
234. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202(c)(S) (2000) (requiring that such a restriction not be
"manifestly unreasonable").
235. See BALOTII & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 233, § 6.6.
236. See id.
237. Delaware Section 202(c)(3) permits consent restrictions on share transferability.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202(c)(3) (2000).
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And legal restrictions on trading can be imposed on buyers - with
whom a firm is not previously in privity - as well as sellers. Just like
property covenants that run with the land,238 a trading restriction runs
with the stock.239 Traders purchase the stock subject to the restriction,
thereby effectively accepting the traded firm's offer to restrict trading
Gust as they consent to other governance issues).
Given the broad range of allowable substantive and procedural
stock restrictions, corporations may already possess the ability to issue
stock restricting the ability of outsiders to engage in informed trad
ing.240 Most dramatically, a corporation could issue stock requiring
that as a condition of buying or selling shares that a trader publicly
disclose any material nonpublic information concerning the company.
Alternatively, as discussed more fully below, the stock could require
that large-volume traders delay trading until after they had adequately
disclosed their intent of buying or selling large volumes.241
Legal restrictions exist, nevertheless, on the ability of a corpora
tion to impose alienability restrictions on their own stock. Courts have
struck down absolute limits on alienability.242 In Delaware, courts have
required that, despite the presence of Section 202's express provision
for stock transfer restrictions, the restrictions must be "reasonable."243
Even where legally valid, corporations employing a restriction on
238. For a discussion of property covenants that run with the land, see JESSE
DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 855-949 (3d ed. 1993).
239. Delaware, for example, provides that a transfer restriction valid under Section 202
of Delaware's General Corporate Law is enforceable not only against the holder of the re
stricted �ecurity but also against "any successor or transferee of the holder including an ex
ecutor, administrator, trustee, guardian or other fiduciary entrusted with like responsibility
for the person or estate of the holder." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202(a) (2000).
240. Significantly, the list of permissible restrictions on the transferability of stock con
tained in Del. Section 202(c) is nonexclusive. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202(e) (2000) (pro
viding that "any other lawful restriction on transfe r or registration of transfer of securities,
or on the amount of securities that may be owned by any person or group of persons, is
permitted by this section").
241. See text accompanying notes 282-303 (discussing the Article's proposal to allow
traded firms to impose trading delays on outside investors).
242. See Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 141 N.E. 2d 812, 816 (N.Y. 1957) (declaring
that a right of first refusal agreement that made it effectively impossible to sell to anyone
but the corporation at a price determined by the corporation would be void); Rychwalski v.
Baranowski, 236 N.W. 131, 132 (Wis. 1931) (stating in dicta that it is "well established in
this state that a corporate by-law which prohibits the alienation of shares of stock, or which
amounts to an unreasonable restraint upon their transfer, is void").
243. See generally SALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 233, § 6.1 1 (noting that the
proper purpose requirement comes out of the principle derived in Lawson v. Household
Finance, 152 A. 723 (Del. 1930), that " 'a restraint oil the free transferability of corporate
stock . . . is permissible under our law provided it bears some reasonably necessary relation
to the best interests of the corporation.' " (quoting Grynberg v. Burke, 378 A.2d 139, 134
(Del. Ch. 1977)). Delaware § 202(d) provides a list of purposes presumptively assumed rea
sonable. Restrictions imposed to maintain any local, state, federal or foreign tax advantage
or to maintain or comply with any statutory or regulatory advantage or requirement are
included under Section 202(d). See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202(d) (2001).
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stock alienability may face large enforcement hurdles. Many investors,
for example, do not hold ownership directly. Rather, the investors'
brokers typically will hold ownership of the securities in their "street
name," allowing for the constant transfer of ownership without the
necessity of recording each ownership change in the corporate rec
ords.244 Corporations seeking to enforce an information-based trading
restriction on a public shareholder, therefore, must expend consider
able resources first identifying the investor.
Even when identified, corporate law may place limits on the types
of sanctions companies may impose on investors who violate their re
strictions. Corporations may first attempt to stop an unauthorized
transfer outright through instructions to the corporation's transfer
agent not to register prohibited transfers.245 Even without registration,
however, a purchaser of restricted shares may attempt to make an eq
uitable claim of ownership in the corporate assets.246 Corporations
may also seek to limit the ability of investors who possess shares trans
ferred in violation of a transfer restriction to vote the shares or receive
dividends based on the shares. Whether corporations are in fact able
to limit the voting power or dividend rights of such shares, however, is
uncertain. 247
244. See Thomas W. Joo, Who Watches the Watchers? The Securities Investor Protection
Act, Investor Confidence, and the Subsidization of Failure, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1071, 1073 &
n.3 (1999) (noting that "stock held in street name can represent as much as 80% of a public
company's outstanding shares").
245. See WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, 12 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE CORP.
§ 5497 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 1996) (noting that the unregistered transferee of stock is not en
titled to the rights and privileges of a shareholder).
246. See id. (noting that an unregistered transfer still passes equitable title to the trans
feree who may then sue to establish their right in corporate property). An unregistered
transferee of shares is still entitled to all dividends declared after the transfer. Where the
corporation has notice of the transfer, the transferee may hold the corporation liable for the
dividends; where the corporation is not on notice, the transferee may still seek to obtain the
dividends directly from the transfe ror shareholder. See id. § 5499.
247. Existing Delaware case law has allowed corporations to implement "scaled" vot
ing under which maximum limits are placed on the number of votes held by any one share
holder. See Providence & Worcester Co. v. Baker, 378 A.2d 121 (Del. 1996). But see
BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 233, § 6.10 (stating that "vote sterilization provisions
are usually limited in application to situations in which the exercise of voting rights would
permit alien control of the corporation to a greater extent than permitted by the restric
tion . . . " and that "[t]he validity of such provisions, however, remains to be adjudicated").
Stock exchanges in the United States also contain express rules against reducing the voting
power of existing shareholders. See NASO Manual (CCH), Rule 4351 ("Voting rights of
existing shareholders of publicly traded common stock registered under Section 12 of the
[Exchange] Act cannot be disparately reduced or restricted through any corporate action or
issuance."); 2 Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH), § 122 (2000) (same).
Delaware has also long held a strong bias toward allowing only pro rata dividends to
shareholders of the same class. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170 (1998); REV. MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT § 6.40 (1 998); see 1 1 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE CORP. § 5352 (perm.
ed., rev. vol. 1995); EDWARD P. WELCH & ANDREW J. TUREZYN, FOLK ON DELAWARE
CORPORATION LAW: FUNDAMENTALS § 1 70.2, at 340-41 (Little Brown ed. 1993); see also
Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for the Omelet to Set: Match-Specific Assets
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Shareholder consent may present another barrier to firms seeking
to impose transferability restrictions on their stock. Where a stock re
striction is adopted in a corporation's initial certificate of incorpora
tion, all shareholders who receive securities are presumed to consent
and are thereby bound under the restriction.248 An entirely different
situation exists, however, where a firm attempts to adopt a stock re
striction after it has already issued shares. If the restrictions are intro
duced midstream, they could be effectuated by an amendment to the
certificate of incorporation.249 Even with such an amendment, how
ever, Delaware treats nonconsenting shareholders as not bound under
the restriction.250
There are, however, several solutions to the problem of noncon
senting shareholders to a midstream imposition of a stock restriction.
Public corporations seeking to adopt a stock restriction may form a
Delaware-based subsidiary. The subsidiary's certificate of incorpora
tion will provide for the desired stock restriction. The public corpora
tion may then engage in a statutory merger with the subsidiary, extin
guishing its own shares and giving each of its shareholders shares of
the subsidiary in return.251 Alternatively, a public corporation may
seek to reincorporate into Delaware, employing the stock restrictions
in its newly issued Delaware certificate of incorporation.
It must be conceded that to our knowledge, no traded firm has
availed itself of stock restrictions as a means to retard informed out
sider trading. The absence of such efforts certainly cannot be taken as
confirmation of the foregoing internalization framework. Our earlier
analysis suggests that at least some firms should want to restrict cer
tain kinds of informed outsider trading, and that others would want to
and Minority Oppression in Close Corporations, 24 J. CORP. L. 913, 921 (1999) ("It would
be clearly illegal - and easily challenged - if the majority shareholder paid itself $1 per
share in dividends, while only paying minority shareholders $.10 per share.").
Salotti and Finkelstein note that corporations may employ automatic sale or transfer
provisions to the corporation or some other shareholder to enforce transfer restrictions. See
BALOTII & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 233, § 6.10 (noting authority for automatic
sale/transfer provisions under Delaware General Corporation Law § 202(c)(4)). Balotti and
Finkelstein also note that corporations may employ automatic conversions provisions in the
certificate of incorporation, converting stock transferred in violation of a transfer restriction
into non-voting and/or non-dividend paying securities. See id. § 6.10.

248. See, e.g., St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc.,
562 F.2d 1 040 (8th Cir. 1977).
249. Under Delaware law, an amendment to the certificate of incorporation requires
consent by a majority of all stock entitled to vote as a well as a majority of each class of
shares entitled to vote. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(l) (2001).
250. Id. at § 202(b); see also B & H Warehouse, Inc. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 490 F.2d
818 (5th Cir. 1974); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Conoco Inc., 519 F. Supp. 506 (D.
Del. 1981).
251. In a statutory merger, under state corporate law, the dissenting shareholders
would still enjoy appraisal rights. For a general discussion of appraisal rights, see 128, 12
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE CORP. § 5906.10 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2000).
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bargain for compensation for such rights. One way to interpret the
traded firms' seemingly ubiquitous acquiescence to outsider trading is
to emphasize the importance of liquidity. Trading restrictions of any
kind may have such a chilling effect on even uninformed outsider
trading that traded firms find that the cost of such restrictions (in
terms of lower liquidity) always exceed the benefits outlined above.
But we do not think the current absence of private efforts to re
strict outsider trading is strong disconfirming evidence of our theory.
An individual firm that wanted to combat the problem of uncompen
sated informed trading by outsiders would face a variety of legal and
non-legal barriers in using restricted stock. Notwithstanding the use of
restricted stock in other contexts, there still is some residual uncer
tainty about whether trading restrictions would be legally enforceable
or whether they would violate exchange rules.252 And there is even
more uncertainty whether discriminatory trading restrictions - which
252. The NASDAQ market, for example, will "exercise broad discretionary authority
over the initial and continued inclusion of securities in NASDAQ in order to maintain the
quality and public confidence in its market." NASO Manual (CCH), Rule 4300. Although
the NASDAQ's listing requirements do not formally exclude securities with transfer restric
tions, see id. Rules 4310, 4420, they do require the presence of a minimum number of regis
tered market makers, among other requirements. Where transfer restrictions greatly reduce
liquidity or otherwise make it difficult for market makers to provide simultaneous bid-ask
prices for a company's securities, the traded firm may fa il to obtain the interest of sufficient
numbers of market makers to meet NASDAQ's listing requirements.
While the New York Stock Exchange and the American Stock Exchange do not impose
explicit prohibitions against restrictions on transfe rability for the securities of domestic
companies, their focus on establishing an "auction market" for trading may lead the two
Exchanges to view negatively stock with stringent transferability restrictions. See 2 Am.
Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) 'lI 1 0,002 § 102(a) (2000) ("In evaluating the suitability of an issue
for listing under this trading provision, the Exchange will review the nature and frequency
of such activity and such other factors as it may determine to be relevant in ascertaining
whether such issue is suitable for auction market trading."); 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide
(Constitutions and Rules) (CCH) 'lI 2499 (2000) ("The aim of the New York Stock
Exchange is to provide the foremost auction market for securities of well-established
companies in which there is a broad public interest and ownership."). In the case of foreign
securities, moreover, the American Stock Exchange in assessing whether to list an
American Depositary Receipt does explicitly prohibit transfer restrictions on the underlying
foreign securities. See 2 Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) 'lI 10,010 § 1 10 (2000) (Securities of
Foreign Corporations) ("Underlying shares will not be accepted for deposit or transfe r if
they are subject to any restrictions on sale or transfer and unless they are accompanied by
all certifications required by the United States or the country of origin.").
Outside the United States, many exchanges refuse to list securities with legends that re
strict the transferability of the securities. See Comment Letter of Morgan Stanley & Co. In
corporated 2 n. 1, File No. S7-8-97 (June 25, 1997) (noting that "[t]he requirements for list
ing equity securities on certain Asian, European and Latin American stock exchanges (such
as the exchanges in Hong Kong, Singapore, Switzerland, Brazil, and Mexico) preclude leg
ending and other trading restrictions of the type proposed"); see also HAROLD S.
BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, 1 GOING PUBLIC AND THE PUBLIC CORPORATION,
§ 4A.Ol [138] (2000) (quoting comments by the Toronto Stock Exchange that "[t]he pur
pose [of the prohibition against securities with transfer restrictions] is to ensure that a pur
chaser receives a valid security that is readily marketable without restrictions arising from
the characteristics of the certificate received. In an impersonal auction market, all purchas
ers must be assured of receiving a security affording identical rights to those received by
others").
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restricted some outsider traders' ability to trade, but which allowed
others to trade on an informed basis (in exchange for compensation)
- would be legally permissible.253 There could also be large costs in
the market in trying to absorb and "price" information about a traded
firm's idiosyncratic outsider trading regime. So while we do not think
there are large network externalities in writing these contracts or in
having courts interpret them,254 there may be important externalities
in having the market evaluate the costs and benefits of restricting out
siders' ability to trade on particular types of nonpublic information.
Moreover, even if such restrictions were enforceable as a formal
matter of civil law, the restrictions might not provide effective
deterrence against informed trading if they fail to provide adequate
procedures for detecting and punishing violations. The SEC actively
investigates and pursues civil remedies for misappropriation and Rule
14e-3 violations.255 Working through the Justice Department, the SEC
may also seek criminal penalties.256 Indeed, the watershed case of
United States v. O'Hagan257 involved the criminal prosecution of James
253. Such discriminatory trading restrictions run counter to the SEC's own movement
toward leveling the playing field for investors under Regulation FD. The SEC has stressed
the need to allow trading advantages only when each investor enjoys an equal erodable
ability to obtain the information is necessary to preserve investor confidence in the market
See SEC, Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, supra note 5, at 51,716 (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. § 243.100-.103). Once firms actively restrict certain investors from engaging in
informed trades, while giving others the ability to do so, investors will no longer each enjoy
the same ability to profit from securities research.
254. For a general discussion of network externalities in the area of contracts and cor
porate law, see Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts,
81 VA. L. REV. 757, 758 (1995). Cf Ian Ayres, Making a Difference: The Contractual Con
tributions of Easterbrook and Fischel, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1391 (1992) (arguing that muddy
defaults may produce network like precedential effects).
255. For example, the SEC obtained civil liability findings and settlements based on
Rule lOb-5 and Rule 14e-3 against several individuals alleged to have traded based on ma
terial, nonpublic information related to several AT&T acquisitions from 1988 to 1991. See
Insider Trading: SEC Notes Additional Rulings in A T& T Insider Trading Ring Case, BNA
SECURITIES LAW DAILY, Feb. 3, 1999, available at LEXIS, BNA, INC., SECURITIES
REGULATION AND LAW REPORT, Feb. 5, 1999, Vol. 31, No. 5, 171. The SEC, moreover,
may pursue enforcement for violations of Regulation FD. To alleviate concerns that too
stringent enforcement of Regulation FD may chill information disclosure to the market, the
SEC stated that it would seek enforcement only where the "issuer's personnel knows or is
reckless in not knowing that the information selectively disclosed is both material and non
public." SEC, Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, supra note 5, at 51,718; see also
Michael Schroeder, Raytheon 's Disclosure to Analysts Is Investigated, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15,
2001, at A3 (reporting that the SEC's investigation of Raytheon Corp. for violation of
Regulation FD represents "the first test of the controversial SEC rule").
256. The SEC may refer willful violations of the securities laws to the Department of
Justice for criminal prosecution. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77z (1996); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff (1997) (providing for up to ten years in prison for
the willful violation of any Exchange Act provision or SEC rule or regulation under the
Act). In 1996, SEC referrals resulted in fifty-seven criminal convictions. See SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (1997).
257. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
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O'Hagan based on both the misappropriation theory under Rule lOb5 as well as for violation of Rule 14e-3.258 But under current law, there
is no way for a traded firm to enlarge unilaterally the scope of the
SEC's enforcement authority with regard to informed outsider traders
who have no contractual relationship with the traded firm.259 By ma
nipulating the misappropriation doctrine, traded firms can contract
with parties that owe a fiduciary duty not to trade based on informa
tion derived from the traded firms, thus empowering the SEC to in
vestigate and criminally punish violations.260 But traded firms cannot
currently use public law to stop stock analysts or industry participants
not in a fiduciary relationship with the firm (e.g., rivals, complemen
tary producers, etc.) from engaging in informed trading in the absence
of contract with the potential outsider trader.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, even where traded firms
are able to restrict informed trades on the part of investors who pur
chase securities directly issued by the traded firms, many outsider
traders may profitably engage in information research through trades
in the options and futures markets. Anyone may create and sell op
tions based on a traded firm's securities.261 An informed outsider
trader may then trade the options in the secondary market, avoiding
the need to directly trade in the traded firm's securities. A firm's re
stricting informed trades in the common stock of a traded firm, there
fore, may simply result in a shift in transactions to options and futures,
resulting in just as much informed trading. Traded firms cannot cur
rently restrict the private derivative trades of others, but government
regulation could easily restrict informed trading on derivative con
tracts. And such regulation could delegate to the traded firms control
over the scope of such restrictions.262 The government therefore has a

258. In O 'Hagan, the Supreme Court expressly upheld that criminal liability under
§ lO(b) may be based on the misappropriation theory of insider trading. See id. at 650.
259. For a discussion on the value of allowing private parties to contract for govern
ment provided enforcement, see Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 NW. U .
L . REV. 916, 951-58 (1998).
260. See supra note 14 (discussing Merrill Lynch's decision to bar its analysts from pur
chasing securities which they cover).
261. A call option, for example, allows the owner of the option the right to buy an un
derlying stock at a specific exercise price. For a description of options, see RICHARD A.
BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 483-504 (4th ed.
1991).
262. Traded firms also have difficulty restricting offshore trading based on nonpublic
information. But the SEC has jurisdiction over all shares issued in the United States and
could require that shareholders submit themselves to U.S. jurisdiction as a precondition of
receiving dividends. The pragmatic problems of enforcing restrictions on informed trading
in offshore markets are therefore no greater with regard to outsider trading than with re
gard to the current insider trading restriction - where notwithstanding the presence of off
shore trading markets for some of the larger issues (such as Enron), the restrictions seem to
have some bite.
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useful role to play in facilitating a traded firm's control over the level
of informed outsider trading related to the firm. And it is this topic to
which we now turn.
3.

Tailoring the Opt Out Menu of Trading Restrictions

The government can facilitate the traded firms' ability to contract
to internalize the full costs and benefits of informed outsider trading
by clarifying what is sufficient to create enforceable trading restric
tions. By establishing clear "opt out" rules (that is, rules which allow
firms to opt out of the current laissez faire outsider trading regula
tions) and by providing firms with a plausible menu of off-the-rack re
strictions from which to choose, government can send a clear message
that both traded firm-imposed restrictions on informed trading and
sales of informed trading privileges are allowed.263
First, we propose the following opt out procedures. In order to opt
out (1) both a majority of a firm's board and a majority of a firm's
shareholders would have to approve an alteration in the current out
sider trading regulations and (2) the alteration would need to be pub
licly disclosed in its annual Form 10-K filing with the SEC.264 The ma
jority approval requirements are traditional indicia of consent of the
affected parties.265 But the mandatory disclosure requirement requires
a bit more justification. We believe that market participants should be
put on notice about the type of firm with which they are trading. Es
pecially if a traded firm is going to create a less than level-playing .
field, it should be under a legal obligation to inform the market to
proceed at its own risk. There is, however, still a question of how
much notice is sufficient. At a minimum, if they aim to prohibit or re
strict larger classes of informed outsider trading, firms need to give
notice to potential traders about the extent of the trading restrictions.
Investors unable to distinguish between firms that allow informed
trading and those that do not may fail to price accurately the securities
of both types of firms.266 Regulators may usefully assist potential in263. One reason for establishing a menu system of limited choice is to economize on
the markets costs of processing information. A traded firm may not fully internalize the
costs that it creates for market participants by including idiosyncratic restrictions on its
forms.
264. See 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (2002) (Form 10-K).
265. For example, under Delaware's General Corporation Law a majority of the voting
stock of the nonsurviving corporation in a merger must approve the merger. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2000) (requiring a vote by a majority of the stock entitled to vote to ap
prove a statutory merger).
266. In the context of insider trading prohibitions, for example, Bainbridge argues that
a voluntary system of insider trading regulation may suffer from a lemon's problem See
Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation, supra note 21, at 1625-26. Assume that investors
value insider trading prohibitions. Some firms may adopt an insider trading prohibition and
enforce such prohibitions. Other firms may choose either to not adopt prohibitions or, if
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formed traders by establishing a centralized public database to dis
seminate information on each company's policy with respect to in
formed trading.267 Summarizing the informed trading rules of different
companies will be particularly easy if firms opt for the off-the-rack
menu items discussed below.
But we would go further and require traded firms to also disclose
information about which traders have the traded firm's consent to
violate the trading restrictions that apply to the public in general. It
should not be enough for a firm to say "We reserve the right to grant
informed trading rights to certain unnamed traders in contravention
of the foregoing restrictions." We would require the trading firm that
was creating unequal outside trade rights ex ante to disclose expressly
the identities of favored outsiders so that uninformed traders can
more fully assess whether they want to play on this particular type of
uneven field.
As previously argued, we would ideally allow firms either to ex
pand or contract the ability of outsiders to engage in informed trading.
Thus, we would allow traded firms to reduce the prohibitory scope of
Rule 14e-3 or Regulation FD to permit more informed outsider trad
ing. But even if we maintained the mandatory nature of these rules,
there would still be a strong internalization rationale to give traded
firms the option of going beyond the present scope of Rule 14e-3 to
restrict the ability of outsiders to engage in informed trading based on
even non-tender offer-related classes of information.
We feel more strongly about preserving a traded firm's option of
constraining the ability of outsiders to engage in informed trades.
Granting informed trading rights to a few outsider traders can
economize on social research costs and compensate a traded firm's
shareholders for their informed trading losses. Without such compen
sation, traded firms may find it individually rational to inefficiently
rush to disclose information to preempt uncompensated trading
losses. But even if (inspired by the ambition behind Regulation FD)
we prohibited traded firms from consenting to outsider favoritism,
there would remain a strong internalization rationale for giving traded
firms the option of instituting across-the-board informed trading re
strictions that go further than our current regulations. Indeed, the
impulse for mandatory, level informational playing fields certainly
militates in favor of granting traded firms the option of prohibiting a
broader class of information advantage. Accordingly, for the rest of
they do adopt prohibitions, not enforce the prohibitions. To the extent investors are unable
to distinguish among such firms, they will not give the firm that both adopts and enforces
insider trading prohibitions a price premium, reducing the incentive of firms to ban insider
trading. See id.
267. The SEC already provides investors easy access to public securities filings of cor
porations contained with the EDGAR database at http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml.
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this section, we will focus on traded firms wishing to institute more
far-reaching restrictions on informed trading. that could not be bar
gained away by particular traders.268
The government might be able to assist traded firms in internaliz
ing the impacts of informed outsider trading by giving them a menu of
alternative regimes. While this menu might also allow traded firms to
craft idiosyncratic outsider trading regulations, it is useful to think
about two different dimensions on which the choices might be ar
rayed: (i) the scope of allowable informed trading and (ii) the mecha
nism to enforce restrictions on informed trading.
As to the scope of nonpublic information that give rise to a trading
restriction, we could imagine a menu that permitted firms to restrict
trades on the basis of all "material, nonpublic" information. Under
this standard, an outsider trader could not trade on the basis of any
information to which the insider trading ban would apply. It is useful
to remember that this is just the standard that the SEC unsuccessfully
pushed for in United States v. Chiarella.269 But given the notorious un
certainties in distinguishing material from non-material information,270
such a standard is likely either to reach underinclusively, allowing sub
stantial amounts of profitable informed trading,271 or to sweep over268. Some companies may wish to auction the right to engage in informed trades. See
supra notes 205-206 and accompanying text.
269. The Second Circuit agreed with the SEC in United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d
1358, 1362 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (holding that the federal securities laws
have '�created a system providing equal access to the information necessary for reasoned
and intelligent investment decisions"). The Second Circuit.had earlier espoused a similar
view in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (stating "[t)hus,
anyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose it to the investing
public or . . . must abstain from trading in or recommending the securities concerned while
such inside information remains undisclosed"). The Supreme Court, however, rejected the
SEC and Second Circuit's parity-of-information view in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
at 235 (holding that "a duty to disclose under § l O(b) does not arise from the mere posses
sion of nonpublic market information"). See also Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657 (1983)
(rejecting the SEC's position that the antifraud provisions· of the securities laws require
equal information among all traders).
270. The Supreme Court in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), held that a fact
is material under Rule lOb-5 if " 'there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable share
holder would consider it important.' " Id. at 231 (quoting TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway,
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (determining the standard of materiality for an action under
Rule 14a-9 of the Exchange Act)). The Court also held .that "to fulfill the materiality re
quirement 'there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the "total
mix" of information made available.' " Id. at 231-32 (quoting TSC Industries, 426 U .S. at
449).
271. Marcel Kahan, for example, distinguishes between an information advantage that
derives from "factual" information and advantages that derive from "assessment" of the
factual information on the part of a specific investor. See Kahan, supra note 56, at 990.
Kahan recognizes that the two forms of advantages are similar in that once a sufficient
number of investors possess the information, it will be incorporated into the market price.
See id. Nevertheless, he makes that argument that legal regulation of assessment-type
information is difficult both because it's difficult to identify specific investors with an
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inclusively, chilling outsider trading that does not substantially hurt
traded firms or their uninformed investors.272 Accordingly, we suspect
that only a small proportion of traded firms would opt for such an in
formational scope to their trading restrictions.
We can imagine, however, that particular types of firms would
wish to adopt analogs to Rule 14e-3's prohibition of trading based on
tender offer information. Firms, for example, may wish to prohibit
trading based on classes of information that might have large discrete
impacts on a firm's stock price. Biotech firms, for example, might re
strict outsider trading based on nonpublic patent information. Military
suppliers might restrict outsider trading based on nonpublic informa
tion about large procurement contracts. Mass tort defendants might
prohibit outsider trading based on nonpublic information concerning
litigation. While it is reasonable to worry that a catchall restriction on
trading based on material information would be unworkable, the ex
perience with Rule 14e-3 suggests that prohibiting outsider trading
based on tender offer information need not have an undue chilling ef
fect on the traded firms' liquidity. We suggest that the opt out menu
provide options for firms to restrict trading on the bases of these addi
tional categories of information as well as others that have been
shown to have statistically significant effects on share price through
abnormal returns event studies.273 Indeed, where regulators have fe ars
that traded firms may unduly interfere with overall information proassessment advantage and because "information assessments have a strong subjective ele
ment, it would be difficult to prove that an investor materially misstated her assessment of
the information." Id.
See also Carlton & Fischel, supra note 111, at 886-87 (stating that "(k]nowledge that one
of the firm's top managers is dispirited because of family problems or because preliminary
reports on a new technological process show that costs are running much higher than ex
pected are examples of valuable information that is almost surely not material in a legal
sense. As long as insiders are allowed to own and trade shares, therefore, Rule lOb-5 is
likely to have a minimal deterrent effect on most of the insiders' desired trading activities."
(citations omitted)); Fried, supra note 70, at 335-37 (contending that insiders enjoy the abil
ity to profit from trades on "sub-material" nonpublic information).
272. Cf Kahan, supra note 56, at 990 (recognizing that requiring the disclosure of "as
sessment" type information may result in too much disclosure, resulting in "excessive dis
closures of useless information assessments at a substantial compliance cost").
273. See, e.g., Gregg Jarrell & Sam Peltzman, The Impact of Product Recalls on the
Wealth of Sellers, 93 J. POL. ECON. 512, 513 (1985); Changqi Wu & John K.C. Wei, Coop
erative R & D and the Value of the Firm, 13 REV. INDUS. ORG. 425, 425 {1998); Zaher Z.
Zantout & George P. Tsetsekos, The Wealth Effects of Announcements of R & D Expendi
ture Increases, 17 J. FIN. RES. 205, 205 (1994); see also Stephen P. Ferris et al., The Response
of Competitors to Announcements of Bankruptcy: An Empirical Examination of Contagion
and Competitive Effects, 3 J. CORP. FIN. 367, 367 (1997); Gun-Ho Joh & Chi-Wen Jevons
Lee, Stock Price Response to Accounting Information in Oligopoly, 65 J. Bus. 451, 471
(1992); Larry H.P. Lang & Rene M. Stutz, Contagion and Competitive Intra-Industry Effects
of Bankruptcy Announcements: An Empirical Analysis, 32 J. FIN. ECON. 45 (1992). The
possibility that outsider information may have a statistically significant impact on share
price as demonstrated in the above event studies is discussed in Ayres & Bankman, supra
note 9, at 241-47.

·
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duction in the secondary market, regulators may take a more staged
approach toward internalization and provide firms with the ability
only to opt-into Rule 14e-3 type prohibition for certain defined classes
of information.274 Conversely, where regulators fear that managers
may use the ability to control outsider trading to quash trades based
on negative information on the managers' own performance, regula
tors may wish to exclude classes of information related to managerial
malfeasance explicitly from the control of traded firms.275
As to the types of traders, we would allow traded firms to have the
restrictions apply to all outside traders (and indeed if there is a strong
form imperative for information parity, this might be required).276 But
if there is only a weak-form imperative for informational parity, the
opt out menu might make the outsider trading restrictions not market
wide, allowing firms instead to restrict the informed outsider trading
of particular firms or individuals. We would also allow traded firms to
place informed trading restrictions on particular types of firms or indi
viduals. Jonathan Macey and his coauthor have persuasively argued
that there may be a predictable set of outsiders who can be probabilis
tically expected to learn about nonpublic information concerning par
ticular companies before other outsiders.277 In particular, it is reason
able for a firm to impose trading restrictions on major customers,
suppliers, or coventurers who might easily come to possess nonpublic
information that creates informed trading opportunities in another
firm. While such trading could be controlled under the misappropria
tion doctrine if the traded firm expressly or implicitly contracts for
trading abstinence by other firms that are already in privity, it might
facilitate the internalization process to allow traded firms to impose
unilaterally such restrictions (by filing the appropriate notification
documents with the SEC) and put the burden on the potential trader
to bargain for the freedom to engage in informed trading.
More importantly, there are a host of related firms - including ri
vals and the producers of complementary products - that may not
have a preexisting contractual relationship with traded firm. It is rea
sonable for traded firms to restrict informed trading by these non274. For a discussion of the problem of third-party information externalities, see supra
Section IV.A.1.
275. See supra Section IV.A.2.
276. See supra note 17 (describing the parity-of-information approach to insider trading
liability).
277. See Haddock & Macey, supra note 96, at 1463 (contending that market profession
als may be better situated compared with other outside investors to learn about and profit
from company-specific information once insiders are forbidden from trading). These so
called "palace guards" are not inside the tsar's court but just outside and hence well-placed
to be the first external source for information about the inner sanctum. See Ayres, supra
note 227, at 992-95 (describing market specialists as "palace guards" able to learn about
material information related to a corporation prior to other outside investors).
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privity market participants. Ayres and Bankman, for example, show
how a firm may have perverse incentives to engage in informed trad�
ing against its rivals: informed trading of this kind is likely to raise a
rival's cost of raising capital by raising the bid-ask spread on the rival's
stock and systematically visiting trading losses on the rival's share
holders.278 They propose an algorithm for identifying the set of related
firms that are particularly likely to obtain informed trading opportuni
ties on the stock of a particular firm.279 It is reasonable for regulators
to delegate to the traded firms the ability to restrict substitute insider
trading by such related firms.
Several alternatives exist, as well, to provide a mechanism to en
force a particular level of informed trading. It might at first seem that
the only type of trading restriction would be the "abstain or disclose"
rule, under which an informed trader would have to abstain from
trading or publicly disclose the nonpublic information prior to trading.
But it turns out that both more and less stringent alternatives are also
plausible and hence should be offered as menu alternatives. For ex
ample, firms might impose an unconditional abstention rule, meaning
that you must refrain from trading based on particular types of non
public information even if you have previously disclosed it to the mar
ket. Some traded firms might opt for this more inclusive restriction
because they would not want to .give the informed trader the opportu
nity of trading on ineffectively disclosed information or using the
threat of public disclosure followed by trading as a means of extorting
hush money from the traded corporation. Texas Gulf Sulphur might
have been willing to pay hush money to an informed outsider trader
who was about to disclose as a precursor to trading.280 A traded firm in
such circumstances might prefer a blanket trading ban.
While remaining somewhat agnostic as to the exact mix of alterna
tives that traded firms would opt for, however, we think it is likely that
firms would be more attracted to delayed-trading requirements.
Delayed-trading rules are procedural and ministerial restrictions that
turn less on the quality of material disclosure and more on verifiable
factors such as the passage of time, the identity of the proposed trader
and the size and price of the intended trade. Such a rule, imposing a
blanket delay on all trades, is less vulnerable to the uncertainties of
determining what is material as well as the difficulties private parties
may face in detecting specific improper trades.281
278. See Ayres & Bankman, supra note 9, at 266.
279. See id. at 287.
280. See supra note 230 (discussing the facts of Texas Gulf Sulphur).
281. Cf Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading as an Agency Problem, in PRINCIPALS
AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 81, 90-97 (John W. Pratt & Richard J.
Zeckhauser eds., 1985) (noting the difficulties contracting parties face in detecting improper
trades).
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In the context of insider trading, Jesse Fried proposed a pre
trading disclosure rule of this kind for insiders, forcing insiders to dis
close their identity and intended trades shortly before they execute
their trades.282 Pre-trading disclosure of insider trading intentions pro
vides the market with information useful in deciphering the informa
tional content of the trades. Where an insider, for example, makes an
unusually large sell order to the market, the market may infer for ex
ample that the insider has nonpublic material negative information
related to the insider's own company value.
A menu alternative that allowed traded firms to force disclosure
about a large volume outsider trade, including the identity of the
trader, the amount, perhaps the bid or ask price at which the trader
was offering to trade, and the historical performance of the trader
would enable other market participants to decode the information.283
The market reaction to disclosure is then likely to decrease the
trader's ability to benefit from an information advantage. Such traders
will face a far reduced ex ante incentive to engage in information re
search.284 Giving the traded firm the ability to require pretrade disclo
sure of these kinds of decoding information (price, quantity, and iden
tity) provides the traded firm the effective ability to restrict outsiders
from engaging in informed trades. We would also allow traded firms
to require that large volume outsider traders report their motivation
for the trade.285 Disclosure of motive and business purpose has been
required in a variety of other corporate contexts.286 But again, the
282 See Fried, supra note 70, at 348-64. Fried notes that: "Corporate insiders should
not, in principle, be able to consistently outperform public shareholders if public sharehold
ers are given the ability to perform the exact same trades as insiders." Id. at 350.
283. Other market participants, for example, may pay close attention particularly to a
trader with a historical track record of high returns from her trades. See id. at 354-57 (de
scribing how market participants may react to the trading history of an insider trader sub
ject to a pretrading disclosure rule to eliminate the excess returns from insider trading).
284. Where the market is on average correct in its decoding of the trade signal, in
formed traders will not earn superior returns where they are unable to cancel their trade
order. For example, consider Trader X with nonpublic information that Texon is really
worth $80 when the market values Texon at $50. Trader X may then attempt to initiate a
large purchase order for a certain amount of shares at the market price. The market may
then either overreact, raising the price to $90 per share or under-react, raising the price to
$70 per share. On an expected basis, to the extent Trader X cannot reverse its trade request,
Trader X will expect to purchase the shares at $80 per share. As an alternative, regulators
may allow traders to cancel their trade order after revealing their identity and intentions.
Under such a situation, regulators may impose a monetary fine on Trader X to reduce the
possibility of Trader X gaining superior returns. See, e.g., Fried, supra note 70, at 351.
285. It is controversial whether such requirements induce effective disclosure of mate
rial information or whether they are merely an invitation for nuisance litigation. We are
agnostic as to whether firms would find it useful to require this more far-reaching disclosure
as a prerequisite for large volume trading.
286. For example, the Williams Act requires the owner of more than five percent of a
class of a firm's equity securities to make a Schedule 130 filing with the SEC containing
information disclosure required under Section 13( d) of the Williams Act and the SEC's own

396

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 101:313

traded firm internalizes the primary costs of adopting an overly broad
restriction that chills its shareholders' liquidity and it, instead of us or
the SEC, is best placed to make this decision.
Presently in the public capital markets, an investor seeking to
transact in securities may do so in one of several ways. Investors exe
cute either sell or buy transactions through the submission of a market
order or a limit order with their broker. Investors typically submit a
market order through a broker, agreeing to transact at the prevailing
market price. Brokers handling the order then come under a duty to
ensure that the investors' orders are executed at the best possible
price.287 Investors who place a limit order, on the other hand, specify a
fixed quantity of shares that they are willing to either purchase or sell
at a set price.288 Certain larger market participants may function as
market makers, holding out simultaneous bid and offer limit prices to
the market. Other more sophisticated market participants may seek to
negotiate directly with one another, bypassing market makers and
possibly obtaining a price in between the national best bid and offer
prices.289
rules and regulations. See Williams Act § 13(d)(1), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l) (2000).
Among the required disclosure items include the identity of the owner, the source and
amount of the funds used to make the purchase, and any plans the owner may have to liqui
date, merge, or make a major change to the corporation if the purpose of the owner is to
acquire control. See id. Corporations that seek to merge as well as an acquirer engaged in a
tender offer must make a premerger notification to the Justice Department See supra note
189.
287. Broker's are under a duty of best execution. Although the SEC lacks a formal rule
relating to the duty of best execution, various sources of law provide support for the duty.
The National Association of Securities Dealers Regulation Inc., for example, has also es
tablished interpretive guidance on the duty for its member brokers. Article Ill, Section 1 of
the NASO Rules of Fair Practice provides that member brokers and associated persons
must "use reasonable diligence to ascertain the best inter-dealer market for the subject se
curity and buy or sell in such market so that the resultant price to the customer is as favor
able as possible under prevailing market conditions." NASO Manual (CCH), Rule 2320(a);
see also NYSE Rule 123A, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) P 2123A.41, at 2748 (adopted June 19,
1969); AMEX Rule 156(a), 2 Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) P 9296, at 2467-3 (adopted May
13, 1965). The SEC's position traditionally has been to treat brokers that execute transac
tions at the national best bid or offer price quoted on NASDAQ as meeting their duty of
best execution. See, e.g., DIVISION OF MARKET REGULATION, MARKET 2000: AN
EXAMINATION OF CURRENT EQUITY MARKET DEVELOPMENTS (Jan. 1990). Nevertheless,
the emergence of electronic communications networks ("ECN") offering potentially better
prices for investors has led the SEC to require brokers, under certain circumstances, to also
consider the ECN's bid and offer prices. See, e.g., Order Execution Obligations, Exchange
Act Release. No. 34-37619 (Aug. 29, 1996).
288. See Request for Comment on Issues Relating to Market Fragmentation, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-42450, 71 SEC Docket 1702, at 1707 (Feb. 23, 2000); see also About
NASDAQ, at http://www.nasdaq.com/about/about_nasdaq_Iong.stm (describing various
methods of executing a trade on NASDAQ) (last visited Oct. 17, 2002).
289. Institutional investors may use NASDAQ's Selectnet system, for example, to
communicate with one another and negotiate a trade at a price in between the national best
bid and offer prices. For information on Selectnet, see About Nasdaq, at
http://www.nasdaq.com/about/about_nasdaq_long.stm (describing the Selectnet system)
(last visited Oct. 17, 2002).
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The menu would also allow the traded firm to choose the length of
the trading delay. Consider a one-hour delayed-trading rule.290 Under
the one-hour delay, all traders must publicly announce the terms of
prospective trade orders one hour before executing the order.291 In the
case of a limit order, the traders must also announce the limit price
they plan to establish.292 Predictably, the delayed-trading rule would
then have adverse consequences on investors seeking to trade securi
ties. Under the delayed-trading rule, investors seeking to engage in a
market order trade face a delay of one hour from the time they make
their pretrade announcement to the time when their market order
would be allowed to execute in the market. Investors seeking to en
gage in a limit order trade face even larger risks. Such investors bear
not only the risk that the market may move against them during the
one hour period but also are required to use only the announced
pretrade limit price.
The cost of the delayed-trading rule, nonetheless, is greater for
traders seeking to trade on an information advantage. Whether sub
mitting a market or limit order, investors with an information advan
tage run the risk that their advantage may dissipate during the one
hour delay. Indeed, for larger volume trades, the investors' own
pretrade announcements may trigger a market price reaction.293 Inves
tors seeking to make a negotiated transaction between the national
best bid-offer price typically trade in larger volumes than retail inves
tors. The forced pretrade disclosure rule would then result in a corre-

290. The choice of a one-hour delay is completely arbitr11ry. In the context of an insider
pretrading rule, Jesse Fried provides a discussion of the relative merits of different length
delays. See Fried, supra note 70, at 386-90.
291. Disclosure, of course, must occur in a manner designed to reduce the trader's in
formation advantage to be effective. The effectiveness of disclosure, in turn, may be meas
ured along at least two dimensions - the type of information and the manner of disclosure.
Along each dimension, in turn, a variety of possibilities exist. Rather than specify any par
ticular method, regulators may simply provide companies a menu from which to select vari
ous effective disclosure mechanisms. For example, one choice might be to have traders dis
close the amount and price of their intended trades and then route this information to a
centralized information source, including either a national securities exchange or the sec
tion. In the alternative, a company could have information on trades routed to itself.
292. Regulators may then either force traders to commit to their announced trade or
allow traders to withdraw their order prior to the end of the one-hour delay. Where traders
may withdraw their orders, regulators should deny traders the ability to make simultaneous
bid and offer quotes. Without such a limitation, investors would be able to mask their trad
ing intentions. For example, an investor seeking to sell a large volume of securities could
simply submit simultaneous purchase and sell orders. Then at the end of the hour, the inves
tor could withdraw the purchase order, allowing the sell order to execute in the market.
293. Market participants may have some problems decoding the informational content
of an announced outsider trade. Nevertheless, given information on the identity, timing, and
potential bid or ask price of a trade, market participants should have the ability to decipher
significant information from larger block trades. See Alan Kraus & Hans R. Stoll, Price Im
pacts ofBlock Trading on the New York Stock Exchange, 27 J. FIN. 569, 574-78 (1972) (re
porting strong price movements in the day following large block trades).
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spondingly larger market reaction against the interests of the investors
initiating such a negotiated transaction.
Liquidity traders, in comparison, face fewer costs from the de
layed-trading rule. On the one hand, the market price may move
against the investor; on the other hand, the market price may move in
the investor's favor. On average, the liquidity trader will receive the
same amount with or without a delay rule in place. Liquidity traders
of course face the cost of delaying for one hour. For investors who
need cash immediately, such costs may be non-negligible. Risk-averse
liquidity traders also bear additional risk from the delayed-trading
rule. To the extent that price movements during the one-hour delay
are random, however, a diversified liquidity trader seeking to sell a
portion of her entire portfolio will face only a minimal risk during the
delay.
Moreover, the opt-out menu would give the traded firm the option
of exempting small traders from delayed-trading concerns. To the ex
tent most smaller investors lack any appreciable information advan
tage, the delayed-trading rule may be tailored to focus specifically on
investors where the risk of informed trading is highest. Investors with
a strong information advantage, in particular, typically seek to profit
by trading large volumes of securities. The extent of an investor's
profit from an information advantage is directly proportional to the
amount of securities traded based on the information. We imagine
that most firms would only require that firms be subject to trading a
substantial number of shares in a short time period to be subject to the
delayed-trading restriction.294 Trades under 10,000 shares in volume,
for example, are likely to be exempt under the restrictions adopted by
traded firms, leaving the vast bulk of uniformed, liquidity trades unaf
fected.295 Firms with different average daily trading volumes and
varying types of investors (including liquidity traders with a large need
to trade immediately), of course, could adjust (within perhaps a range
of set menu options) the non-delayed-trading volume ceiling. On the
other hand, some traded firms may wish to block even traders engag
ing in small volume trades. To the extent many small-volume investors
trade based on noise and not material information, increasing trading

294. Note that in 1998, block trades - defined as trades over 10,000 shares - ac
counted for 48.7 percent of the New York Stock Exchange's reported volume. See N.Y.
STOCK EXCHANGE, FACT BOOK FOR THE YEAR 1 998, at 16, 93 (1999).
295. See Judith Burns, Deals & Deal Makers: Nasdaq's Conversion to Quoting Stocks In
Decimals May Cost Up to $130 Million, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2000, at C16 (reporting that
the average transaction volume on NASDAQ is only 625 shares). Although relatively small
in number, large block trades account for a significant fraction of the total volume of securi
ties trades. See Greg Ip, Individuals' Role in Stock Market Grows As the Influence of Insti
tutions Declines, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 1998, at Cl (noting that block trades involving
1 0,000 or more shares accounted for just under 49% of the trade volume in the New York
Stock Exchange for 1998).
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barriers for the investors may actually result in an increase in overall
securities price accuracy while also reducing expenditures undertaken
as part of such noise trading.296
The ability of the delayed-trading rule to siphon profits from in
formed investors depends on other active investors in the market in
terpreting and using pretrade disclosures to execute trades ahead of
the disclosing party. To the extent no single investor chooses to pur
chase the right to engage in immediate trades, however, an informed
investor may nevertheless benefit from its information advantage
through even delayed trades. Nevertheless, where even one investor
chooses to purchase the right to engage in non-delayed trades, an in
formed investor's ability to benefit ·from delayed informed trades is
much reduced. In the case where an outsider trader has purchased the
right to engage in immediate trades and also engages in information
research, the outsider trader will be able to profit fully from her in
formation advantage before the first trades of other informed traders
(without the right) even reach the market due to the trading delay.
The presence of an outsider trader with the right to engage in imme
diate trades crowds out the ability of delayed traders from gaining a
profit due to their information advantage.
The delayed-trading rule may nevertheless fail to block the ability
of informed investors to profit where the traders obtain their informa
tion from an exclusive source of information. Particular investors, for
example, may enjoy a specialized ability to value companies. Warren
Buffett enjoys a well-deserved reputation for finding undervalued
companies.297 Because no other investor has the same information that
Buffett generates, no direct competing investors exist to step in front
of Buffett to take all the trading profits. On the other hand, to the ex
tent such unique investors are well known and the trade is large
enough in size, the market price may nevertheless react to the
pretrade announcement of their intended transactions.298
The delayed-trading rule may also hinder market makers from
either taking order flow or revealing their intentions to trade. Market
makers on NASDAQ, for example, presently submit simultaneous bid
and offer prices. Traders may then use NASDAQ's network to view
the range of different bid and offer prices as well as desired share
amount across all market makers and alternative trading systems con-

296. So-called noise traders may cause large deviations of market prices from the fun
damental value of a security and thereby increase market risk. See J. Bradford De Long et
al., Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J. POL. ECON. 703, 703 (1990) ("The unpre
dictability of noise traders' beliefs creates a risk in the price of the asset that deters rational
arbitrageurs from aggressively betting against them.").
297. See supra note 52 (citing newspaper reports lauding Warren Buffett).
298. See supra note 293 (citing evidence that large block trades result in significant
stock market price movements).
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nected to NASDAQ.299 Because market makers are frequently buying
and purchasing securities, they will run into the limits imposed
through the delayed-trading rule. At the very least, the risks imposed
through the one-hour delay will result in larger bid-ask spreads, to the
detriment of all investors trading in the traded firm's stock.300
The drop in liquidity of the traded firm from a restrictive informa
tion research policy, however, is also internalized within the traded
firm.301 Investors who expect a relatively illiquid market will demand a
higher discount when they initially purchase their shares for the addi
tional delay in their ability to sell shares. Working backwards, inves
tors purchasing shares initially from an issuer will demand a similarly
large discount for the illiquidity risk. The traded firm (taking into ac
count the other impacts from information research) therefore will
have an incentive to adopt an information research policy that maxi
mizes the liquidity of the secondary market for its securities.302 Regu
lators may assist traded companies in dealing specifically with market
makers through a program to register such market makers, including
all parties that are in the business of continuously providing simulta
neous bid and ask quotations.303 We imagine that traded firms would
ubiquitously exempt identified market makers from the delayed
trading restriction.
Lastly, the SEC may allow for a number of different sanctions
provided through a menu of opt out alternatives that penalize outsider
traders that fail to follow a firm's given informed trading restrictions.
We can imagine giving the traded firm the option of specifying
whether informed trading violations create a private right of action for
the traded firm or its shareholders. The menu might also give traded
firms the ability to grant the SEC the authority to investigate and to
299. For example, using the Nasdaq Workstation II software, investors may query of
Market Maker quotations, enter orders and trade reports through their computer terminals.
For a description of the Nasdaq Workstation II, see http:/lwww.nasdaqtrader.com (last vis
ited July 14, 2001).
300. See Macey & Kanda, supra note 223, at 1012-14 (discussing the value of liquidity
to investors).
301. See Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, A New Approach to the Regulation of
Trading Across Securities Markets, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev: 1411 (1996) (arguing that issuers in
ternalize the benefits of increased liquidity for their own investors and therefore proposing
to give issuers the exclusive ability to control the location where their trades will take
place).
302. Texon, nevertheless, may ignore externalities that result from allowing informed
outsider trading. We, nevertheless, make the argument in Section IV.A.1 that the magni
tude of such externalities is small.
303. For example, the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASO") already
provides for a system to register market makers in securities that trade on NASDAQ. See
NASO Manual (CCH), Rule 4611 (providing that information on quotations and quote
sizes may be transmitted through NASDAQ only by a NASO "member registered as a
NASDAQ market maker or other entity approved by (NASO] to function in a market
making capacity").
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bring civil or criminal action against violators of informed trading re
strictions (with sanctions up to the same level available for insider
trading violations).304 Of course, it at first seems unusual to allow a
private firm to decide the ambit of the criminal law.305 But the misap
propriation doctrine does just this with regard to a source's ability to
criminalize informed trading by its agents. The SEC rp.ight charge a
traded firm fees to cover the government's marginal (expected) cost of
enforcement ..-- so as to force the traded firms to internalize the full
costs of exercising their property right.306
4.

Summary

Internalization brings the possibility that the market may work to
determine the optimal level of information research with respect to
outsider trading. Henry Manne's insight with respect to insider trading
in combination with this Article's proposal allows for a laissez faire
approach to outsider trading. Shifting the property right to engage in
informed trades to the traded firm permits the implementation of rela
tively low-cost transactions with potential informed traders. The re
duction in transaction costs, in turn, allows for Coasean bargains
among the informed traders and the traded firm. To the extent most
of the costs and benefits from informed trading are internalized, the
bargains struck will approximate the first-best information research
outcome.
Internalized outsider trading, in fact, may prove a more fruitful
area for self-regulation than insider trading. Unlike insider trading, in
ternalization involving outsider trading is relatively free of the prob
lem of opportunism. Although the traded firm may directly internalize
·

304. In addition to possible criminal fines and imprisonment as well as civil injunctive
relief and the disgorgement of profits, insiders may also face heightened civil penalties for
insider trading. In 1984, Congress enacted the Insider Trading Sanctions Act, providing for
a possible civil penalty for insider trading up to "three times the profit gained or loss
avoided" from the insider trading. Pub. L. No. 98-376 § 2, 98 Stat. 1264, 1264 (1984) (codi
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(A) (Supp. III 1985)). Insiders must pay the penalty directly to
the Treasury of the United States. See id. In 1988, Congress enacted the Insider Trading and
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988), giv
ing the SEC the power to seek civil penalties of up to $1 million and increasing criminal
fines to $1 million as well as prison time for insider trading to 10 years from 5 years. See id.
The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act also established a bounty sys
tem that gives up to 10% of the assessed penalty to informants. See id. See generally LARRY
E. RIBSTEIN & PETER v. LETSOU, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS § 13.08, at 994 {3d ed. 1996)
(summarizing the provisions of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act).
305. One of us, nevertheless, has made the argument that firms should have a limited
ability to self-tailor the regulatory regime surrounding its securities. See Choi, supra note
259, at 951-58
306. However, we should keep in mind that we do not generally charge fees for pro
tecting other property rights and to do so would often be deemed to produce an inefficient
distortion in the creation of property.
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many of the impacts from insider trading, insiders may force the
traded firm to allow insider trading even when against the best inter
ests of the traded firm's shareholders. Insiders at the traded firm, on
the other hand, have fewer incentives to make decisions opportunisti
cally regarding outsider trading. Whereas insider trading directly in
creases the wealth of insiders, informed outsider trading only gener
ates increased fees for the traded firm directly. Without some side
payment from the outsider trader to management, insiders will have
no different incentive with respect to outsider traders than with any
decision that may increase the traded firm's overall profits.307
C.

Implementation Problems

Several possible implementation problems exist with the Article's
internalization proposal. First, the ability of companies to commit to a
particular informed trading policy is important to implementation. In
deciding how much to pay initially for a traded firm's securities, inves
tors will take into account the number of informed trades that will oc
cur in secondary market trading. Where the traded firm may later
change its information research policy, investors will fear that the
traded firm may not act in their best interest.308 Investors, for example,
may desire an all-may-research policy. As a result, the traded firm
may adopt such a policy. After the initial sale of securities, the traded
firm may then change it� policy, selling the right to engage in informed
trades for a high price to a limited number of investors. Investors fear
ful of a subsequent policy shift will demand a higher discount at the
time of the initial offering. The traded firm then benefits from com
mitting to a particular information research policy.
Regulators, in turn, may assist companies in committing to a par
ticular information policy. Some companies, for example, may wish to
adopt a particular information policy and then "freeze" the policy.
Part of the opt out procedures should also allow traded firms to com
mit to various degrees of constraints on the ability of future amend
ments to the information policy. Traded firms might make a particular
policy subject to amendments only based on a super majority vote of
shareholders and/or the board or impose a large monetary penalty for
regime changes. Again, firms are well placed to decide whether re
taining the flexibility of adjusting their informational policy in the fu
ture is to their benefit. A traded firm has good incentives to select a
procedural mechanism that balances both the value of flexibility
307. We discuss the problem of managerial self-dealing in the context of outsider trad
ing supra Section IV.A.2.
308. Cf Gordon, supra note 182, at 1573 (arguing that "[o]pportunistic amendment is
possible because the corporate contract is inevitably incomplete. The parties cannot specify
terms to cover even plausible contingencies").
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against the need of shareholders to protect against future managerial
opportunism.
Second, not all market participants that engage in information re
search do so to engage directly in trades. Analysts, for example, may
conduct research to generate information for resale to a large number
of investors. To the extent a traded firm opts for a minimum trade
threshold before the delayed-trading rule takes effect, analysts may
still benefit from the sale of information to small volume investors.
Regulators, nevertheless, may prohibit the sale of information relating
to a specific company on the part of analysts. Alternatively, regulators
may allow traded firms to determine whether to allow specific analysts
to sell information to others, allowing the traded firm to charge a fee
for such a privilege.
Third, even an investor who otherwise would engage in informa
tion research and then engage in large volume trades may potentially
avoid the delayed trade rule through a series of smaller trades. In
deed, large block traders already have an incentive to hide their trad
ing intention through smaller trades to avoid a negative market reac
tion that may increase the cost of their trade. Regulators,
nevertheless, may respond to the risk of partitioned trades in a num
ber of ways. To the extent the minimum trade threshold for the de
layed-trading rule is sufficiently low, large block traders may simply
find it infeasible to partition their trades into small enough lots to sat
isfy the requirement. To the extent the minimum trade threshold is set
at 10,000 shares, a block trader seeking to sell one million shares, for
example, will have to submit 100 separate offers to sell through differ
ent identities in an attempt to avoid detection.309 The large number of
separate 10,000 share offers makes it unlikely that the trader will suc
ceed at hiding its trades from either the market or regulators. Regula
tors may also install rules designed to allow market participants and
regulators to trace quickly the true transacting parties.310 Such rules, in
turn, will limit the ability of an investor hiding their identities and
trades through "front" investors.
Finally, certain sources of information relevant to the valuation of
a traded company's securities may not seek to negotiate for the right

309. Alternatively, investors seeking to engage in a large block trade may go offshore
to escape the delayed-trading rule. See Aniihud & Mendelson, supra note 301, at 1438
(stating that "{i]nvestors who want to hide information will execute their block trades in
markets with lenient reporting requirements, free riding on those who trade in an exchange
that provides prompt trade reports. The order flow into the market that enforces trade re
porting rules may also decline, further reducing liquidity."). The cost of such block trades,
however, are borne at least initially by uninformed investors in the offshore markets and
not investors within the United States.
310. Here again the SEC could assist through the establishment of a centralized data
base interfaced with the databases of broker-dealers to trace the ownership of securities
held in street name.
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to engage in informed trades even where such trades are profitable.
Nevertheless, such circumstances are often not problematic because
most sources that choose not to negotiate will not be directly con
cerned with trading profits. Put another way, many sources will gener
ate information even without the possibility of trading profits and will
continue to do so even if they do not bid to engage in informed trad
ing.311 For example, government regulators, newspapers, and competi
tors of a traded company all may generate specific information rele
vant to the traded company's securities pricing even without the
prospect of trades in the securities. Instead, mainly securities markets
professionals - who expend resources collecting information from
many different sources and analyzing the information - might alter
their information research activities based on their ability to trade
upon such information.
V.

CONCLUSION

The securities laws of the United States make regulatory distinc
tions based on the source of an information advantage and the pres
ence of a fiduciary duty. Insiders that trade based on nonpublic mate
rial information obtained from the traded firm, for example, face
classical insider trading prohibitions. Even outsider traders that obtain
their information through a breach of fiduciary duty may face poten
tial liability under the misappropriation theory of insider trading. Rule
14e-3 restricts the ability of outside investors to trade based on tender
offer-related information. Regulation FD, similarly, prohibits firms
from providing nonpublic, material information to outsiders selec
tively. Aside from such prohibitions, however, the securities laws pro
vide no limitations on information research, implicitly giving outsider
traders a right to engage in informed trades.312
Despite the present laws' focus on the source of information, this
Article has argued that any form of informational disparity in the
capital markets can be usefully assessed from a common informational
effects framework. If regulators were the final arbiters of whether par
ticular classes of informed trading are to be permitted, the framework
could very well provide justification for some of the present prohibi
tions against the use of information in securities transactions. For ex
ample, insider trading by employees may result in a net social loss in
many instances. The framework may also demonstrate that outsider
trading is beneficial for investors in many circumstances. Regulators

311. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing "non-trading" information).
312. But see supra note 101 (describing other more specific limitations to outsider
trading).
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might apply the framework's normative analysis directly to determine
what information advantages to allow in the market.
The Article, nevertheless, takes a different approach. Rather than
recommend particular divisions between allowable and prohibited in
formation advantages, the Article argues that regulators should in
stead focus on enabling the market to make such determinations. In
particular, regulators may help the traded firm internalize the various
effects of an information advantage. Granting the traded firm a right
to control outsider informed trades in the traded firm's own securities
allows the traded firm to indirectly control information research re
lated to its securities. Regulators may then establish low-cost mecha
nisms for investors to negotiate with the traded firm to purchase the
right to engage in informed trades. When both the informed trader
and the traded firm believe that informed trading will be privately
beneficial, there are strong reasons to believe that the informed trad
ing will promote social welfare more generally.
Internalization via such contracts, of course, is not perfect. Others
have identified possible externalities that internalization may fail to
capture. For example, under the Article's internalization system, the
traded firm may ignore the external benefit information research has
for the overall cost of research at other companies. But many of these
residual externalities are·only small in magnitude or could be captured
more efficiently by mandating disclosure by the traded firm itself.
Moreover, there are many classes of informed outsider trading that
predictably produce minor and ephemeral external benefits, such as
frontrunning information that would be shortly disclosed to the mar
ket in the absence of outsider trading. Traded firms should at least be
given the right to curtail such frontrunning. And no one who supports
Rule 14e-3 can take the position that the external benefits of informed
outsider trading always outweigh its costs. No one system will achieve
the first-best level of securities research where external effects exist.
The Article's internalization system (with appropriate limits on traded
firms' control to account for potential third-party benefits), neverthe
less, achieves a very close second best, taking into account the major
ity of impacts from informational research.
Henry Manne long ago realized that employment contracts al
lowed firms to internalize the costs and benefits of their employees'
informed trading, but failed to see from this internalization perspec
tive that outsider trading (by, say, stock analysts or rival firms) was
more problematic. Because informed trading by outsiders does not
currently need to garner the consent of the traded firm, we should be
less confident that it enhances social welfare. From an internalization
perspective, the current regulatory emphasis on insider as opposed to
outsider trading gets it exactly backward. Manne, as a noted libertar-
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ian,313 may have shied away from raising this point for fear that regula
tors would ham-fistedly prohibit large classes of outsider trading. But
we have shown that a concern with the efficiency of outsider trading
does not necessitate a restriction on freedom of contract. Our pro
posed system of allowing traded firms to restrict informed trading in
their shares is still a laissez faire regime, but one which has reassigned
from the outside source to the traded firm an alienable right to control
whether informed trading takes place.
Several variants of the precise right that traded firms may allocate
to parties to engage in informed trading are possible. At the very least,
we have argued that traded firms should have the ability to expand
the scope of Rule 14e-3 blanket trading prohibitions to include other
classes of information in addition to tender offer related news (with
the possible exception of negative manager-related information). Un
der this minimalist proposal, the traded firm could adopt an across
the-board Rule 14e-3-like prohibition against informed trading on the
basis of nonpublic patent information, but would be prohibited from
selectively selling rights to trade on the basis of such information. If
compared to the current regime, this proposal should be deeply attrac
tive to a variety of academics. Libertarians will be hard put to criticize
a proposal that grants more contractual liberty to traded firms, and
left-leaning thinkers should embrace potentially broader restrictions
on informed trading. Cast in terms of the efficient capital markets hy
pothesis, we can now see that allowing outsider traders to push a par
ticular firm's stock toward "strong form" efficiency - where even
nonpublic. information is impacted into the current stock price - may
be both socially inefficient and expose the traded firm shareholders to
uncompensated costs.314 A traded firm should (and would under our
minimalist proposal) have the right to decide that it wishes its stock to
be efficient in only the "semistrong form" sense, so that only public
information would be impacted into its stock price.315
A more ambitious version of our internalization proposal - which
would allow the traded firm to alienate selectively its informed out
sider trading rights - is likely to be more controversial. Once the
beneficial effects of giving traded firms control over the scope of Rule
14e-3 are recognized, regulators may wish to consider a further expan
sion to allowing traded firms the ability to allocate the right to engage
in informed trading selectively among outsider traders based on the
identity of the trader. Some liberals would cringe at the prospect that
313. For example, in a profile of Henry Manne, the Washington Times reported under
the heading "self-portrait" that Manne was "[l]ibertarian, independent, intellectual."
WASH. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1994, at C15.
314. See supra note 18 (defining the strong form of the efficient markets hypothesis).
315. See supra note 18 (defining the semistrong form of the efficient markets hypothe
sis).
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outsiders would be able to purchase the right to take advantage of the
uninformed side of the market. But advantage taking exists today without the traded firm either consenting to or being compensated for
the informed trading.
Moving outward along a continuum of choice (and controversy),
regulators may finally consider giving traded firms the right to reduce
the current scope of informed trading restrictions - e.g., limiting the
reach of insider trading liability for a traded firm's own managers. The
heightened possibility of managerial self-dealing, nevertheless, may
caution regulators against such an expansion of choice with respect to
insider trading in a way not applicable to outsider trading where
managerial self-dealing is not as great a risk. Many people will not
want to ride on the internalization train this far, but they should at
least be willing to begin the journey.
In an analogous debate in the context of takeover law, Frank
Easterbrook and Dan Fischel put forth the argument that during a
tender offer, the management of a target firm should remain passive,
not mounting any defensive tactics to block their shareholders from
accepting the tender offer. Passivity would prevent managers from,
among other things, assisting other outside bidders attempting to free
ride on the informational investments of the initial tender offeror.316
Their passivity thesis is in fact quite comparable to the so called
"property rights" rationale for laissez faire outsider trading. Both
theories attempt to preserve the incentives for outsiders to deliber
ately acquire outside information. However, Haddock, Macey, and
McChesney's ("HMM's") "passivity killer" article in the Virginia Law
Review317 demolished the passivity thesis (in a way that quickly caused
Easterbrook and Fischel to recant).318 HMM showed that giving the
target board the ability to resist a hostile tender offer may increase the
welfare of the target company's shareholders along a number of di
mensions. The ability to resist gives the target company more bar
gaining power and thereby a share of the takeover surplus, giving tar
get firms themselves a greater ex ante incentive to search for value
increasing business combinations.319 Resistance may also give manag
ers the needed reassurance to engage in firm-specific investments in
human capital.320
316. See Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Manage
ment in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1 161, 1175-77 (1981).
317. See David D. Haddock et al., Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender
Offers, 73 VA. L. REV. 701 (1987).
318. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 174 (1991} (accepting HMM's position that tender offer
passivity should not be an immutable rule but rather a contractual default}.
319. See Haddock et al., supra note �17, at 709.
320. See id. at 712-17.
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Just as HMM demonstrated that the target companies (literally the
traded firms in a tender offer) should have the alienable right to re
strict hostile takeover activity (comparable to outsider trading), we
have argued that traded firms should have the alienable right to re
strict informed outsider trading in their firms. Indeed, our internaliza
tion argument is more straightforward than either Manne's powerful
insider trading argument or HMM's forceful takeover argument be
cause concerns with managerial self-dealing and entrenchment are
much more attenuated with regard to the traded firm's decision to re
strict or sell outsider trading rights (than with regard to a traded firm's
decision to restrict or sell insider trading or takeover rights).
Viewed more generally, the Article's proposed internalization sys
tem represents a new approach to securities regulation. Market fail
ures may certainly exist affecting all types of securities transactions.
Up to now, the standard response to market failures has been one of
mandatory regulation.321 Internalization, however, provides regulators
another option. Instead of determining from above how a market
should operate, regulators should strive to connect parties through
contract that otherwise would fail to negotiate with one another. Once
connected, internalization will produce regulatory protections far
more tailored to the needs of market participants than mandatory
regulation from above.

321. For an example of this standard approach, see Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities
Disclosure, supra note 171 (arguing that externalities and the possibility of manager oppor
tunism requires the imposition of mandatory securities disclosure).

